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Agriculture and food policy has been subject to extensive changes since the early 1990s. This 
study focus on Norwegian and German interest groups representing agriculture, food industry, 
and veterinarians, more precisely, their strategies for exerting influence on agriculture- and 
food policy decision-making. The basic question is whether changes in opportunity structures, 
first and foremost the ascending delegation of policy making authority to the EU level, also 
lead to changes in interest groups’ strategic dispositions toward decision-makers.  
The master’s thesis is grounded on a qualitative multiple case study analysis, which in turn 
implies that research on the Norwegian and German network of interest groups has been 
conducted individually, and not by means of a traditional comparative design. The choice of 
design reflects the recognition of the apparent differences between the two countries, e.g. in 
terms of size. However, common, and diverse, features between the two systems nonetheless 
contribute to the selection of the two. First and foremost, state-society relations in Norway 
and Germany have traditionally been characterized by corporatism. In both countries, strong 
agricultural interest groups have enjoyed special access to domestic governing institutions. On 
the other hand, one apparent difference between the two is the formal attachment to the EU, 
with Germany being a full EU member, and Norway being attached by means of the EEA-
agreement. Nevertheless, both countries, and consequently interest groups, are being affected 
by policy making processes at EU level.  
The analysis is mainly grounded on data collected from semi-structured interviews with key 
informants from German and Norwegian interest groups, and, moreover, diplomats. What 
first is clarified is how interest groups operate in order to exert influence on processes. 
Emphasis is especially placed on their selection of influence channel(s), i.e. national 
government, European Associations, EU institutions. In order to explain why these activities 
are chosen, a liberal intergovernmentalism approach emphasizing the decisive position of the 
national state, and a historical institutionalism approach emphasizing the impact of critical 
junctures and increasing returns, are applied. Moreover, a multi-level governance perspective 
is included in the thesis. It is to be employed as an alternative approximation of framework 
conditions, i.e. structure in which interest groups operate, in order to assess whether findings 
in the analysis correspond to an LI or MLG description of interest group channelization of 
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The EU’s institutional framework for agricultural and food policy has been subject to 
extensive reform since the late 1980s, early 1990s. Price level support systems for farmers 
have been replaced by the income support systems of the Single Payment Scheme (SPS). 
Furthermore, the EU has acquired considerable competence in terms of decision making on 
food policy. What merely used to be an ad hoc approach, now amount to institutions and 
extensive legislation (Nugent 2010: 361, Lie and Veggeland 2010: 78). This study departs 
from the observation that food and agricultural policies at national and EU level have changed 
considerably since 1990. The research question is as follows, 
How do agricultural interest groups in Norway and Germany adapt their activities to 
changing institutional structures at national and EU level? How to explain eventual changes 
in interest groups' strategies toward decision making authorities?  
As indicated in the research question, focus in this thesis is the behaviour of agricultural 
interest groups, in terms of strategic activity. Particular emphasis is put on interest groups' 
selection of channel(s) of influence, whether strategic activities are channelized toward 
national authorities, or alternative channels, such as European associations of interest groups 
and EU institutions. With regard to the selection of cases and inherent observations, German 
and Norwegian agricultural interest groups have been chosen on the basis of an assumption 
that analysis should reveal insight on behavioural patterns by actors from an EFTA-country
1
 
and an EU-country. In other words, the study endeavours to establish greater knowledge of 
eventual differences, or similarities, in Norwegian and German actors' strategic activity 
toward EU policy-making. Moreover, a time perspective from 1990 up till present day is to be 
subjected for analysis. The reason for choosing this perspective is that processes of EU 
agricultural policy reform were initiated at that point of time. Developments in the EU's food 
policy became evident a few years later, in the mid 1990s.   
The relation between agriculture and food policy is perceived of as follows. Food and 
agriculture used to a greater extent to be two separate policy areas. However, political 
developments in the 1990s and 2000s, at both European and national level, contributed to the 
enhanced interconnectedness between the two. One superficial indicator is the amendment of 
                                                 
1
 which is part of the EU's single market by means of the EEA-agreement.  
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the names of agricultural ministries in both Norway and Germany. Both ministries 
incorporated the expression food in the early 2000s. With regard to agricultural policy at EU 
level, more and more policy areas, including food policy, seem to be drawn into the processes 
of its formulation (Nugent 2010: 361). Put in a simplified manner, the CAP could be said to 
be moving from version 1.0 and onwards, with food policy to an increasing extent being 
attached to it.  
Symptomatic of this development is the strengthened emphasis on consumer- and health 
protection (Lie and Veggeland 2010: 68). One implication of which is the enhanced public 
scrutiny on food, and consequently, agricultural policy-making processes. Put face to face 
with these developments, how do domestic interest groups with a direct attachment to farming 
and food production behave? Are efforts in terms of exerting influence on policy-making 
processes first and foremost channelized toward national authorities? Alternatively, are 
changes in policy-making structures reflected by amendments in interest groups' 
channelization of influence too? In other words, is a greater presence at EU level of farm, 
food industry and veterinarian interest groups possible to observe? Moreover, de facto 
selection of channels of influence notwithstanding, how to explain the interest groups' 
strategic behaviour?   
These questions illustrate the approximation of this thesis. In the following, some 
clarifications are to be presented.  
1.1 Clarifications 
1.1.1 Agricultural interest groups 
This thesis adopts a rather broad conception of agricultural interest groups by including 
German and Norwegian interest groups representing farmers, veterinarians and the food 
processing industry. The reason why I choose to do this is to be found in the EU’s integrated 
approach to food policy2, the “from farm to fork” approach, which stipulates that food policy 
legislation is applicable to the whole food production chain. Hence, the inclusion of farm, 
food industry and veterinary interests in order to cover a more extensive share of the 
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 EU’s Food Law, adopted on 28th of January 2002, confirms the so called “from farm/fjord to fork” principle, 
implying that food policy regulations apply to actors across the whole production chain (Lie and Veggeland 
2010: 70).  
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production chain. The ideal option of course would be to include all segments within the food 
production chain. However, in order to secure a realistic scope of analysis, one that was 
possible to undertake within a limited time perspective, the retail segment was left out. 
Moreover, it ought to be emphasised that when elaborating on institutions, my focus is the 
national authorities employed with the policy areas already highlighted, and the EU 
institutions which have the CAP and Food Policy within their portfolio of responsibilities. 
Interest groups are the units which are to be analyzed in this essay. As noted by Eising (2008: 
5), with regard to definitions, researchers on interest groups have not managed to agree on a 
common understanding. According to Eising (2008: 5) this apparent lack of clarity comes 'as 
a consequence of the variance within interest group systems'. The understanding presented 
below is borrowed from Beyers, Eising and Maloney (2008: 1106), and arguably 'remains the 
most commonly used neologism
3
 [...]'.  
The three scholars’ conception is grounded on three factors or qualities attached to actors 
conceived of as interest groups. The first of which is organization which refers to the nature 
of the group. In contrast to broad movements and waves of public opinion, which every now 
and then influence political outcomes, 'interest group politics concern aggregated 
individuals’ and/or organized forms of political behavior' (Beyers et al 2008: 1106). The 
second factor, political interest, 'refers to the attempts these organizations make to influence 
policy outcomes' (ibid.). This aspect arguably comes close to what is being denoted political 
advocacy, encompassing 'all efforts to push public policy in a specific direction on the behalf 
of constituencies or a general political idea' (ibid.). Beyers, Eising and Maloney’s (2008: 
1106) third factor is informality. By including this aspect Beyers et al emphasizes that 
'interest groups do not normally seek public office or compete in elections' (ibid.). They are 
rather expected to 'pursue their goals through frequent informal interactions with politicians 
and bureaucrats' (ibid.). One the other hand, one should 'not rule out that important facets of 
state–group relations in capitalist democracies can be heavily institutionalized' (Beyers et al 
2008: 1107). 
1.1.2 Strategy – the selection of channel(s) of influence 
                                                 
3
 Neologism: a)”A word or phrase which is new to the language; one which is newly coined”, b)”The coining or 
use of new words or phrases” (Oxford English Dictionary 2012). 
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The term strategy can be understood as 'a plan of action designed to achieve a long-term or 
overall aim' (Oxford Dictionaries 2013). A more comprehensive definition is developed by 
Andrews (1997: 52), who describes [Corporate] strategy [as]  
'the pattern of decisions in a company that determines and reveals its objectives, 
purposes, or goals, produces the principal policies and plans for achieving those goals, and 
defines the range of business the company is to pursue, the kind of economic and human 
organization it is or intends to be, and the nature of the economic and noneconomic 
contribution it intends to make to its shareholders, employees, customers and communities'. 
Whereas the definition made by Andrews seems to be rather extensive in capturing a larger 
scope of an organization’s activities, this thesis adopts a rather narrow conception of strategy. 
As the study is to be focused on interest groups’ strategies for exerting influence on policy 
making processes, I choose to apply a concept which understands strategy as the interest 
group’s selection of channel of influence. A measurement of interest groups' de facto 
influence, in terms of achieving influence on policy-making processes, would have been 
difficult to undertake. Successful lobbying appears to be difficult to spot. Where successful 
lobbying occurs, processes tend go on without conflict. Hence, the emphasis on the deliberate 
selection of influence channel(s), in order to avoid the difficulty related to the measurement of 
successful/unsuccessful influence. 
The selection of channel of influence variable represents the dependent variable of this study. 
In accordance with the theoretical approaches applied, three values, i.e. alternatives, stand out 
as most likely to be used by domestic interest groups. Namely the channel toward national 
authorities, i.e. ministries and national agencies, and two European channels. The first of 
which being the European association of interest groups, and the second, direct contact with 
EU institutions, e.g. the Commission and European Parliament. What nevertheless should be 
emphasized is that values are not assumed to be mutually exclusive. On the one hand, one 
could assume that interest groups applied one influence channel exclusively, on the other, 
application of two or more influence channels cannot be ruled out. 
1.2 Previous research 
As indicated in the research question, I intend to direct my attention to eventual changes in 
agricultural interest groups’ influence strategies, possibly triggered by developments at EU 
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level. The approach comes close to the scholarly literature which is being denoted 
Europeanization.  
Although often employed and referred to, Europeanization has yet to be given a precise, 
unitary, definition (Featherstone 2003: 12). According to Radaelli (Featherstone 2003: 17), 
'Europeanization […] consists of processes of (a) construction (b) diffusion and (c) 
institutionalization of formal and informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms, styles, ways 
of doing things, and shared beliefs and norms which are first defined and consolidated in the 
EU policy process and then incorporated in the logic of domestic (national and subnational) 
discourse, political structures, and public policies'.  
Olsen in his elaboration refers to March (1981, referred to in Olsen 2002: 923) who argues 
'that the dynamics of Europeanization can be understood in terms of a limited set of ordinary 
processes of change, well known from other institutionalized systems of governance'. Further 
building on this assumption, Olsen (2002: 923-924) outlines five possible conceptions of what 
is changing, namely Europeanization as  
'changes in external boundaries', 'developing institutions at the European level', 
'central penetration of national systems of governance',  'exporting forms of political 
governance […] beyond the European territory' and as 'a political unification project'.  
With a primary emphasis on processes of change at domestic level, my approach probably 
comes closest to the top-down perspective of Europeanization. Consequently, main focus is 
on the 'domestic adaptation to pressures emanating directly or indirectly from EU 
membership' (Featherstone 2003: 7). However, interest group adaptation at domestic level 
does not necessarily exclude simultaneous alterations at European level. Interest groups' 
presence in Brussels might for instance be strengthened, and the ways of channelizing 
strategic efforts toward EU decision-makers altered. As pointed to by Olsen (2002: 942) 'no 
single dominant and deterministic causal relation' appears to be prevalent. One could 
envisage agricultural interest groups adjusting their influence strategies at both national and 
supranational EU level. As processes of Europeanization tend to be complex, one cannot 
ignore the possibility for both top-down and bottom-up processes to be present.  
This study emphasises the potential impact of developments at EU level on domestic interest 
group behaviour, it thus seems natural to link the approach to existing research on the 
Europeanization of interest groups. Eising's (2007: 168) introduction to core research 
questions illustrates the proximity of the thesis to previous research. Scholars such as Marks 
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and McAdam (1996, referred to in Eising 2007: 168) and Egeberg (2005, referred to in Eising 
2007: 168) emphasise the changes to political opportunity structures to which European 
integration has contributed. The transfer of political decision making competences is 
accentuated to be important because 'political institutions [...] not only "organize some 
conflicts into politics and come conflicts out of it", but also channel how these conflicts are 
being resolved' (Egeberg 2005: 105, referred to in Eising 2007: 168). Other scholars focus on 
the dual strategies of interest groups, by which influence is channelized toward both domestic 
and EU institutions. Research on this topic have been done by scholars such as Kohler-Koch 
(1997, referred to in Eising 2007: 169), Coen (1998 referred to in Eising 2007: 170) and 
Eising (2004, referred to in Eising 2007: 169).  
Finally, the analysis made by Cowles (2001) ought to be highlighted. Cowles (2001: 159) in 
her research emphasises the Europeanization of business-government relationships. She 
points to the traditional strong position of national industry associations vis-à-vis national 
governments in France, Germany and the UK. However, with the introduction of the 
Transatlantic Business Dialogue, 'large companies have moved the locus of EU commercial 
policy lobbying activity from the domestic to the European level' (Cowles 2001: 160-61). It 
should be interesting to observe whether Cowles observations can be applied to agricultural, 
food industry and veterinarian interest groups too.  
1.3 Case selection 
Two cases are to be subjected for in-depth analysis for the purpose of enhancing knowledge 
on the topic chosen for study. The first of which is a system of Norwegian agricultural 
interest groups, the second of which is a system of German agricultural interest groups. The 
reason why I am referring to systems of interest groups is mainly because I intend to 
compensate my small number of cases with multiple observations within each case. For 
further elaboration on the rationale behind the selection of these particular cases, see chapter 
two. However, I find it appropriate to reiterate that the selection is based on the assumption 
that research on German and Norwegian networks could yield insight on the working methods 
of interest groups from EU member states and EFTA member states.  
The interest groups which are to be observed within each network of agricultural interest 
groups are listed below. As indicated by the list, some of the interest groups have been 
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selected on the basis of their participation in European associations of interests groups, the so-
called "Euro-groups". 
Segment  Norway Germany Euro-group 
Farmers  Norwegian 
Farmers' Union 











and Drink Industry 
Forschungskreis der 
Ernährungsindustrie (FEI), 
Gemeinschaft zur Förderung der 
privaten deutschen Pflanzenzüchtung 
(GFP) 







Bundesverband der Deutschen 
Süβwarenindustrie (BDSI)  





1.4 Empirical background 
In the following, the empirical context of the study is to be introduced. Due to the extensive 
focus on European level developments in the thesis, emphasis in this introductory chapter is 
confined to agriculture and food policy systems at EU level. Presentations of domestic 
developments are to be found in chapter three. What should be noticed is the impression of 
two policy fields in continuous development. This however should not be interpreted as if 
development within the agricultural- and food policy sector is unique when compared to 
general development trends in the EU system. The bearing in mind of developmental trends in 
the political systems is nevertheless important because it touches upon an essential point in 
this essay; whether developments in policy-making institutions are reflected by developments 
in domestic interest groups' strategic activities too.  
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1.4.1 The European Union 
While simultaneously recognizing the importance of subsequent treaty revisions it might be 
argued that the basic framework of the European Union has existed in its present form since 
the European Council summit in Maastricht, December 1991 (Phinnemore 2007: 33). At the 
summit, European leaders agreed on the Treaty on European Union4, which formalized the 
merger of the three, previously separate, European Communities5 into one out of three pillars6 
of the European Union (Nugent 2010: 28). The Treaty on European Union (TEU) 
simultaneously reaffirmed the institutional structure(s) of the European Communities. The 
first pillar, the European Community, consequently should be governed by four institutions; 
the Council of Ministers, the Commission, the European Parliament and the European Court 
of Justice (Nugent 2010). According to the EU’s founding treaties7 the Commission is 
responsible for policy propositions, the Council for decisions and the Court of Justice for 
interpretations of decisions into Community Law. However, succeeding treaty revisions8 have 
pushed the dynamic between the institutions towards an increased sharing of power. The 
legislative processes are now said to be governed by the Council, the Commission and the 
European Parliament, the latter of which has been strengthened by the gradual extension of 
legislation by the co-decision/ordinary procedure9 (Nugent 2010: 29-30, 183).  
1.4.2 The Common Agricultural Policy 
If one were to look into policy literature for factors explaining the controversial nature of EU 
agricultural policy, one of the factors one almost by certainty would detect is institutional 
reform. As noted by Nugent (2010: 359), in the late 1980s and 1990s the European 
Community came under increasing pressure because of its Common Agricultural Policy. The 
pressure was both external, emanating to a large part from the United States which accused 
                                                 
4
 Commonly known as the Maastricht Treaty.  
5
 The European Economic Community (EEC), the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) and the 
European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom).  
6
 In addition to the first pillar, constituted by the European Communities, the European Union was to consist of a 
second pillar, the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), and a third pillar, Justice and Home Affairs 
(JHA) (Nugent 2010: 28). 
7
 The Treaty of Paris (signed in April 1951) and the two Treaties of Rome (signed on 25. March 1957).  
8
 First and foremost the Single European Act (signed on 17 and 28. February 1986) and the Treaty of Maastricht 
(signed on 7. February 1992). 
9
 According to the co-decision procedure, the European Parliament (EP) is a co-decision maker with the Council, 
and thus posit the power to veto and amend policy proposals (Nugent 2010: 181).  
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the CAP for being too protectionist, and internal, from camps which accused the CAP for 
being too expensive to finance (Nugent 2010: 359).  
The EU’s Common Agricultural Policy has been subject to four major rounds of reform since 
the 1980s; the 1988 reforms, the MacSharry reform in 1992, the Agenda 2000 reform package 
from 1999 and the Fischler reform in 2003 (Nugent 2010: 365). The reforms all have in 
common that they have been designed with the purpose of decreasing the expenditure on 
CAP, preparing the Union for enlargement and meeting external demands 10 for a dismantling 
of protectionist systems. A common denominator for the CAP reforms is the criticism they all 
have received for being insufficiently radical for targeted goals to be achieved (Nugent 2010: 
359-360).  
The Commission has been a key driver behind the endeavours to reform the CAP system. 
Whereas the Commission in most policy sectors are mainly concerned with creating policy 
frameworks, its emphasis in relation to the CAP has primarily been on efficiency 
improvement and movement towards a more market-based system (Nugent 2010: 364-365). 
The DG Agriculture within the Commission plays a central role in the management and 
implementation of EU agricultural policy (Grant and Stocker 2009: 233). Its – i.e. the EU 
Commission – activity level within agricultural policy is of a greater extent than what is being 
observed in most other policy sectors (Nugent 2010: 368). Nonetheless, when it comes to 
actual decision making on agricultural policy, the central institutions to be highlighted are the 
Agriculture Council and the European Parliament. The former institution is located within the 
Council of Ministers. It is constituted by the Ministers of Agriculture from the EU member 
states (Nugent 2010: 366). The latter institution saw its influence on agricultural policy being 
considerably strengthened by the Lisbon Treaty revision, which acknowledged the extension 
of the co-decision legislation procedure to agricultural matters (Nugent 2010 368). The 
implementation of policy proposals on agriculture is consequently reliant on the joint 
acceptance by the Agricultural Council and the European Parliament.  
1.4.3 EU Food Policy 
It has already been emphasised that food policy regulation at EU level is a rather new 
phenomenon. Food policy in the EC prior to the innovations in the late 80s and 90s was 
                                                 
10
 First of all from the USA, but also from the GATT (later WTO) international trade negotiations.  
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primarily of an ad hoc nature (Vos and Wendler 2006: 65). Formulation and implementation 
of food [safety] regulation was a national affair, and legislation on food policy emanating 
from the EC was primarily designed to eliminate barriers to trade (Lie and Veggeland 2010: 
92-93, Vos and Wendler 2006: 67).  Since the mid-90s however, food policy in terms of 
securing safe food has been ‘moved up the ladder’ and is now regarded as one of the EU’s 
high priority areas (Mission of Norway to the EU 2010). 
The majority of innovations on EU Food policy are being explained as products of the food 
scandals
11
 which hit Europe in the mid-1990s. The outbreak of large scale animal diseases 
made the shortcomings of national governments’ approach to food policy evident. National 
governments
12
 were criticized for commingling business- and consumer interests and for not 
making sufficiently clear divides between the political and scientific aspects in food policy 
processes (Rykkja 2005: 82, Vos and Wendler 2006: 69). The EU on the other hand came 
under criticism for its lack of a conceptual approach to food safety regulation.  
The outbreak of the BSE
13
 disease in 1996 triggered the expansion and consolidation of EU 
Food Policy competences. The year 1996 was 'depicted as the ‘Year Zero’ of the EU Food 
Regime' (Vos and Wendler 2006: 69-70). Risks related to food were no longer to be 
considered primarily a matter of national interest, rather a European one (Vos and Wendler 
2006: 69).  
A series of subsequent institutional and political reforms at EU level were to contribute to the 
gradual transfer of decision making power from national to supranational level. EU decided 
upon the introduction of the General Food Law in 2002. The extensive law package has direct 
effect, which implies that its content is to be implemented without amendments in member 
state law (Lie and Veggeland 2010: 70). Furthermore, EU competence on food policy has 
been centralized into one single DG, the Directorate-General Health and Consumer 
Protection, within the Commission (Vos and Wendler 2006: 70, Lie and Veggeland 2010: 78). 
The recently established DG has a considerably strengthened “Food and Veterinary Office” 
placed under its authority. Whereas the Food and Veterinary Office primarily is concerned 
with risk management, a third recently established EU institution – the European Food Safety 
                                                 
11
 The most well-known of which was the BSE animal disease, famously known as the mad-cow disease. 
12
 Especially the British government, whose domestic food production was severely hit by the outbreak of BSE, 
came under criticism because of its conduct of food policy. 
13
 The BSE disease (bovin spongiform encephalopati), commonly known as mad-cow disease, because of its 
damaging effect on the brain of cattle, among which it spreads.   
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Authority (EFSA) – has risk assessment as its main task. The EFSA has been given an 
independent status so as to safeguard it from external influence (Lie and Veggeland 2010: 78-
81). A central motivation behind these institutional alterations has been the introduction of a 
clear division between the exercise of risk management and risk assessment.    
1.4.4 Interest group activity at European level 
Interest groups have been present at the European Community level since the founding years 
of the Community (Grant and Stocker 2009: 235-36). Their presence and involvement have 
apparently been very much supported and backed by the governing institutions at European 
level. One plausible reason is the alleged interdependent relation between the European 
Community, first and foremost the Commission, and private actors. Bouwen (2009: 20-22) 
argues that the Commission due to its under-resourced nature and consequent reliance on 
technical and political information, and, in addition, need to legitimize decisions, has sought 
close interaction with private actors (Bouwen 2009: 20, 22). Private actors have been granted 
access to decision making arenas in return.  
The Committee of Professional Agricultural Organisations (COPA) was established in 1958 
after having been suggested by the Commission itself14 (Grant and Stocker 2009: 235). A 
federation uniting national farmer’s organizations from the then six EC Member States, 
COPA constituted the first European representative organization for farmers (COPA-
COGECA 2012, Grant and Stocker 2009: 236). COPA has been a core insider with benefits 
such as frequent access to high ranked officers, technical experts and Advisory groups within 
the Commission (especially DG Agriculture). Although still possessing these benefits, 
COPA’s influence has declined over the last 20 years. Resistance to CAP reform programs, 
internal dissent and rising ineffectiveness, caused by e.g. enlargement, have seemingly 
contributed to this development (Grant and Stocker 2009: 236-237). The evolvement of the 
CAP framework, and the delegation of decision making power on Food policy to the EU, 
have furthermore contributed to an increase in private actors aiming to influence these policy 
making processes at European level. These processes are no longer, if ever, exclusively 
attracting farmers’ interest. Also present are interest groups and companies representing e.g. 
veterinarians, the food industry, consumer interests, animal protection and green energy. The 
                                                 
14
 Took place at the Stresa conference of 1958, at which EC level representative groups were permitted to 
participate (Grant and Stocker 2009: 235).  
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competition for access and influence among private actors with an interest in agriculture and 
food policy apparently has increased.  
1.5 Theoretical approach 
My thesis is based on three theoretical approaches. First, liberal intergovernmentalism (LI), 
which stipulates that national state preferences are shaped domestically on the basis of 
autonomous interests, championed by influential societal groups within a policy sector 
(Moravcsik 1993: 483). Domestic societal groups channelize their efforts toward national 
governments, who then bring national preferences to arenas for interstate bargaining. Second, 
historical institutionalism (HI) that directs attention to how and why institutional choices have 
long term effects (Rosamond 2007: 124). Pierson (2000), whose HI approach is to be 
employed in the analysis, emphasises the impact of critical junctures and increasing returns 
processes on the historical development of actor behaviour. And third, multi-level governance 
(MLG), which assumes political decision making authority to be spread across multiple 
territorial levels; i.e. the supranational, the national and the subnational level (Eising 2007: 
169, Hooghe and Marks 2001: xi , referred to in Time 2011a). 
It should be emphasised that only two of the three approaches, LI and HI, are to be dealt with 
as independent theories, in that expectations about interest group behaviour, i.e. selection of 
channel(s) of influence, are to be derived. The third approach, MLG, is grasped as an 
alternative to the LI's approximation of framework conditions, i.e. structure, in which actors 
operate. Whereas according to LI, domestic interest groups would channelize their strategic 
efforts toward national authorities, MLG presumes that efforts are channelized toward both 
national authorities and European decision making bodies.  
1.6 Outline of the chapters  
The following approach has been chosen in order to come up with a satisfactory answer to the 
research question.  
In chapter two, the theoretical approach to the analysis is to be presented. Also included in the 
chapter is an outline of the methodological ponderations that underpin the thesis. What is to 
be presented in chapter three is a detailed outline of the agricultural- and food policy making 
systems at EU level and domestic, i.e. Norwegian and German, level. This is done in order to 
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highlight the extensive changes through which the systems have gone since 1990. Chapter 
four contains the analysis of this thesis. Two elements are in particular emphasised, namely 
how interest groups channelize their efforts aimed at influencing policy making processes.  
And why, or, put differently, how to explain interest group behaviour in terms of their 








2 Theory and method  
Two theoretical approaches have been selected as basis for the analysis of the Norwegian and 
German interest groups' strategic behaviour, in terms of selection of channel(s) of influence, 
namely Moravcsik's (1993) Liberal intergovernmentalism (LI) and Pierson's (2000, 2004) 
Historical institutionalism (HI). Moreover, a third approach, Multi-level governance (MLG)
15
, 
is to be applied. In that regard it ought to be accentuated that MLG does not constitute a free-
standing theoretical approach in this thesis, rather an alternative to Moravcsik's perception of 
the structural framework in which interest groups operate.  
In what follows, the main characteristics of the theoretical approaches are to be presented. 
Furthermore, the variables and attached indicators, on the basis of which theoretical 
assumptions have been derived, are to be identified. The second section of this chapter is 
focused on the thesis' methodological foundation. Special emphasis is put on the selection of 
research design and methods, and the potential implications of these priorities on reliability 
and validity.  
2.1 Liberal intergovernmentalism 
According to Moravcsik (1993: 517)  
'the net economic interests of producers and popular preferences for public goods 
[central aspects of LI] provide a solid foundation for explaining agricultural policy [...], as 
well as socio-economic public goods provision, within the EC'. 
Thus, the application of LI in the analysis of farmer, food industry and veterinarian interest 
group behaviour ought to be convenient.  
The basic claim of liberal intergovernmentalism is that the EU – or EC as it was denoted prior 
to the Maastricht Treaty, which established the European Union – 'can be analyzed as a 
successful intergovernmental regime designed to manage economic interdependence through 
negotiated policy co-ordination' (Moravcsik 1993: 474, Nugent 2010: 56).  Implicit in this 
claim is the assumption that the position of national governments is strengthened through the 
existence of EU institutions. The reasons why is that the institutions make interstate 
bargaining more efficient, and moreover 'strengthen the autonomy of national political 
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 I apply the version developed by Hooghe and Marks (2001). 
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leaders vis-à-vis particularistic social groups within their domestic polity' (Moravcsik 1993: 
507). The latter argument, because of the increasing extent of decisions being made at a 
greater distance from domestic groups' scrutiny, i.e. in Brussels. One implication of 
Moravcsik's perception is that national governments control developments in Brussels. 
Consequently, if domestic social groups want to influence policy-making at EU level, they 
should persuade their national governments to bring forward their arguments in interstate 
bargaining processes.  
Liberal intergovernmenalism rests on three core elements. Namely, the assumption of rational 
state behavior, an implication of which being that states are assumed to be directed by 
purpose 'toward the achievement of a set of consistently ordered goals or objectives' 
(Moravcsik 1993: 480-81). The objectives, which represent alternative future states of the 
world
16
, are assumed to be subjected for evaluation on the extent to which they generate 
utilities. Put differently, a central motivation behind state behavior is to maximize utilities, in 
terms of supply from e.g. interstate bargaining. However, as the second core element 
illustrates, the state does not act on fixed preferences. Moravcsik (1993: 480) employs a 
liberal theory of national preference formation to show that national interests are being 
created through processes, in which domestic societal groups compete for gaining the upper 
hand in terms of influencing their national governments. Finally, an intergovernmentalist 
analysis of interstate bargaining lays down the premises for the examination of distributional 
conflicts among governments (Moravcsik 1993: 480-81).  
Moravcsik perceives policy-making processes to be conducted in two successive stages. First, 
the formation of national preferences at domestic level, by means of state-society relations. 
This stage can be denoted the demand side, as national governments are presented with 
demands, in terms of desired outcomes, from societal groups. In the second stage, national 
governments bring their national preferences to interstate bargains at EU level, which 
ultimately 'defines the possible political responses of the [EU] political system to pressures 
from those governments' (Moravcsik 1993: 481). Hence, the labeling of the second stage as 
the supply side.  
With regard to the application of liberal intergovernmentalism, emphasis in this thesis is 
exclusively put on the demand side. The decision can be justified on the grounds that my 
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 Such as higher levels of economic transactions or exchange rate stability (Moravcsik 1993: 481). 
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focus is the behavior of domestic interest groups – or, in line with Moravcsik's 
characterization, domestic societal groups. It is the channelization of efforts in terms of 
influencing decision making, and not the decision making per se that is focused on. Thus, it is 
the liberal element of LI, i.e. preference formation through state-society relations, which is 
assumed to constitute the main contribution to the analysis.  
2.1.1 Theoretical expectations 
Issue salience 
Issue salience, understood to imply the interest group's anticipation of the distribution of net 
costs and/or benefits from specific political outcomes, constitutes the variable derived from 
LI. With the exception of the expectation of channelization, all other LI expectations 
presented here, constitute indicators of the issue salience variable. According to Moravcsik 
(1993: 487), the extent to which interest groups anticipate costs and/or benefits of policy-
making to be certain, or, on the contrary, ambiguous, has implications for their incentives to 
mobilize politically. Moreover, the extent to which national governments are being put under 
pressure from societal groups, because of their mobilization, is believed to constitute a 
potential barrier to their freedom of manoeuvre. Consequently, on issues 'where societal 
pressure is ambiguous or divided, governments acquire a range of discretion', whereas in 
instances where pressure is strong and united, governments are assumed to act under greater 
constraint (Moravcsik 1993: 484). As national government behaviour is not the focus of this 
thesis, the latter assumption, i.e. constraints on governments' freedom of manoeuvre, is not to 
be tested in the analysis. It has nevertheless been emphasized in order to provide the reader 
with a better understanding of the "greater picture" in Moravcsik's theory.  
The two main theoretical expectations derived from the 'issue salience' variable are as follows.  
If the interest group on behalf of its members perceives the cost or benefit of EU policy to be 
'certain, significant and risky', it is assumed to mobilize politically (Moravcsik 1993: 487). 
If the interest group on behalf of its members perceives the cost or benefit of EU policy to be 
'diffuse, ambiguous, insignificant, and with low risk', it is assumed not to mobilize politically 
(Moravcsik 1993: 488). 
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Determinant of interest groups' cost/benefit assumptions 
Liberal intergovernmentalism assumes the existence of economic interdependence in society 
(Moravcsik 1993: 485). Interdependence can be understood as the presence of mutual 
dependence between actors. Its rise is assumed to be correlated with the rise in transnational 
flows across borders, in terms of e.g. goods and services (Jackson and Sørensen 2007: 103, 
Moravcsik 1993: 485). Ascending levels of transnational flow moreover are assumed to 
contribute to the emergence of international policy externalities. According to Moravcsik 
(1993: 485), '[such] externalities arise where the policies of one government create costs and 
benefits for politically significant social groups outside its national jurisdiction'. Here 
arguably lies the incentive for national governments to engage in international coordination, 
in that it ultimately may contribute to both the elimination of negative policy externalities
17
, 
and the enhanced control over domestic policy outcomes (Moravcsik 1993: 485).  
However, the advancement of international coordination efforts, such as the EU's common 
agricultural policy and food policy, do necessarily affect domestic societal groups differently. 
Moreover, as is to be emphasized later on, EU policy makers tend to emphasize the further 
advancement of market liberalization in order to secure a proper functioning of the internal 
market. Whether or not domestic societal groups – first and foremost producers – perceive EU 
policy-making to be positive or negative, thus could be related to their robustness if 
confronted with the further liberalization of markets. Hence, the expectancy of import-
competing producers to oppose free trade, and exporters and multinational investors to 
support it (Moravcsik 1993: 489). The expectation with regard to domestic societal groups' 
anticipation of the further liberalization of markets, including the EU's internal market, is as 
follows,  
'the extent to which individual producers profit from commercial liberalization [i.e. 
the CAP] depends most fundamentally on their competitive position in domestic and 
international markets' (Moravscik 1993: 489) 
Mobilization 
Moravcsik applies a categorization of EC policy areas, between which the extent of societal 
groups who mobilize politically is expected to vary.  
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 'occur where the policies of one nation imposes costs on the domestic nationals of another, thereby 
undermining the goals of the second government's policies (Moravcsik 1993: 485).  
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The first category, commercial policy, market access and producer interests, primarily 
concerns legislation on the internal market, including agricultural policy. According to 
Moravcsik (1993: 488), 'these [policies] are designed to liberalize or eliminate distortions in 
markets for private goods and services'. In accordance with the expectation, 'that 'social 
groups with an intense interest in a given policy area are more likely to mobilize than those 
with a weak interest', LI foresees mobilization on commercial policy to be 'almost exclusively 
[confined] to domestic producers' (Moravcsik 1993: 488). The apparent reason being the 
potential impact of commercial policy amendments on producers' framework conditions.  
The second category, socio-economic public goods provision, could be perceived of as a 
bifurcated category, in that it is expected to affect both producer interests and the public in 
general (Moravcsik 1993: 493). The primary reason is that policy-making within this category 
provide public goods, such as health safety. At the same time, implications, in terms of e.g. 
guidelines for production, are added to producers' net-costs (Moravcsik 1993: 491). In other 
words, one foresees the coming into existence of a 'two-dimensional' issue, where 
'governments must strike a balance between two independently valued policy targets: flows of 
economic transactions and levels of public goods provision' (Moravcsik 1993: 492). EU food 
policy appears to fit nicely to this category. On the one hand, it is designed to provide health 
safety standards on food products. On the other, it relates to the internal market, in that the 
introduction of common safety standards simultaneously promote enhanced transborder flows 
of products.  
Two theoretical expectations are developed on Moravcsik's categorization of policy areas.  
The scope of mobilized interest groups is believed to be extensive on issues pertaining to EU 
food policy, due to its implications for both economic commerce and public goods standards.   
The scope of mobilized interest groups on issues pertaining to agricultural policy is believed 
to be confined to producers, who altogether are most likely to be affected in terms of net 
costs/benefits. 
Channelization of influence 
As already indicated, liberal intergovernmentalism perceives national governments to be the 
decisive actors, both at domestic and international levels. At domestic level, they formulate 
national preferences on the basis of input from domestic societal groups. At international 
19 
 
level, they possess the right to participate and decide on issues in interstate bargaining. On 
these grounds, one might argue that liberal intergovernmentalism comes close to what 
Hooghe and Marks (2001: 1) denote a state-centric governance approach. Which implies that 
'European integration [is not perceived to] challenge the autonomy of national states' 
(Hooghe and Marks 2001: 1). A logical implication would be that domestic interest groups 
perceive their national government, i.e. authorities, to be the most important targets for 
influence. Their behavior ought to reflect this perception.  
Hence, the theoretical expectation,  
If the interest group in question is mobilized politically by the EU policy, it is assumed to 
regard its national government the most important target for influence. 
Consequentially, the interest group in question is assumed to channel its strategic activities 
toward national authorities.  
2.2 Historical institutionalism 
'[Historical institutionalism is historical in the sense that it emphasizes] that political 
development must be understood as a process that unfolds over time' [, and] institutionalist 
because it stresses that many of the contemporary political implications of these temporal 
processes are embedded in institutions – whether formal rules, policy structures, or norms' 
(Pierson 2000: 264-65).  
For the matter of clarity, it needs to be emphasised that Pierson's theoretical approach relies 
on North's (1990: 3, referred to in Pierson 1996: 126) definition of institutions, namely as  
'the rules of the game in a society or, more formally, ... the humanly devised 
constraints that shape human interaction.' 
The application of HI rests on the assumption that interest group behaviour, whether 
corresponding to LI or MLG expectations in terms of influence channelization, could be 
explained by looking at historical developments. Central to the analysis in that regard is the 
examination of whether processes of path dependence can be identified. Pierson in his 




'Path dependence has to mean, [...] that once a country or region has started down a 
track, the costs of reversal are very high. There will be other choice points, but the 
entrenchments of certain institutional arrangements obstruct an easy reversal of the initial 
choice.'  
Levi's approximation corresponds quite neatly with Pierson's employment of the concept 
'increasing returns'. Accordingly, as the benefits of a given activity, relative to alternative  
activities, increase when more time and resources are invested in it – put differently, the more 
steps are taken down a distinct path – the more difficult it becomes to switch from that given 
activity (Pierson 2000: 252).  
Pierson's account constitutes one of multiple contributions on historical institutionalism. His 
claim 'that actors may be in a strong initial position, seek to maximise their position'  to some 
extent indicate an orientation toward the fraction which assumes a rational-choice behaviour 
by actors (Pierson 1996: 126). HI however add yet another expectation, in that apparent 
rational decisions at a given point of time, might generate future outcomes that were not 
anticipated, or intended, from the outset (Pierson 1996: 126).  
Pierson's account belongs to the fraction of HI that makes use of economic assumptions 
originally developed to explain why certain technologies achieve advantages over alternative 
technologies
18
 (Pierson 2000: 254, Thelen 1999: 384). One apparent implication of this 
employment is that political developments at some stage become 'locked in', thereby making 
the change of direction, i.e. change of path, nearly impossible. Thelen (1999: 385) has 
criticized this fraction of HI on these grounds. It arguably is too contingent, in the sense that 
political decisions very seldom are open decisions, where actors are free to decide in 
accordance with what maximizes their utility (Thelen 1999: 385). Hence, the questioning of 
the approximation of 'critical junctures' as open ended. Second, it is too deterministic, too 
mechanical, in the sense that actors, who do not make use of an activity characterized by 
increasing returns, apparently have to adapt, or, if not, disappear. According to Thelen (1999: 
385) one does not necessarily see the disappearance of actors employing other activities. 
Rather their eventual adaption does not have to imply the reproduction of the activity subject 
to increasing returns.  
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 Pierson makes use of Arthur's (1994: 112, referred to in Pierson 2000: 254) approach by which the success of 
the "QWERTY" typewriter keyboard is theorized.   
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Thelen's critique is worthy to keep in mind when interpreting the observations in this thesis. If 
there is evidence for an existence of increasing returns processes in interest group behavior, 
i.e. their selection of influence channel(s), this does not necessarily imply that interest groups, 
whose behavior is not in accordance, are expected to fully adapt, or alternatively, cease to 
exist. Pierson (2004: 72) addresses the critique brought forward by Thelen (1999) by pointing 
out that  
'even if a particular environment is conducive to positive feedback, it obviously does 
not follow that any group will be able to exploit these opportunities [In other words,] events 
at the beginning of a path-dependent processes are not totally contingent' (Pierson 2004: 73).  
2.2.1 Theoretical expectations  
Critical juncture 
Pierson (2000: 263) characterizes critical juncture as one of HI's 'crucial object[s] of study'. 
Whether or not a critical juncture has occurred in interest group behaviour – in terms of 
channelization of influence – over the last 23 years, constitutes the first HI variable of this 
thesis. 
According to Tilly (1984: 14, referred to in Pierson 2004: 54), 'When things happen within a 
sequence affects how they happen'.
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Pierson's reference to Tilly illustrates his emphasis on interaction effects generated by 'the 
temporal intersection of distinctive trajectories of different, but connected, long-term 
processes' (Aminzade 1992: 466-67, referred to in Pierson 2004: 55-56). Such intersections 
are assumed 'to have a crucial impact on outcomes' (Pierson 2004: 55). One plausible 
illustration of intersecting trajectories, could be the entering into force of the EEA-agreement, 
whereby the Norwegian political system got formally attached to the political system of the 
EU. What is realized is that Pierson not merely finds questions concerning what happened to 
be interesting, but furthermore, when it happened. To find out when something happened, 
implies the analysis of whether a critical juncture has occurred. Pierson (2000: 263) refers to 
critical junctures as 'triggering events, which set development along a particular path'.  
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 Sequences in that regard are identified as 'cases where different temporal orderings of the same events or 
processes will produce different outcome' (Pierson 2004: 68). Timing on the other hand relates to 'the timing of 
something relative to something else' (Pierson 2004: 55). 
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Thus, the examination of the unfolding of processes since 1990 – whether changes in interest 
group priorities, in terms of selection of influence channels, are evident – and the 
identification of events, which presumably have contributed to changes in interest group 
priorities, become important to the analysis. In that regard, two events, i.e. processes, are 
identified as potential critical junctures. In both of which, different, but connected, long term 
processes seemingly have intersected. Substantial reform of the EU's food policies implied a 
greater connection between national and the EU's food regimes. Whereas EU agricultural 
reform imposed new, radical, policies, in comparison to traditional modes of agricultural 
policy prior to 1990. According to the theoretical expectation, these two events in the policy 
making structure, ought to have influenced interest group behaviour to the extent that 
established activities for exerting influence have been amended.  
The point at which 1) national competences on agriculture and/or food policy area are 
delegated to institutions at EU level, or 2) major EU agricultural policy reforms are 
completed, constitutes a critical juncture, which ultimately has contributed to a strengthened 
presence of domestic interest groups at EU level.  
The point at which 1) national competences on agriculture and/or food policy area are 
delegated to institutions at EU level, or 2) major EU agricultural policy reforms are 
completed, does not constitute a critical juncture, implying that domestic interest groups' 
channelize their strategic approaches primarily towards national authorities.  
When reading the analysis, one needs to keep in mind the challenge which the deduction of 
general propositions on critical junctures constitutes. This is admittedly being pointed to by 
Pierson (2004: 58). A reservation with regard to the eventual generalization of findings is thus 
given.  
Increasing returns 
The second 'crucial object of study [...] [is] the mechanisms of reproduction of the current 
path' (Pierson 2000: 263). This object is captured by the concept of increasing returns, which, 
as already touched upon, emphasizes positive feedback processes. In other words, as the 
benefits of a given activity, relative to alternative activities, increase over time, the more 
difficult it becomes to abandon that activity (Pierson  2000: 252). Thus, whether or not an 
increasing returns process is present constitutes the second HI variable of this thesis.  
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Two main theoretical expectations have been derived. Moreover, expectations have been 
developed from additional indicators in order to approach the variable from different 
positions.  
The more positive feed-back is acquired from activities at a given level of governance, the 
higher the probability that the interest group continues to channelize strategic activities 
towards that level.  
The less positive feed-back is acquired from activities at a given level of governance, the 
lower the probability that the interest group continues to channelize strategic activities 
towards that level.  
Positive feed-back is expected to emerge as either the supply of material capabilities (e.g. new 
locations or units), economic income for the interest group or its' members, technological 
advancement, organizational capabilities (e.g. recruitment of new expertise) or ideational 
elements, in terms of learning effects and the gaining of experience.  
Multiple equlibrium – inertia 
If a given activity is subject to increasing returns processes, it ought to be perceived of by 
interest groups as the single equilibrium, i.e. option. If so, its behaviour corresponds to what 
Pierson (2000: 263) would denote as inertia. On the other hand, if the interest group perceives 
multiple options, in terms of strategic activity, to be possible, the situation is equivalent to a 
state of multiple equilibria (Pierson 2000: 263). Consequently, one either has no process of 
increasing returns, or, alternatively, the process is at an early stage. Hence, the theoretical 
expectations,  
Where a process of increasing returns has been established, the interest group is expected to 
perceive the strategy which is subject to the process, as the only preferred option.  
Where a process of increasing returns is absent or in an early sequence, the interest group is 
expected to perceive multiple strategies as possible options. 
The costs of establishing a trajectory 
Large set-up costs is assumed to 'create a high pay-off for further investments' in that 
trajectory, i.e. activity (Arthur 1994: 112, referred to in Pierson 2000: 254). One obvious 
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illustration is interest groups' decision to open an office in Brussels. Two theoretical 
expectations have been developed in that regard,  
The higher the set-up costs related to the establishment of strategic activities at a given level 
of governance, the more likely the continuation of the activity by the interest group.  
The lower the set-up costs related to the establishment of strategic activities at a given level of 
governance, the less likely the continuation of the activity by the interest group.  
Institutional density – estimated costs of exit 
As noted by Pierson (2000: 259), 
 'efforts to coordinate actors in the pursuit of public goods often require the 
construction of formal institutions. Once established, these institutional constraints can apply 
to all [...], and they are backed up, ultimately, by force. The exit option [...] is often 
unavailable (or prohibitively costly)[...]'. 
Moreover, the longer the process of increasing returns, the greater the benefits acquired from 
the given activity. One would equally assume that the costs of exit from that given activity are 
perceived of as high too. The theoretical expectations are as follows. 
The more positive feed-back is acquired from activities at a given level of governance, the 
higher the interest group's estimation of costs caused by it ending the activity.  
The less positive feed-back is acquired from activities at a given level of governance, the 
lower the interest group's estimation of costs caused by it ending the activity. 
2.3 Multi-level governance 
Whereas Moravcsik's approach could be denoted a state-centric perspective, multi-level 
governance emphasises the sharing of policy-making competence across multiple levels of 
governance, i.e. the European, the national and the subnational level (Hooghe and Marks 
2001:1-2). Again, it must be emphasised that MLG is not employed as an independent theory 
in this thesis, which in turn explains the absence of theoretical assumptions derived from it. 
Rather, it is viewed as an alternative approximation of key characteristics of the framework 
condition, in which all actors, both public authorities and private interests, operate. 
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Multi-level governance draws inspiration from several sources, including the likes of 
Schmitter (1992, referred to in Hooghe and Marks 2001: 3), Jachtenfuchs and Kohler-Koch 
(1995, referred to in Hooghe and Marks 2001: 3). The account which is made use of in this 
thesis is promoted by Hooghe and Marks (2001). In their presentation, references are being 
made to developments in the European Union the last two decades. Emphasis is put on the 
immense increase in 'the scope and depth of policy making at the EU level' (Hooghe and 
Marks 2001: 1). Policy reforms contribute to the seemingly increasing influence of EU 
policies on European citizens' everyday life. Whereas, on the other hand, amendments of 
decision-making procedures, e.g. the introduction of the co-decision procedure and qualified 
majority voting, contribute to the enhancement of EU institutions' competencies (Hooghe and 
Marks 2001: 8).  Yet another aspect, in apparent response to the greater presence of the EU, 
as e.g. the introduction of the Euro illustrates, 'EU decision making [furthermore]has come 
under greater public scrutiny' (Hooghe and Marks 2001: 9). 
All of these perceptions point to the core argument of the multi-level governance model, 
namely that 'European integration has weakened the state' (Hooghe and Marks 2001: 3). The 
argument is derived into three basic elements. First, far from having become unimportant, the 
state still has lost its' monopoly in terms political authority and decision making competences 
(Hooghe and Marks 2001: 3). These are to an increasing extent shared by actors, including the 
state, across different levels of governance, i.e. the subnational, the national and the European 
level. Thus, whereas Moravcsik perceives EU institutions to be mere instruments for national 
governments' coordination of policies, Hooghe and Marks assign independent value to 
institutions such as the European Parliament and the EU Commission. Consequently, these 
institutions have a say in the coordination of policies too.  
Second, collective decision making at EU level weakens national governments' control over 
policy outcomes (Hooghe and Marks 2001: 4). The contradiction between MLG and LI 
becomes evident at this point too. Whereas Moravcsik (1993: 485) points to the enhanced 
control over domestic policy outcomes as an incentive for states to engage in international 
cooperation, Hooghe and Marks (2001: 5) points to the opposite. An important aspect in that 
regard is the increased usage of qualified majority voting in EU decision making.  
The third line of argument states that 'political arenas are interconnected rather than nested'  
(Hooghe and Marks 2001: 4). This latter point is of particular interest to the analysis, in that it 
rejects the notion that processes of national preference formation find place exclusively within 
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nation states. Thus, domestic societal groups are perceived not to channelize their interests 
exclusively towards national authorities and governments. Rather, on EU related issues, they 
are believed to channelize efforts towards multiple levels of governance, including the EU 
level. The intensive mobilization by numerous "Euro-groups", i.e. European associations 
composed of domestic interest groups, is being highlighted in that regard (Hooghe and Marks 
2001: 15). So is alternative modes of transnational organization by domestic interests 
(Hooghe and Marks 2001: 9).  What consequently is communicated is that '[states] no longer 
provide the sole interface between supranational and subnational arenas' (Hooghe and Marks 
2001: 4).  
2.4 Summary of theoretical expectations 
According to liberal intergovernmentalism, societal interests
20
' perception of profit from 
policies aimed at the further liberalization of markets, is dependent on their competitive 
ability on domestic and international markets. In other words, interest groups whose members' 
competitiveness is primarily confined to domestic markets, tend not to perceive such policy 
amendments as profitable for business. On the other hand, interest groups, whose members 
have ambitions toward both domestic and international markets, tend to support policy 
initiatives aimed at further liberalization. Consequently, in instances where suggested EU 
policies are perceived by the interest group to impose certain and significant costs or benefits 
on its members, it is expected to mobilize politically. Whereas, in instances where the interest 
group, on behalf of its members, perceives costs or benefits to be ambiguous and uncertain, it 
is assumed not to mobilize politically.  
Moreover, the scope of domestic societal groups who mobilize politically, is expected to be 
greater on issues related to food policy than on issues related to agricultural policy. The 
reason why is that agricultural policy is ascribed to the category commercial policy, which 
due to its direct influence on framework conditions for production, tend first and foremost to 
mobilize producers. Food policy, on the other hand, is ascribed to the socio-economic public 
goods provision category. Thus, as food policy generates political outcomes which are of 
interest to society and citizens in general, the scope of politically mobilized interests is 
expected to be extensive. Last, but not least, domestic societal interest who are mobilized by 
suggested EU food and agriculture policies, channelize their efforts toward national 
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authorities. The reason why is that the state is gate keeper to decision making arenas at EU 
level.  
Of critical importance to the analysis of expectations derived from historical institutionalism 
are two objects of study. First, the extent to which events in the historical development of 
interest groups under scrutiny qualify to the characteristic of a critical juncture. In other 
words, whether events that trigger subsequent developments of interest group behavior along 
a particular path, can be observed. Path is understood as interest groups' selection of channels 
of influence. If a critical juncture has occurred in an interest group's development since 1990, 
it is expected to have strengthened its presence at European level. Vice versa, in the absence 
of a critical juncture, it is expected to channelize its efforts toward national authorities.  
Two events, or processes, stand out as plausible junctures. Namely, the transfer of 
competences on food policy-making from national to European level. And moreover, the 
consecutive rounds of CAP reform, which have introduced new modes of agricultural policy 
in EU member states. In both instances, distinctive trajectories – the former, in terms of 
political systems, the latter, in terms policies – seem to have been temporally intersected. 
According to Pierson (2004: 55) this ought 'to have crucial impact on outcomes'.  
The second crucial objective of study is the process of increasing returns. The gradual 
increase in benefits from a given activity, relative to alternative activities, contributes to the 
'lock-in' of interest group behaviour to that given activity. Thus, in instances where a critical 
juncture sets an interest group on a distinctive trajectory in terms of behaviour, processes of 
increasing returns are expected to further entrench that trajectory. Regardless of the interest 
group's de facto selection of channel(s) of influence, a presence of increasing returns 
processes is expected to contribute to the continuation of that behaviour. Further indicators 
have been developed in order to analyse whether processes of increasing returns are present. 
If present, the interest groups is expected to perceive the activity which is subject to 
increasing returns, as the only preferred option. Moreover, if the costs associated with the 
establishment of given activity are looked upon as high by the interest group, it is expected to 
continue that activity. And finally, a gradual increase in benefits from an activity subject to 
increasing returns, makes the interest group perceive the costs generated by an exit from the 
activity as too high.  
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2.5 Underlying variables 
In addition to the variables and indicators derived from theory, two more variables ought to be 
mentioned. These however are not included for the primary purpose of analyzing their 
implication on actor behaviour. Rather, they contribute to the selection and diversification of 
cases and observations. The two, identified as underlying variables, are as follows.  
Formal attachment to the EU. Whether the country, to which the interest group belongs, is an 
EU member state, or EFTA member state
21
. The two cases, i.e. the German and the 
Norwegian systems of interest groups, are consequently divided on this variable. 
The resource basis of the interest group. Whereas the selection of interest groups has not been 
guided by estimations of their resource basis, it nevertheless has been one objective of the 
analysis to get an impression of interest groups' resource bases. The variable is defined as the 
size of the interest group, in terms of personnel. Eventual observations on interest groups' 
resource base are to be commented upon toward the end of the analysis chapter. 
2.6 Method 
Ponderations and decisions in terms of the selection of research design and research methods 
are of decisive importance. As pointed to by Lund (2002: 89, 108, referred to in Time 2011b: 
10-11) such ponderations have implications on the validity of research. In what follows, the 
design and method related decisions in this thesis are to be presented. Towards the end of the 
presentation follows an evaluation of the thesis' reliability and validity.  
2.6.1 Research question 
How do agricultural interest groups in Norway and Germany adapt their activities to 
changing institutional structures at national and EU level? How to explain eventual changes 
in interest groups' strategies toward decision making authorities?  
King et al (1994: 15) propose two criteria against which the research question should be 
evaluated. Accordingly, 'all research projects in the social sciences should satisfy [these] two 
criteria' (King et al 1994: 15).  
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First, 'a research question should pose a question that is "important" in the real world' (King 
et al 1994: 15). In other words, it ought to have social relevance. This thesis' research question 
highlights interest group behaviour towards both national and European decision-making 
levels. With regard to the ongoing debate in Norway on implications of the EEA-agreement, 
and the general perception of a limited potential for influencing decision-making in Brussels, 
this thesis could potentially constitute a contribution. It ought at least to be of interest to the 
sectors which are dealt with in the thesis. Yet another aspect in this regard, is the inclusion of 
observations on German interest group behaviour, in terms of strategic activity towards 
decision making authorities. Consequently, an impression of EFTA- and EU-member state 
interest groups' modes of operation ought to be generated. This too could have social 
relevance.  
Second, 'a research project should make a specific contribution to an identifiable scholarly 
literature by increasing our collective ability to construct verified scientific explanations of 
some aspect of the world' (King et al 1994: 15). With reference to the theoretical approaches 
and the topic, this thesis appears to fit into the scholarly literature which emphasises 'the 
Europeanization of interest organizations and social movements' (Eising 2007: 167). And in 
particular, the literature which focuses on the behaviour of interest groups within a perceived 
system characterized by multi-level governance (Eising 2007, 2008, Coen and Richardson 
2009, Bouwen 2009, Greenwood 2003 so on etc.). In that regard, this thesis' employment of 
path dependency expectations could provide an additional dimension to the literature. The 
reason why being its emphasis on the temporal unfolding of processes as explanations of actor 
behaviour.  
2.6.2 Research design 
This thesis is carried out in accordance with what is denoted a case study. It follows that 
research is carried out 'as the intensive study of a single case where the purpose of that study 
is – at least in part – to shed light on a larger class of cases (a population)' (Gerring 2009: 
20). Moreover, due to the incorporation of two cases – namely the German and the 
Norwegian systems of agricultural interest groups – the research design constitutes a multiple 
case study (Gerring 2009: 20). One implication of the employment of such a design is that 
research is confined to a limited number of observations, in other words, it constitutes a 
small-N research design (Gerring 2009: 21). This touches upon the structural ambiguity 
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which according to Gerring (2009: 78, reffered to in Time 2011b: 3) characterizes the case 
study. On the one hand, it seeks to establish knowledge on what is particular to the case, on 
the other, what is general to it. Hence, the presence of both particularizing and generalizing 
ambitions (Gerring 2009: 78, 80).  
An alternative, which perceivably could have further enhanced the validity of findings – if 
compared with the employment of the case study – is the usage of a comparative most similar 
systems design (MSSD). The primary reason being that one, through the inclusion of cases 
which have similar values on crucial variables, except for the dependent variable, establishes 
a control effect. Consequently, one is able to 'isolate and analyze the influence of other 
variables that might account for the differences [one] whishes to explain' (Lijphart 1975: 164, 
referred to in Time 2011b: 8). However, there are compelling reasons for the decision not to 
employ a MSSD comparative design in this case study. First and foremost, the value on the 
dependent variable – whether German and Norwegian interest groups channelize their 
activities exclusively toward national authorities, or, alternatively, toward the European level 
too – is not known from the outset (Time 2011b: 8). Moreover, the countries to which the 
interest groups belong, is perceived as too different in order for strict guiding rules of a 
comparative design to be met. Similarities in national political systems notwithstanding
22
, 
differences such as e.g. country size and form of government – Germany is of course a federal 
state, whereas Norway is a constitutional monarchy –thus contribute to the preference of a 
multiple case study rather than a comparative one (Time 2011b: 8). Consequently, eventual 
findings that differ between the German and Norwegian cases, cannot with certainty be 
assigned to one isolated variable.  
Selection of cases and observations  
Although representing cases too dissimilar in order for research in accordance with a 
comparative design to be carried out, it still is the apparent similarities that make me select 
respectively a German system of interest groups, and a Norwegian system of interest groups. 
The term "system of interest groups" reflects the selection of interest groups, i.e. units, from 
within the German and Norwegian food production chain. Or more precisely, interest groups 
representing the agricultural, food industry or veterinarian segment. Each interest group from 
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within these two systems, i.e. the cases, represents an observation
23
. Thus, although the 
analysis in this thesis is constituted on merely two cases, the inclusion of multiple 
observations – four in the Norwegian case, and five in the German case – contributes to the 
increase in observed implications. And consequently the enhancement of information in the 
data material (King et al 1994: 31, referred to in Time 2011b: 12). 
Returning to the introductory statement of this section, the case selection is based on the 
perceived similarities between Norway and Germany. What ought to be highlighted in that 
regard is the state-society structure, i.e. relations between national authorities and interest 
groups, with salient corporatist features in both Norway and Germany. And furthermore, the 
presence of farmers' unions which traditionally have held close relations with national 
authorities, and hence held a good position to influence their policy-making. These aspects 
are to be further emphasized in chapter three.  
On the other hand, difference in formal attachment to the EU, ought to imply that both 
national authorities and private interests have different opportunities and incentives to access 
decision-making bodies at EU level. This conception has motivated the selection of an EU 
member and EEA member case too.  
With regard to the method guiding the selection of observations, it ought to be emphasized 
that it follows the diverse-case method (Gerring 2009: 97-101). This method has as its core 
strength the possible enhancement of representativeness, when compared to the typical study 
of one case. The reason why is that it introduces variation on variables (Gerring 2009: 100). 
Usage of this method implies the selection of observations on one or more dimensions along 
which the chosen observations are to vary. As indicated above, my selection has been guided 
by one dimension, namely the formal attachment to the EU dichotomy. Hence, the division of 
observations into an EU member state and EEA member state category. Moreover, the 
specific selection of interest groups and informants has been guided partly by identifying 
which groups represent Norwegian and German sector interests in European associations. 
Then, after choosing the interest group, I endeavored on identifying informants with potential 
knowledge of interest, by looking into organizational charts at their web pages. This method 
has been extensively used in order to get German observations. With regard to the Norwegian 
observations, I, to a greater extent, have been given advice of whom I ought to talk to, by my 
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supervisor. In some instances, both Norwegian and German, additional advice of whom I 
ought to talk to has been supplied by informants.  
2.6.3 Research methods 
Semi-structured interviews 
The 14 semi-structured interviews with informants from Norwegian and German interest 
groups, and diplomatic services, constitute the majority of data in my research. The volume of 
completed interviews has been necessary in order to establish an impression as absolute as 
possible of the two cases. Some interviews have been carried out in Oslo, some in Brussels 
and, moreover, some by phone. The latter solution clearly represents the least desirable one, 
as contact with the informant is limited to verbal communication without visual observation. 
However, the positives in terms of information generated from these interviews, clearly are 
superior to the disadvantage made up by the fact that they have been carried out by phone.  
Bryman (2004: 113) refers to semi-structured interviews as,  
'a context in which the interviewer has a series of questions that are in the general 
form of an interview schedule but is able to vary the sequence of questions. [...] Also, the 
interviewer usually has some latitude to ask further questions in response to what are seen as 
significant replies' 
This conception of the semi-structured interview corresponds quite neatly with the procedure 
applied in this thesis. Prior to the interviews, an interview guide
24
 with questions derived from 
the theoretical expectations, was developed. It was used as a guideline throughout the 
interviews. However, the completion of interviews was not dictated rigidly by the guide. 
Thus, although endeavouring on getting information on all aspects as described in the 
interview guide, some flexibility was introduced. In particular in terms of asking spontaneous 
questions, or leaving out follow-up questions in instances where the informant did not have 
the requested information. The interview situation moreover came close to what Andersen 
(2006: 280) denotes an active and conversation based method of interviewing informants. 
Which implies that I actively –  which by no means ought to be interpreted as continuously –
utilized the situation in order to develop and get answers to my research questions (Andersen 
2006: 281).  
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An active approach to the interview actualizes the potential danger of errors generated 
throughout the situation. One needs to take into consideration that instances such as 
'misunderstanding[s or memory problems] on the part of the interviewee' might emerge 
(Bryman 2004: 110). Furthermore, there is the difference between the supply of subjective 
and objective
25
comprehensions of reality (Andersen 2006: 283). Aspects such as these, might 
weaken the validity of interview data, in other words, the extent to which the relevant 
inferences are recognized as being valid (Lund 2002: 85). On the other hand, as pointed out 
by Andersen (2006: 282) in instances where the informant is resourceful, which indeed has 
been the case in this research, the interviewer ought to take on an active approach. Thereby 
one might enhance the extensiveness of information supplied by the informant, and moreover 
challenge the concern's eventual intent to hold back information.  
In order to maximize the quality of data subjected for analysis, I made use of a digital 
recorder while undertaking the interviews. The certainty that I was to get everything on tape, 
helped me focus my attention on the conversation, and not on making notes. Put differently, it 
made the active approach to the situation possible. After having completed the majority of 
interviews – the first was undertaken end of October 2012, and the last, mid February 2013 – 
I transcribed all interviews in detail. The recordings lasted by average from one to two hours 
each. Needless to say, this process was time consuming.  Nevertheless it generated an 
extensive amount of precisely reproduced interview data, which quality ought to be 
satisfactory.  
This thesis' research by means of interviews has been registered and approved by the Privacy 
Ombudsman for Research at the Norwegian Social Science Data Services (NSD). Research 
has been conducted in line with the Norwegian personal data protection law.  
The use of documents 
Whereas data collected through interviews constitute the majority of this thesis' basis for 
analysis, official documents have been studied in detail too. The inclusion of official 
documents is justified on two points. First, to add greater empirical debt to information 
supplied by the interviewees. Important in that regard is the possibility to control the 
exactness of verbal statements, and thereby enhance the validity of observations and 
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inferences. Second, access to official documents has been critical to the analysis of temporal 
processes. As is to be emphasized in chapter four, natural obstacles, first and foremost 
geographic distance, have made it difficult to access German official documents that were not 
on the internet. Hence, the greater reliability of findings on the Norwegian observations, when 
it comes to temporal processes.  
Nevertheless, to state that a thorough document analysis has been undertaken in this research 
process, would be an exaggeration. Thus, similarly as Johannessen (2010: 27) points to in his 
masters' thesis, rather than referring to an employment of the method, document analysis, it 
seems more appropriate to denote the inclusion of official document as 'the use of documents'. 
The official documents which have been subjected for usage in the analysis constitute, 
respectively, annual reviews by interest groups, press releases and consultative statements. 
They are all public, non-confidential, documents. However, since the analysis was intended to 
cover the period from 1990, up till present day, some documents had to be acquired from 
interest groups' own archives.  
With reference to Kjeldstadli's (1992: 163) categorization of written sources, the documents 
selected for analysis constitute communicative, or symbolic sources. They were made to 
represent circumstances out over themselves. Some of the documents, in particular press 
releases and consultative statements, could be characterized as normative, and future oriented, 
in that they signalize what ought to be done. Others, in particular the annual reviews, are 
regarded to be descriptive and oriented toward the past. They describe what the interest group 
in question did the previous year (Kjelstadli 1992: 163). The analysis of historical 
developments has been undertaken on the basis of annual reviews, precisely because of their 
descriptive character. In order to get an impression of development, whether amendments in 
strategic activities have occurred, the annual reviews have been examined from the oldest to 
the most recent document.  
2.6.4 The reliability and validity of research 
'Reliability refers to the degree of consistency with which instances are assigned to the 
same category by different observers or by the same observer on different occasions' 
(Hammersley 1992: 67, referred to in Silverman 2005: 210).  
What reliability implies is the extent to which research is trustworthy, whether the findings 
could be verified by others employing exactly the same methods and theoretical approaches. 
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Consequently, in order to secure a satisfactory level of reliability, research needs to be 
undertaken with high levels of accuracy. In terms of reliability, this research has been 
undertaken in accordance with a carefully considered plan. First, a thorough study of the 
theoretical approaches culminated in the identification of theoretical variables and 
expectations. These constituted the foundation, on which the interview guide was developed. 
Then, after having completed the interviews and transcriptions, each interview was carefully 
analyzed on the basis of the theoretical expectations presented in this chapter.  
With regard to the data material, depersonalization and deletion of interview data, in 
accordance with data protection legislation, necessarily make the exact verification of some of 
this thesis' findings difficult. Where possible, written sources have been supplemented in 
order to enhance the reliability of findings. Nevertheless, a considerable extent of the 
observations would arguably not have been possible to attain without the employment of 
interviews. This aspect ought to be taken into consideration when evaluating the reliability of 
this research.   
'By validity, I mean truth: interpreted as the extent to which an account accurately 
represents the social phenomena to which it refers' (Hammersley 1992: 67, referred to in 
Silverman 2005: 210).  
Cook and Campbell (1979, referred to in Lund 2002: 104-105) have developed a general 
system for evaluating validity in a causal analysis. It is most widely used in quantitative 
research. However, as the objective, 'identification of a specific mechanism – causal pathway 
–' appears to be present in both quantitative and qualitative research, Cook and Campbell's 
system ought to be applicable
26
 on qualitative analysis too (Gerring 2009: 5).  
Internal validity concerns the extent to which a correlation can be interpreted as the effect of 
an independent variable on the dependent variable (Lund 2002: 106). Alternatively, as 
understood by Gerring (2009: 43), the validity of the sample under study. Internal validity is 
the main virtue of the case study (Gerring 2009: 43). With reference to this study, the 
undertake of analysis by means of a multiple case study, has allowed the detailed exanimation 
of interest groups' placement on the independent variables. Simultaneously, the interest 
groups' placement on the dependent variable have been observed. Thereby, a process of 
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identifying plausible causal mechanisms
27
 has been possible to undertake. The internal 
validity of findings arguably constitutes one of the strengths of this study.  
Construct validity concerns the extent to which the operationalized variables measure the 
relevant concepts (Lund 2002: 107). With regard to the independent variables and indicators 
employed in the analysis, these have been sought developed as similar as possible to the 
theoretical expectations promoted by Moravcsik (1993) and Pierson (2000, 2004). They 
consequently ought to measure the terms promoted by the two theorists. The dependent 
variable, interest groups' selection of channel(s) of influence, equally ought to measure the 
correct term. The reason why is that it captures one apparent prominent indicator of interest 
group behaviour.  
External validity refers to the potential for generalizing causal correlations to or over relevant 
individual, situations or periods of time (Lund 2002: 107). In this study it seems more 
appropriate to speak of an endeavour for over-generalization, in that one could envisage the 
applicability of findings to equal interest groups in other European countries too (Lund 2002: 
106). In particular the ones whose country traditionally have been characterized by corporatist 
state-society relations. However, given the inclusion of two cases and thirteen observations – 
in terms of interest groups and diplomats –one must admit that the representativeness28 of the 
sample constitutes a challenge. The units have not been selected in accordance with a random 
selection technique, hence the potential danger of skewness. One illustration is the 
identification of German interest groups on the basis of their participation in European 
associations. However, while acknowledging the potential bias generated by such methods for 
selection, it was recognized as a "necessary evil" in order to gain insight on interest groups 
from the outset. Moreover, the informants, and consequently their information, might have 
been biased by e.g. their specific work locations. In other words, this study's, as case studies 
in general, external validity is not perceived of as too extensive (Gerring 2009: 43). 
Nevertheless, measures, such as the employment of the diverse case selection method, and the 
inclusion of official documents in the analysis, have been employed, in order to accommodate 
this as best as possible. 
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3 Agriculture and food policy in the 
EU, Norway and Germany 
The intention behind this chapter is to sketch the evolution of agriculture- and food policy in 
the European Union, Norway and Germany. Of major significance is the relation between 
decision making authorities and interest groups representing the agricultural, food industry 
and veterinarian sectors. By focusing on the evolution of the European and domestic decision 
making arrangements I present the reader with insight on the policy-making system, against 
which domestic interest groups have channelized their efforts of excitation. This chapter is 
mainly based on contributions by other scholars, however, where found appropriate, 
information from interviews with representatives of Norwegian and German interest groups, 
and diplomats, is to be supplemented.  
My approach is a historical one, focusing on perceived key developments in Norway and 
Germany, as well as the supranational entity – the EU – from 1945 and onwards. The outline 
is structured thematically. It is divided in three. What first is about to be presented is the 
developments in EU agriculture- and food policy. Of special interest are the changes that have 
occurred since the late 1980s. In the second section, attention is directed toward the key 
features of the decision-making system that constitute Norwegian agricultural policy and food 
policy. Emphasis is furthermore put on the apparent influence by the EU on the Norwegian 
political system. The third section examines the decision making systems of food- and 
agricultural policy in Germany. Here too, emphasis is put on the EU’s influence on the 
German political system. With regard to the presentations of Germany prior to the 
reunification in 1990, what needs to be accentuated is the exclusive focus on developments in 
the Federal Republic of Germany – West Germany. 
Three concepts which capture different dimensions of politics are to be used as theoretical 
guidelines in this chapter. The policy dimension denotes the content within a given policy 
sector, the polity dimension equals the – institutional – structure in which policy is made, 
whereas the politics dimension denotes political practice, processes and acting (Rykkja 2008: 
5).  
3.1 Agricultural and food policy at the EU level 
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The Common Agricultural Policy has held a central position in the portfolio of European 
Union policy competences ever since the ratification of the Treaty of Rome in 1958. 
Moreover, agricultural policy is one of the sectors within the EU with highest institutional 
presence and level of activity (Nugent 2010: 353).  Food policy, on the other hand, was for a 
long time handled primarily within the confines of the member states, only to be dealt with on 
an ad hoc basis at EU level (Vos and Wendler 2006: 65, Lie and Veggeland 2010: 66). Since 
the mid 1990s however, a more conceptual approach, involving considerable institutional and 
policy build up, has been developed. In the following, the major developments of EU 
Agriculture- and Food policy after 1990 are to be elaborated.   
3.1.1 The Common Agricultural Policy  
Continuity has been characteristic to the evolution of the Common Agricultural Policy. Its 
objectives are exactly the same, as when agreed upon prior to the ratification of the 1957 EEC 
Treaty – The Treaty of Rome. According to Article 39 (1) of the TFEU29, the CAP is to 
promote: 
(a) the increase of agricultural productivity [...] 
(b) the ensuring of a fair standard of living for the agricultural community [...] 
(c) the stabilization of markets 
(d) the assurance of the availability of supplies  
(e) ensure that supplies reach consumer at reasonable prizes 
(Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, Article 39 (1), referred to in 
Nugent 2010: 358) 
Policy  
According to Daugbjerg and Swinbank (2007: 8, Daugbjerg 2009: 406) the very basic of the 
policy framework, on which the EU’s agricultural policy rests, has been, and apparently still 
is, the state assisted paradigm. In fact, about 40-60 percent of the income of farmers in the 
EU, including Germany, comes from the direct payments of the CAP first pillar (Interview 
Brussels diplomat 2012, DBV 2011: 44). It follows from the state assisted paradigm that ‘the 
agricultural sector contributes to national policy goals and therefore merits special attention, 
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and, [moreover], the price mechanism is a suboptimal means of achieving an efficient and 
productive agricultural sector’ (Coleman et al. 1997: 275, referred to in Daugbjerg and 
Swinbank 2007: 8). Four guiding principles have been derived from the paradigm in order to 
meet the objectives as set out in the Treaty.  
The first principle concerns the internal market – the core of the CAP. It stipulates that  
‘agricultural goods are supposed to be able to flow freely across internal EU borders, 
unhindered by barriers to trade and unhampered by devices such as subsidies or 
administrative regulations that might distort or limit competition’ (Nugent 2010: 359) 
What seemingly appears to be a market based on pure liberal market principles, is however a 
thoroughly regulated one, primarily based on support mechanisms for production. ‘Europe 
[apparently] has not fully embraced the new paradigm of market liberalism’ (Garzon 2006, 
referred to in Nugent 2010: 361). Prior to the initiation of reform processes in the early 1990s, 
the internal market was comprised of multiple ‘common organisations of the market’ 
(COMs). Thus, while constituting a coherent market, the agricultural market in reality was a 
conglomerate of different regimes, with different measures for protection and support built 
into them. What the regimes had in common though, was the considerable burden of their 
financing being held by the EU. Approximately 70 percent of all products generated by 
agriculture in the EU benefitted from some kind of support mechanism – up to the initiation 
of reform in the early 1990s, primarily price support mechanisms. Besides constituting the 
largest post of expenditure on the EU budget – about 60 percent in the late 1980s – CAP 
policy instruments in effect subsidized the generation of vast surpluses of food products. 
These circumstances contributed to the initiation of reform in the early 1990s (Nugent 2010: 
359).  
The three other principles are closely linked to the internal market. Prices on agricultural 
products have invariably – except for a brief period in the 1970s – been higher within the 
internal market than on the world market. Thus, in order to prevent the unlimited inflow of 
cheap products from outside the EU, protectionist measures have been adopted (Nugent 2010: 
359, 361). According to the second principle, the access of non-EU products onto the internal 
market is dependent on the concession of a Community preference by the EU. It should be 
noted that the usage of Community preference has decreased since the early 1990s (Nugent 
2010: 362). A third principle states that the CAP is to be financed jointly by the EU member 
states. Also contributing to the CAP post of expenditure on the EU budget are institutions 
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such as the European Investment Bank (EIB) (Nugent 2010: 362). Whereas the three 
principles already mentioned are official ones, the fourth principle is unofficial in nature. 
Nevertheless, the allowance for national variations is valid (Nugent 2010: 362). What seems 
to be a considerable, and increasing, difference in agricultural economies and structures 
across the EU – not least caused by the enlargements of the EU – appears to have made the 
‘cut slack’ of national activities a necessity. 
Polity 
The majority of expertise required for formulating new CAP policies is located within the 
Directorates General Agriculture (DG Agriculture), the most prominent agenda-setter of CAP 
policies (Nugent 2010: 366). A function of it being a constituent unit of the European 
Commission, the DG Agriculture is responsible for the preparation and submitting of EU 
policy (Lie and Veggeland 2010: 75). It furthermore is responsible for the monitoring of the 
CAP system, including the follow-up of domestic agencies – national Ministries of 
Agriculture etc. – responsible for implementing jurisdiction in national law (Nugent 2010: 
368).   
Over the years, the DG Agriculture has stood out as a proactive actor with regard to the 
promotion of fundamental CAP reform (Nugent 2010: 364). According to Daugbjerg (2009: 
399) this can be seen in light of two fields of responsibility attached to the Commission, 
namely the administering of the EU budget and the conduct of trade negotiations. The 
successful handling of these responsibilities appears to be essential if an impression of the 
Commission – correspondingly the EU – as a trustworthy partner in international trade 
relations is to be maintained (Daugbjerg 2009: 399). Acknowledging the challenges related to 
the fact that the CAP occupies a considerable share of the EU budget, the Commission thus 
has opted for efficiency enhancing measures in order to reduce the spending on agriculture.  
Nevertheless, the DG Agriculture often have found its initiatives for further CAP reform 
being watered-down by the Council of Ministers (Nugent 2010: 365). The Council, or more 
precisely, the Council of Agricultural Minsters (CoAM), is constituted by the Ministers of 
Agriculture of the 27 EU member states. Although its decision-making is based on the 
Qualified Majority Vote
30
 principle, the diversity of interests – which obviously has increased 
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with the Enlargements of 2004 and 2007 – generated by 27 member states has tended to make 
decision making difficult. Hence, the frequent watering-down of Commission proposals in 
order to achieve consensus. Moreover, or possibly due to diversity,  
‘within the [Agricultural Council], it is the norm that the Commissioner’s proposal 
forms the basis of the discussions [...]. After the Commissioner’s proposal has been formally 
presented to the Council, farm ministers seldom put forward alternative proposals’ 
(Daugbjerg 2009: 399).  
Set aside its different approach to reform, in that it has tended to be status-quo oriented, the 
Council of Agriculture nonetheless is an integral part of the highly specialised area of EU 
agricultural policy. The preparatory work prior to Council meetings is handled by a Special 
Committee of Agriculture (SCA), not as in the other policy sector specific Councils, by the 
Committee of Permanent Representatives (COREPER). As is the case in the DG Agriculture, 
the SCA is constituted by actors specialized on agricultural issues. But whereas the officers in 
the DG work in the best interest of the EU as a whole, officers in the SCA, coming from 
member states’ Permanent Representations and national Ministries of Agriculture, promote 
national interests (Nugent 2010: 367, 146).  
The latter of the central institutions at EU level, the popular elected European Parliament 
(EP), has only recently been assigned with de facto influence on the CAP. The introduction of 
the co-decision procedure on the CAP in December 2009, coincides with an already advanced 
process through which the EP has gained more competences in EU decision-making (Nugent 
2010: 205-6). 
Politics 
The management of EU agricultural policy was for a long time handled in accordance with 
the consultation procedure, implying that the supranational EU Commission – the ‘executive’ 
authority of the EU – submitted policy proposals, upon which the Council of Ministers – 
constituted by each member state’s minister of agriculture – decided, after first having 
consulted the European Parliament (Claes and Førland 2004: 171, Nugent 2010: 366). The 
entering into force of the Lisbon Treaty, December 2009, brought substantial change to this 
decision making dynamic, by introducing the co-decision procedure (Nugent 2010: 77, 366). 
                                                                                                                                                        
Consequently, 'a minimum of 255 of the 345 weighted votes', which moreover 'represents the majority of the 
member states' is required (Nugent 2010: 154). 
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First introduced with the entering into force of the Maastricht Treaty in November 1993, and 
now representing the ‘ordinary’ legislative procedure, co-decision implies that policy 
proposals forwarded by the Commission have  to be decided upon by both the Council of 
Ministers and the European Parliament (Claes and Førland 2004: 171, Nugent 2010: 366). 
The popular elected Parliament thus has strengthened its influence on a policy area, which has 
been regarded as somewhat special and isolated from other policy areas (Nugent 2010: 367).  
Both the Commission and the EP thus have considerable influence with regard to formulation, 
the former institution, and decision making, the latter, of EU agricultural policies. Part of both 
institutions’ way of dealing with these responsibilities is to maintain close contacts with 
private interest groups, first and foremost interests from within the food chain. This practice  
was initially encouraged by the first commissioner of DG Agriculture, Sicco Mansholt, who 
invited agricultural private interests to participate in the 1958 negotiations that established the 
CAP (Grant and Stocker 2009: 235-6). Partly due to Mansholt’s initiative, European farm 
interests agreed upon the establishment of a Farmers’ Association at European Community 
level, the COPA, in 1958 (COPA-COGECA 2012). According to Grant and Stocker (2009: 
236-7) COPA became a ‘core insider’ within the Commission’s DG Agriculture. However, 
due to its firm opposition against the Commission’s reform proposals, COPA appears to have 
lost some of its influence on EU policy processes (Grant and Stocker 2009: 237, Nugent 
2010: 356).  
Nonetheless, COPA and other interest groups, such as the CIAA (FoodDrinkEurope) continue 
to hold frequent contacts with the Commission. What furthermore appears to be the incidence, 
is the increased emphasis by interest groups on getting to talk with members of the EP 
(MEPs) (Interview BDSI 2012, Interview by phone DBV 2012). Both interest group actors 
and officials of the Commission and the EP seem to profit from these contacts. The former 
through access and thus the possibility to influence policy-making, and the latter through a 
greater influx of knowledge, experience, and legitimacy, thereby strengthening the basis for 
making policies (Nugent 2010: 357, Bouwen 2009: 22). 
CAP reform  
As noted by Daugbjerg (2009: 400), 
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‘prior to 1992, the CAP had changed little from its original design. Basically, the CAP 
was a high price policy in which consumers paid a significant share of the costs of subsidizing 
farmers through artificially high consumer prices’.  
Pressure for reform was ascending at the time. It came from both within the EU and outside of 
Europe. Within the EU, DG Agriculture, representing the Commission and the EU as a whole, 
was in favour of amendments designed to decrease the CAP spending and handle the 
surpluses of agricultural products. Outside of Europe, international trade negotiations within 
the GATT
31
 framework – later to be renamed the World Trade Organization (WTO) –  
revived the calls for further liberalization of world farm trade (Daugbjerg 2009: 400).  
It was against this context that the EU agreed upon the first round of substantial CAP reform 
in May 1992. According to Daugbjerg (2009: 400), The MacSharry reform – named after the 
then Farm Commissioner  Raymond MacSharry – ‘changed the architecture of the CAP’, 
while simultaneously ‘preserving the core of the policy’. Included in the reform was ‘a partial 
shift from price support mechanisms to direct payments’ (Daugbjerg 2009: 400). Moreover, 
one sought a bearing down of prices on agricultural products (Nugent 2010: 359). 
Compensatory measures were adopted in order to accompany farmers’ loss of revenue. A new 
agri-environmental programme postulated the direction of subsidies toward the afforestation 
of agricultural land, the reservation of a minimum of 15 percent of the farmer’s arable land 
and the providence of an early retirement scheme for farmers (Daugbjerg 2009: 400). Despite 
‘outright’ opposition from actors representing the policy takers – first and foremost the 
European Farmers’ Association (COPA), but also national ones such as the German Farmers’ 
Association (DBV) – the reform package was agreed upon by the Council of Agricultural 
Ministers (Daugbjerg 2009: 401-402). The MacSharry reform was regarded as a necessary 
step in order to reach an agreement of the Uruguay Round
32
, the negotiations on which had 
broken down in December 1990 (Daugbjerg 2009: 9).  
Five years later, in July 1997, the Commission set out a new programme for CAP reform, the 
Agenda 2000. What the MacSharry reform did was arguably not to solve, but to alleviate the 
challenges caused by the CAP (Nugent 2010: 359-360). Internal and external pressures – 
elaborated on above – were still very much present. European decision makers furthermore 
had the forthcoming enlargements of the EU to Central East European Countries (the CEECs) 
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 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.  
32
 the 8th round of multilateral trade negotiations conducted within the GATT framework, 1986-1994 
(Daugbjerg and Swinbank 2007: 2).  
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in mind. The content of the Agenda 2000 reform represented ‘a deepening’ of what was 
decided upon in the MacSharry reform (Daugbjerg and Swinbank 2007: 8). Further steps were 
taken with regard to the removal and reduction of support prices, and, moreover, the 
expansion of direct compensatory support to farmers (Nugent 2010: 360). Yet another, more 
inventory step, was the establishment of a second pillar – the first one being the price- and 
income support mechanisms –  to the CAP; rural development (Daugbjerg and Swinbank 
2007: 8). However, as the establishment reflected partly a strengthening and partly a 
reorganization of existing rural development programmes, the actual change caused by the 
pillar structure should not be exaggerated (Daugbjerg and Swinbank 2007: 8). The Agenda 
2000 reform proposal was supported by a qualified majority of the CoAM in March 1999, 
only to be watered down by the heads of state at the Berlin summit of the European Council 
some weeks later (Daugbjerg and Swinbank 2007: 14-15).  
The Fischler reform constitutes the latest of the major CAP reforms. It was put forward by the 
then DG Agriculture Commissioner Franz Fischler in July 2002, and presented as a mid-term 
review of the 1999 agreements (Daugbjerg 2009: 405). Whereas the reform package agreed 
upon in 1999 appeared to be a ‘deepening’ of the MacSharry reform, what Commissioner 
Fischler presented ‘involved a change of policy instruments’ (Daugbjerg and Swinbank 2007: 
8). With reference to the growing complexities caused by the introduction of direct payment 
mechanisms, Fischler recommended the de-coupling of direct aid payments and its 
transformation into a Single Payment Scheme (SPS) (Daugbjerg and Swinbank 2007: 8, 
Daugbjerg 2009: 403-405). De-coupling is understood as the separation of financial support 
from agricultural production. According to the Single Payment Scheme, one single payment is 
to be issued. Moreover, a system of ‘cross-compliance’ makes the payment conditional on 
farmers fulfilling multiple farming practice standards, such as e.g. food safety and animal 
welfare (Nugent 2010: 360).  
The approach to reform brought forward by the Commission, was, just as the MacSharry 
reform, met with ‘fierce opposition’ by a majority of national ministers within the CoAM 
(Daugbjerg 2009: 406). Also present within the oppositional camp was the European 
Farmers’ Association (COPA). But, as noted by Daugbjerg (2009: 406), ‘the power of COPA 
had declined dramatically over the past two decades’. Hence, despite its critique especially 
against the introduction of ‘de-coupling’, COPA was not able to prevent the CoAM from 
eventually reaching an agreement – one more flexible than the original draft  – on the Fischler 
45 
 
reform. The acceptance by EU member states seems to have been partly driven by the need to 
adjust the CAP to ongoing WTO negotiations on farm trade – the Doha round. By de-
coupling, the EU was able to transfer its farm support mechanisms from ‘the blue box’ 
category – ‘under-production-limiting programmes’ – into ‘the green box’ category – 
‘minimally trade distorting domestic support’ – of the WTO, the former category being 
subject to reductions (Daugbjerg and Swinbank 2007: 10, Daugbjerg 2009: 405).  
According to Nugent (2010: 361), the three rounds of reform have brought about fundamental 
changes of the EU agricultural market, on which the CAP rests. Income support mechanisms 
have been introduced and intervention prices lowered, in an attempt to restore market 
imbalances and budget deficits. De-coupling of support mechanisms in accordance with the 
Single Payment Scheme (SPS), was adopted partly as a reaction to growing ‘international 
dissatisfaction with the distorting effects of the CAP on world [...] trade’ (Nugent 2010: 361). 
Finally, an increasing number of policy areas have been added to the CAP, thereby making 
the framework increasingly complex. Rural development now constitutes the second pillar of 
EU agricultural policy. Food policy, furthermore, has rapidly become a primary concern for 
the EU. The evolution of EU food policy is to be elaborated on in the forthcoming section. 
3.1.2 EU Food policy 
Food policy is in this thesis understood to be ‘public measures designed with the purpose of 
securing safe food of good quality that is presented in a honest way’ (Lie and Veggeland 
2010: 18). With honest presentation of food is meant the guarantee for consumers that the 
food products they purchase in fact is what they are made to look like by the seller. Central 
characteristics associated with food policy are food security
33
; the securing of sufficient 
amounts of food to all inhabitants, food safety; the securing of safe food free from disease and 
non-contagious, the promotion of fine nourishment and the satisfaction by food products to 
environmental standards (Lie and Veggeland 2010: 18). In this elaboration on the 
developments of EU Food policy, special emphasis is put on the food safety aspect. One 
prominent reason is the extensiveness of this policy, in terms of its applicability to multiple 
societal sectors. As stated in the Commission's White Paper,  
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 is provided for by the aims of the CAP (Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, Article 39 (1), 




The guiding principle throughout this White Paper is that food safety policy must be 
based on a comprehensive, integrated approach. This means throughout the food chain ('farm 
to table'); across all food sectors; between the Member States; at the EU external frontier and 
within the EU; in international and EU decision-making fora, and at all stages of the policy-
making cycle [...](European Commission 2000: 8). 
EU Food policy up to the 1990s 
The institutions of the European Community were from the outset not meant to deal with food 
safety and consumer protection (Vos and Wendler 2006: 66). These policy concerns remained 
primarily under the jurisdiction of the member states (Lie and Veggeland 2010: 66, Ugland 
and Veggeland 2006: 612). According to Ansell and Vogel (2006: 6) ‘food safety [as a matter 
of fact] is one of the oldest regulatory systems at the national level’. Food safety policies were 
however made at European level too – the first EU directive on food coming into force as 
early as 1962 (Ugland and Veggeland 2006: 612). These however were strongly induced by 
the objectives set out in the Common Agricultural Policy. EU Food policy, first and foremost 
food safety, can be portrayed as a balancing act between the promotion of ‘a true internal 
market’ and the protection of consumer health and safety (Vos and Wendler 2006: 65). With 
regard to the EU policies on food up to the mid-1980s, emphasis was mainly put on the 
preposition of the free movement of agricultural goods, against which national regulatory 
systems were perceived of as potential barriers (Vos and Wendler 2006: 66-67, Ugland and 
Veggeland 2006: 612).  
Meanwhile, an ad hoc institutional system employed with the protection of consumer’s 
interests, including food safety, was developed at Community level from the 1960s and 
onwards. This however was a very complex structure with units dispersed across several DGs, 
including DG Industry, DG Social Affairs and DG Agriculture (Ugland and Veggeland 2006: 
613). Moreover, the structure merely constituted a system of consultation. A number of 
committees composed of scientific experts, national representatives and representatives of 
interest groups, provided the Commission with scientific knowledge (Vos and Wendler 2006: 
67). The Standing Committee on Foodstuffs – established in 1969 – on the other hand, 
provided an arena for discussion and consensus-making between national representatives and 
the Commission (Vos and Wendler 2006: 67). Despite these arrangements, food safety 
policies at EU level still remained disintegrated (Ugland and Veggeland 2006: 613).  
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The BSE-crisis as a window of opportunity  
In March 1996 the United Kingdom government went public with the finding of a possible 
connection between the BSE-disease
34
 found in cattle and the fatal Creutzfeldt-Jacob disease 
(vCJD) found in humans (Ugland and Veggeland 2006: 615, Ansell and Vogel 2006: 13). TV-
images of the burning of possibly BSE-infected cattle in the UK, the ban on British beef 
imposed by the EU, so on so forth, triggered strong emotional reactions across Europe (Ansell 
and Vogel 2006: 4, 13). Both the British government and the EU, in particular the 
Commission, came under heavy criticism for their approach to food safety regulation, an 
approach which until the 1990s ‘was widely accepted as functioning adequately’ (Vos and 
Wendler 2006: 68-69).  
The BSE-crisis has been recognized as a damaging factor to the popular trust and legitimacy 
of the EU’s ‘ad hoc’ food safety approach – and public authority food safety regulations in 
general (Ansell and Vogel 2006: 12, 20). With public attention and media scrutiny rising to 
intense levels, the pressure on both national and European decision makers ‘to do something 
about it’ equally was ascending. Thus, a window of opportunity for fundamental reform was 
emerging due to the ‘shock to the institutional status quo’ caused by the BSE-crisis (Ansell 
and Vogel 2006: 12, Ugland and Veggeland 2006: 616).  
What seems to have become apparent for decision makers in light of the BSE-disclosure was 
the need for a more coherent approach to food safety regulations. Furthermore, a new 
approach ought to be ‘causally related and structurally connected around the public health 
objectives’ (Ugland and Veggeland 2006: 616). The balancing act between economic, internal 
market, oriented objectives and public health objectives, inherent in EU Food policy, was in 
need for a revisal. As noted by the then President of the Commission, Jacques Santer, in his 
remark on the EP’s report on BSE – the ‘Medina Ortega report – 19. February 1997:  
Did the Commission put the market before public health? With the benefit of what we 
know today, the attitude adopted at the time is open to criticism. But it must also be admitted 
that the question was not put then in such straightforward terms: the market or health.[...] 
But I would also point out that a number of measures - at both national and Community level 
- to prevent any risk to health were taken from 1989 90 onwards. I would add in this 
connection that a number of Commission proposals designed to strengthen the health pillar of 
the single market were not adopted. The Member States rejected them. [...] It is my belief that 
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 Bovin spongiform encephalopati, commonly known as mad-cow disease, because of its damaging effect on the 
brain of cattle, among which the BSE-disease spreads.   
48 
 
the time has come to put health to the fore in Europe. (European Commission 1997, referred 
to in Ugland and Veggeland 2006: 615) 
Policy reform 
A series of amendments were set in motion in order to ‘put health to the fore in Europe’. At 
the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference in Amsterdam, member state Heads of State agreed 
upon the reformulation of some of the Articles of the EC Treaty. Henceforth, the Article 152 
spelt out ‘the requirement that all Community policies and actions should ‘ensure’ ([prior to 
the amendments, the spelling was] ‘contribute to’) a high level of health protection in 
general’ (Vos 2000: 235, referred to in Ugland and Veggeland 2006: 616). In addition the 
Commission issued two papers – the Green Paper on the general principles of food law, 1997, 
and the White Paper on Food Safety, 2000 – in which the foundations of a new, 
comprehensive, food safety policy were developed (Vos and Wendler 2006: 70). Both the 
Commission papers and the amendments to the EC Treaty pointed forward to the entering into 
force of the General Food Law in 2002.  
The General Food Law (GLF) reaffirmed the developments which had occurred since 1996 – 
‘the ‘Year Zero’ of the EU food regime’ (Vos and Wendler 2006: 70). Inherent in the GFL is 
the common principles, procedures and responsibilities of EU Food policies (Vos and 
Wendler 2006: 72). Herewith is stated that:  
consumer health protection placed at the fore of EU food policy, decisions based on 
sound science, transparency of scientific advice and regulative decisions, food safety 
objectives pursued in all food sectors (sector consistency) and throughout the whole chain of 
food production, all of which principles are to be ensured (Ugland and Veggeland 2006: 
617).  
The latter principle, pursuit of food safety objectives throughout the whole chain of food 
production, is a confirmation of the new, integrated approach to food safety – ‘from the farm 
to the fork’ (Vos and Wendler 2006: 65). Which, according to an informant from the 
Norwegian Mission in Brussels, even applies to activities ‘behind the farm’, with e.g. 
authorization of fertilizers  being issued by the EU (Interview Mission of Norway to the EU 
2012a). Consequentially, an extensive scope of sectors and actors – including the farming 
sector, processing industry, veterinarians etc. – are subjected to EU Food Law. Yet another 
aspect contributing to the wide applicability of the GFL is its adoption in the form of a 
regulation – more precisely, Regulation 178/2002 (Vos and Wendler 2006: 72). EU 
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Regulations are transposed directly into member states’ jurisdiction, whereas in case of EU 
Directives, member states enjoy a greater degree of freedom with regard to the exact 
introduction of law into national jurisdiction (Lie and Veggeland 2010: 70). From primarily 
issuing directives on food policy, the EU is moving in direction of a greater usage of 
regulations when issuing new food policies (Ugland and Veggeland 2006: 616). Consequently 
reflecting the considerably enhanced authority of the EU in member states’ food policy 
jurisdictions.  
Reform of the polity 
Yet another amendment emerged in the form of an extensive reorganization of units 
responsible for food safety regulations. A new administrative department had been established 
within the Commission in 1995, DG Consumer Policy. In 1996/97,  scientific committees that 
previously had been dispersed across several DGs, were moved to the new DG. Also subject 
for transfer to the new DG was the responsibility for food and veterinary inspections
35
, which 
up to then had been governed by DG Agriculture (Ugland and Veggeland 2006: 615). The 
considerably enlarged DG Consumer was then renamed  DG Consumer Policy and Health 
Protection (the present DG Health and Consumers, DG SANCO). By co-locating the majority 
of units employed with food safety regulation, the EU signalled its intent of creating a 
framework much more coherent. The selection of DG SANCO as main food safety location 
furthermore signalled an intent of distancing the policy sector from economic interests.  
A key feature of the emerging EU food regime was its emphasis on risk analysis (Vos and 
Wendler 2006: 72). The organizational framework underpinning the regime in fact appeared 
to be built around the aspects of risk analysis; risk assessment and risk management.  
With regard to risk assessment, the co-location of scientific committees into the DG SANCO 
appeared to be an insufficient measure for confidence in EU regulation to be restored. Hence, 
the creation of an independent agency, the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA), as 
stipulated in the GLF (Vos and Wendler 2006: 618). As noted by Ugland and Veggeland 
(2006: 618) ‘EFSA can be seen as a response to the need for increased excellence, 
independence and transparency of scientific advice and to the necessity of separating 
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scientific advice from regulative activity’. The independence of EFSA is provided for by its 
location outside of the Commission’s organizations. Although having no decision-making 
powers, its leading role in providing risk managers in the Commission, EP and Council of 
Ministers with scientific advice nevertheless constitutes a sound base for exerting influence 
on policy-making (Ugland and Veggeland 2006: 618). Also affiliated with the EFSA is an 
advisory forum, in which one representative from each member state, plus an observer from 
the Commission and the Executive director of the EFSA participates (Vos and Wendler 2006: 
79). Norway, together with the EFTA-countries Switzerland and Iceland, is participating in 
the advisory forum as observers (Veggeland 2011: 13).  
Reform of politics  
According to the GFL the conduct of risk assessment and risk management is to be held 
‘strictly separated, both functionally and institutionally’ (Vos and Wendler 2006: 74). The 
conduct of risk management involves ‘the weighing of policy alternatives, consultancy with 
concerned parties and [consideration] of scientific advice provided by the EFSA [...]’ (Vos 
and Wendler 2006: 88). These tasks are primarily realized by the Commission’s DG SANCO. 
As a matter of fact both preparation of food policy drafts, decision-making and management, 
usually, take place within the DG SANCO. Decision-making on Food policy is performed in 
accordance with the comitology procedures, introduced by the EU in 1987. Where applied, 
the Commission has the authority to make the decisions, but only if the draft in questions has 
been accepted by a committee composed of representatives from the member states (Lie and 
Veggeland 2010: 80).  
In relation with the entering into force of the GLF, a revision of the comitology procedure on 
Food policy was made. A new comitology committee, the Standing Committee on the Food 
Chain and Animal Health (SCFCAH), was put in place. It replaced the various comitology 
committees that had operated on food safety up to the BSE-crisis in 1996 (Vos and Wendler 
2006: 88). Henceforth, in order to adopt new policies on foodstuffs the Commission first has 
to consult the SCFCAH, whose backing requires the support by a qualified majority of its 
members (Vos and Wendler 2006: 89). The committee, under which numerous working 
groups are located, is composed of member state representatives. As was the case with the 
EFSA advisory group, Norway is represented in both the SCFCAH and its affiliated working 
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groups (Veggeland 2011: 14). However, due to her status as observer, Norway possess no 
formal voting rights. 
A supervisory role of the comitology procedure, and hence conduct of risk management, has 
been assigned to the European Parliament (Vos and Wendler 2006: 89). Thus although the 
EP’s active participation in these policy processes appears to be somewhat limited, it 
nonetheless has a role to play. Its right to scrutinize was given in 1999
36
 , in 2006 it 
furthermore was given the right to oppose decisions made by the Commission and the 
SCFCAH, however only in specific instances
37
 (Council of the European Union 2006, 
referred to in Vos and Wendler 2006: 89).  
Apart from the SCFCAH, the Commission is expected to consult the Advisory Group on the 
Food Chain and Animal and Plant Health on food safety issues (Vos and Wendler 2006: 91). 
The Advisory Group ensures the inclusion of private stakeholder groups in DG SANCO 
policymaking. It was created by the Commission in 2004 in order to meet the requirements as 
set out in Article 9 of the GFL ‘that there shall be an open and transparent public 
consultation’ (EUR-Lex 2002, referred to in Vos and Wendler 2006: 90). 36 organizations 
were initially given membership on the basis of the general criteria
38
 formulated by the 
Commission. Later on, nine additional organizations have been granted access by the 
Commission (European Commission 2011). Thus, the Advisory Group now is composed of 
45 European level groups, including the likes of COPA-COGECA, FoodDrinkEurope (CIAA) 
and the Federation of Veterinarian of Europe (FVE) (European Commission 2011). Meetings 
are in principle held twice a year, during which the group members are consulted and 
informed by the Commission (Vos and Wendler 2006: 90-91).  
3.1.3 Summary thus far 
In the two first sections of this chapter, focus has been on the EU’s agricultural and food 
policy sectors. The changes brought about by reform have been fundamental in both policy 
sectors.  
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 Comitology Decision 1999/468 (Vos and Wendler 2006: 89).  
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 'on the grounds that the measures exceed the implementing powers provided for in the basic instrument or are 
not compatible with the aim or the content of the basic instrument or do not respect the principles of subsidiarity 
or proportionality;' (Council of the European Union 2006). 
38
 'the organisation must have as its primary objective the protection of interests in food safety matters, [...] it 
must represent all or most of the Member States, as well as have a permanent representation at the Community 
level' (Vos and Wendler 2006: 90).  
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With regard to the Common Agricultural Policy changes appear to be most prominent in its 
policy and politics dimension, whereas the polity – the structure and institutions – of the CAP  
appears to be more or less untouched. Considerable reform efforts have been directed toward 
the functioning of the EU’s internal agricultural market, including the financial support 
mechanisms for farmers. Furthermore, the European Parliament has been handed co-decision 
rights, thereby altering the processes of CAP decision-making, and the GATT/WTO trade 
negotiations have increased in importance to EU agricultural policy makers (Daugbjerg and 
Swinbank 2007: 9).  
What has taken place with regard to EU Food policy – food safety policy in particular – since 
the BSE-crisis in 1996, is more or less the birth of a new policy area, with amendments being 
made both with regard to the policy, polity and politics dimension. Prior to the crisis in 1996, 
the EU employed an ad hoc approach to food policy. EU laws on food safety were primarily 
motivated by the objectives of the CAP, i.e. the promotion of the internal market of 
agricultural goods. Since 1996 however, a new institutional framework has been put in place. 
It is to administer a considerably enlarged portfolio of policies, which now applies to sectors 
and actors across the whole food production chain and furthermore have consumer- and 
health protection as their number one priority (Lie and Veggeland 2010: 70) These changes 
have been accompanied by the gradual delegation of food policy competences and decision 
making power from the member state level to the European level (Lie and Veggeland 2010: 
92).  
3.2 The political systems of food and agriculture at 
domestic level 
The next two sections of this chapter are to focus on the political systems attached to 
agriculture and food policy in Norway and Germany. Private and public actors, and the 
institutional arrangements between which – state-society relations – are of special interest. 
Moreover, how the two countries in question are affected by the agricultural and food policy 
sectors of the EU is to be dealt with. The inquiry into state-society relations in Norway and 
Germany points forward to one of the main questions underpinning this thesis, whether 
interest group strategies toward decision  making authorities are being adjusted in response to 
the increasing importance of the EU.  
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First of all however, what deserves a brief presentation is the system in which farmers, food 
manufacturers, merchants etc. – the food- and agriculture policy takers – operate; i.e. the food 
production chain. What is provided is a brief introduction to how the actors under scrutiny 
relate to each other. Basic interests of actors can arguably be derived from their positioning 
within the food production chain.  
3.2.1 The food production chain 
According to Rommetvedt and his fellow scholars (2002: 18) the food production chain – 
from now on, food chain – can be regarded as constituting a political-economic system. 
Economic in the sense that the chain involves the production, processing, selling, 
consumption and, last but not least, profiting of food commodities. Political in the sense that 
activities across the food chain  are subjected to public regulations and monitoring from both 
national and inter-/supranational authorities. Furthermore, public authorities to a varying 
extent constitute an important source of economic income for actors – such as e.g. farmers – 
within the food chain. Consequently, with reference to the multiplicity of affiliated actors, an 
equivalent number of incentives for the exertion of influence on policy-makers exist.  
The food chain tends to be portrayed as consisting of four sections; the farmers, the food 
industry, the food retailers and the consumers (Rommetvedt 2002: 18). With regard to the 
dynamics linking the four – put very simply – , the farmers appear to be interested in selling 
their raw materials for a highest possible price, whereas the food industry
39
 is interested in 
buying them to favourable prices (Rommetvedt 2002: 24). Similar mechanisms appear to be 
in work when moving further down the food chain, i.e. from food producers to retailers, and 
from retailers to consumers. As noted by Rommetvedt (2002: 24) such dynamics easily create 
contradictory interests between the different sectors of the food chain. On the other hand, one 
might argue that the system, in which the sectors comprising the food chain co-exist, is 
characterized by interdependence, implying that actors are mutually dependent, and hence get 
affected by each other’s actions (Jackson and Sørensen 2007: 103). If so, one might assume 
actors affiliated with the food chain to coordinate to a greater extent their positions when 
seeking influence on policy-makers’ decisions. 
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 With regard to the food industry, what should be noted is the difference between the industry owned by 
farmers, the agricultural cooperatives, and the private food industry (Rommetvedt 2002: 20, 23). 
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3.2.2 The political system of agriculture and food in Norway  
Policy 
The Norwegian Ministry of Agriculture and Food operates with four main objectives as 
foundation for its agriculture- and food policy. These are food security (the securing of 
sufficient amounts of food that moreover is safe to eat), agriculture in all regions of Norway, 
increase in added value (encouragement of innovation and adjustment in order to strengthen 
the competitiveness of agricultural activities) and sustainable agriculture (sustainable usage of 
resources in order to safeguard the environment) (Norwegian Ministry of Agriculture and 
Food 2011: 14). One observes the inclusion of various non-economic objectives in the 
political framework, including the likes of scattered settlements (regional policy), the 
environment and the protection of agricultural landscape (Veggeland 2011: 40). It is ‘a 
multifunctional agriculture [that] constitutes the foundation for agriculture- and food policy 
making’ (Norwegian Ministry of Agriculture and Food 2011a: 15). An apparent indicium  is 
the incorporation of food- and consumer policy into what seemingly used to be an exclusive 
agricultural policy (Rommetvedt 2002: 31).  
Politics and Polity  
Agricultural policy in Norway is primarily managed through the annual agricultural 
negotiations (“jordbruksforhandlingene”). The negotiations have found place every autumn 
since 1950 – with the establishment of the General Agreement. Based on the longevity of the 
arrangement, one could argue that the arrangement itself constitutes an institution, and thus 
amount to a central feature of both agricultural politics and the polity. Hence, the inclusion of 
both politics and polity in this section.  
The General Agreement constitutes the very symbol of an agricultural policy-making sector 
distinguished by corporatism (Rommetvedt 2002: 25, Seip 2002: 120). Schmitter (1974: 93) 
defines corporatism as 
a system of interest representation in which the constituent units are organized into a 
limited number of singular, compulsory, noncompetitive, hierarchically ordered and 
functionally differentiated categories, recognized or licensed (if not created) by the state and 
granted a deliberate representational monopoly within their respective categories in 
exchange for observing certain controls on their selection of leaders and articulation of 
demands and supports. 
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The relation between societal interests, interest groups, and the public administration is the 
key feature of this corporative channel (Rommetvedt 2002: 25). In Norway, it is common for 
interest groups to participate routinely in consultation forums provided by the public 
administration. In most instances, however, political decisions are made by the popular 
elected and implemented by the public administration (Rommetvedt 2002: 25). What stands 
out with regard to the agricultural policy sector is its more ‘complete’ variant of corporatism. 
In addition to being present in consultancy forums, agricultural interest groups, at least in 
principal, have a major say in the determination of political outcomes – by means of the 
General Agreement.  What comes out of the negotiations on the General Agreement are 
moreover, to a great extent implemented by affected special interests themselves 
(Rommetvedt 2002: 26, Nordby 1994: 9).  
With regard to the General Agreement, and the negotiation on which, its constituent parties 
are the Norwegian Farmers’ Union, the Norwegian Farmers and Smallholders Union and the 
state authority. The negotiating parties are in principal coequals during the negotiations 
(Rommetvedt 2002: 26). Both parties, the special interests and the state, appear to have some 
advantage from the arrangement (Seip 2002: 126). The farmer organizations have gained 
unique access to national policy-makers and, furthermore, co-decision rights. For state 
authorities, the General Agreement has functioned as a means to control the developments 
within the agriculture and food chain as such, and to legitimize its policies (Seip 2002: 119, 
126).  
Agriculture in Norway has traditionally been extensively regulated. What initially was 
implemented into national legislation as a response to measures initiated by the Farmers’ 
Union in the 1930s
40
, has materialized itself in agricultural policy-making later on. The 
introduction of negotiations on a General Agreement in 1950 thus constituted a formalization 
of an arrangement already established (Seip 2002: 119-20). Through the negotiations, 
objectives such as prices on grain feed and the size of farmers’ income subsidies, were 
discussed and determined. From the 1960s and onwards further objectives, such as e.g. new 
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measures to regulate prices and social measures for farmers, were included in the 
negotiations. The General Agreement thus came to be decisive not only for the two farm 
unions, who were taking part in the negotiations, but also for the economic organizations who 
represented the interests of food industry and food retail (Seip 2002: 127-28).  
In the first Norwegian Account on Power (“Den første Maktutredningen”) Egeberg, Olsen 
and Sætren (1978, referred to in Rommetvedt 2002: 16) elaborated on the possible coming 
into existence of a segmented
41
 state. Whereas the three scholars adopted a rather cautious 
approach to the term, Hernes (1983, referred to in Rasch and Rommetvedt 1999) came to the 
conclusion that ‘iron triangles’ – close alliances – within sector specific policy areas existed. 
Members of a sector specific Parliament committee hence were expected to have close 
alliances with officials in the corresponding sector specific Ministry and sector specific 
interest groups. Together the parties of the ‘iron triangle’ would sort out the policy-making 
decisions, thereby establishing a hegemony over their policy sector (Rommetvedt 2002: 16).  
Policy-making on agriculture has tended to be highlighted as containing elements of 
segmentation (Nordby 1994: 32). Accordingly, the main content of policies has been 
formulated at the negotiation table between the two farmer unions and the state authorities, 
and then endorsed – usually without amendments – by the Norwegian Parliament (Seip 2002: 
135). Furthermore, the implementation of agreed upon policies has been, and still is, 
administered by a ‘commerce council’ (“omsetningsrådet”) composed of organizations 
representing agricultural- and food industry interests (Rommetvedt 2002: 26, Norwegian 
Agricultural Authority 2012). With regard to the organizations representing the food industry, 
these do not have access to the negotiations on the General Agreement. Thus, whereas the 
farm unions have tended to rely on the corporative channel, food industry organizations, 
especially the non co-operatives, have made use of informal channels – by means of lobbyism 
– in order to attain decision makers (Rommetvedt 2002: 27).  
However, as times have been changing so it appears that the precedence held by Norwegian 
farmer unions, with regard to access to decision makers through corporative channels, has 
receded. Rommetvedt (2002: 27) in 2002 observes a greater orientation toward informal, less 
institutionalized lobby strategies, also in agriculture. A greater awareness of the importance of 
influencing the opinion, and the consumer, via e.g. communication in the media is for 
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 (Interview Norwegian Farmers' Union 2012). This tendency 
corresponds with the general currents in society, with market economic, neo liberal, thinking 
paving its way into the different areas of society since the 1980s (Seip 2002: 133). The 
competition between actors and different segments of the food chain has increased 
(Rommetvedt 2002: 24-25, Seip 2002: 136). One furthermore observes enhanced 
concentration of market control in the food retail segment, with relatively few retailers 
controlling vast majorities of the food market (Norwegian Ministry of Agriculture and Food 
2011b: 19). The increased competition within the food chain allegedly reappear in the 
influence channels toward decision-making authorities (Seip 2002: 136). Farsund (2002: 160) 
observers the strengthened presence of the food industry in relation with the 1998-2000 
agricultural negotiations. Based on these observations, one might argue that the present 
system, with negotiations on the General Agreement performed exclusively by farm interests 
and the authorities, is coming under increasing pressure. 
The EU’s presence in Norwegian Agriculture and Food policy 
Not only have the circumstances within the food chain changed over the years, so has the 
framework for policy making. As noted by Rommetvedt (2002: 21), policy making on 
agriculture (and, in particular, food) is not conducted in isolation from international influence 
anymore. In what follows, the EU’s effect on Norwegian agriculture and food business is to 
be presented. 
The EEA-agreement  
The Agreement on the European Economic Area (from now on, the EEA-agreement) is an 
international law pertaining agreement between the EU and the three European Free Trade 
Association (EFTA) countries
43
 Norway, Iceland and Lichtenstein (Lie and Veggeland 2010: 
84). The European Economic Area thus is comprised of all EU member states and of the three 
EFTA countries. It entered into force on the 1. of January 1994, the same year the Norwegian 
people voted no to EU-membership in a referendum. Consequently, instead of EU 
membership the EEA-agreement has become the foundation of the attachment between the 
EU and Norway (Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2012a).  
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 direct quote: 'inntrykket er at en kanskje har blitt mer og mer bevisst på å påvirke opinionen da, og påvirke 
forbrukere, folk flest [...] enn bare byråkrati og politikere'. 'det er klart at media og har blitt viktigere da, altså på 
innflytelse, altså kanskje ikke på media, men via media'.  
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 the fourth EFTA-country, Switzerland, is not member of the EEA (Lie and Veggeland 2010: 84). 
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Main objective of the EEA-agreement is to link the EEA/EFTA-countries to the EU’s single 
market by means of a common legislation on the free exchange of goods, free movement of 
people, services and capital
44
, and also common rules of competition (Norwegian Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs 2012a: 14). Due to the agreement, Norway gets to participate in the single 
market, while simultaneously accepting the incorporation of an extensive part of EU 
legislation – in particular the ones concerning the ‘four freedoms’ (Lie and Veggeland 2010: 
85). One of the central characteristics of the EEA-agreement is its dynamism (Norwegian 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2012a: 16). The agreement is continuously subject to update as 
the system of agreements needs to be kept in accordance
45
 with the ever evolving EU 
legislation. Implementation and compliance to EEA (EU) legislation is monitored by ESA, 
The EFTA Surveillance Authority (Lie and Veggeland 2010: 85). Originally, the EEA-
agreement consisted of 1875 legal documents (when signed in May 1992). Since then, 9008 
legal documents
46
 have been implemented into Norwegian legislation (pr. 30. August 2012) 
(Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2012a: 16). Thus, the evolution of the EEA-
agreement, in terms of its volume and scope, appears to be considerable. Consequently, 
Norwegian authorities is to a greater extent enforced to include the European dimension when 
weighing political options (Veggeland 2011: 51).  
The influence of the EU on Norwegian agriculture 
Agricultural policy was one of the policy areas
47
 that was omitted from the EEA-framework 
during negotiations in 1990-1992 , one reason being the Norwegian government’s objective to 
hold on to its right to protect the agriculture- and food industry from competition from abroad 
(Veggeland 2011). With agricultural policy being left nearly unaffected by EU/EEA-
legislation, Norway has held greater degrees of freedom with regard to the formulation of its 
agricultural policies (Veggeland 2011: 35). Hence, the continuation of an ambitious 
agricultural policy with extensive usage of support mechanisms, strong import protection and 
clear targets for production and income (Veggeland 2011: 40).  
Norway’s interests with regard to the EU’s Common Agricultural Policy appear to be 
somewhat defensive. With the exception of the cheese brand ‘Jarlsberg’, Norwegian 
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 The four freedoms of the EU – free movement of goods, capital, services and people. 
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 One primary target for the EU is the uniform, homogenous, development of its legislation.  
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 total amount of EEA legal documents in force today is 4445. 
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 another policy area that was excluded was fishery (Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2012: 16). 
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ambitions in terms of export of agricultural products arguably are non-existent (Interview 
Mission of Norway to the EU 2012b). Moreover, according to an informant from one of the 
leading interest groups of Norwegian food industry, the CAP is being looked upon as a 
‘threat’ by the industry. The main reason is the difference in competitive ability, generated by 
differences in Norwegian and EU agricultural policy, first and foremost with regard to the 
emphasis on market orientation (Interview Federation of Norwegian Food and Drink 
Industries 2012).  
Although being to some extent protected from the EU’s agricultural policy, two law 
provisions of the EEA-agreement nonetheless affect Norwegian agriculture- and food 
industry. Both of which concern the trade of agricultural goods. These are Article 19 and 
Protocol 3.  
According to Article 19 of the EEA Agreement (EFTA 2011: 11) 
1. The Contracting Parties shall examine any difficulties that might arise in their trade in 
agricultural products and shall endeavour to seek appropriate solutions. 
2. The Contracting Parties undertake to continue their efforts with a view to achieving 
progressive liberalization of agricultural trade. 
3. To this end, the Contracting Parties will carry out, before the end of 1993 and subsequently 
at two-yearly intervals, reviews of the conditions of trade in agricultural products. 
Which stated, an ambition to further liberalize agricultural trade between the EFTA 
signatories and the EU is expressed in the agreement. It is in particular the trade with basis 
agricultural products, such as milk, meat, vegetables etc, that this provision is directed at 
(Prestegard et al 2009: 121). The first agreement on the review of Article 19 entered into force 
on 1. of July 2003. As a consequence, competition levels on the domestic food market 
increased a little. On the other hand, one observed some increase in the export potential for 
Norwegian food enterprises (Prestegard et al 2009: 121). A second agreement on the Article 
19 came into force on the 1. of January 2012. In response to EU member states’ demands of 
easier market access, the Norwegian government has given concessions on agricultural goods 
where import already features, or import is requested by the food industry (Prestegard et al 
2009: 121, Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2012a: 19).  
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Protocol 3 of the EEA-agreement concerns the trade with ‘Price Compensation to processed 
Agricultural Products’ (“RÅK48-varer”), understood as goods for which raw material 
compensation is given (Prestegard et al 2009: 122). Products such as yoghurt, ice cream, soup 
and pasta typically belong to this category. According to Protocol 3, products belonging to the 
raw material compensated category are subjected to the general provisions on the free 
movement of goods, as stated in the EEA-agreement (Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
2012a: 19). The entering into force of the protocol in Norway, 1. of January 2002, resulted in 
the general cut of tariff rates of approximately 3 percent. Which in turn led to the 
enhancement of competition in the domestic markets, in which products affected by the 
protocol were traded (Prestegard 2009: 122).  
Whereas Norwegian agriculture in the strict sense is less affected by EU policy-making, the 
agriculture and food industry appear to be increasingly exposed to competition from EU 
agricultural markets. As noted by Veggeland (2011: 36), the import of agricultural goods 
from the EU has increased to levels fivefold higher than what was observed in 1990
49
. The 
levels for Norwegian export to the EU have increased
50
 as well, however to a considerably 
lower extent than the import levels.  
The influence of the EU on the Norwegian political system of food 
In contrast to agricultural policy, food policy, including food safety, was included in the EEA-
agreement when it entered into force in 1994. Most of the EU’s veterinarian legislation was 
however held outside of the final agreement, much because of Norway’s insistence on 
retaining its border controls of animals and animal products  (Veggeland 2011: 16). Still, 
developments in Norwegian food policy making after 1994, can to a great extent be ascribed 
to developments at EU level. As noted by the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2012a: 
67) ‘the food policy area, in numbers, comprise the definite largest share of legal documents 
within the EEA-agreement’. According to an informant, ‘over 60 percent, or at least more 
than 50 percent of the EEA-agreement is related to decisions concerning food safety'
’51
 
(Interview Mission of Norway to the EU 2012a). 
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 in Norwegian: råvarepriskompensasjon 
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 1990: 500 000 kg, 2010: 2 500 000 kg (SSB, referred to in Veggeland 2011: 36) 
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 1990: 60 000 kg (appox.), 2010: 700 000 kg (SSB, referred to in Veggeland 2011: 36) 
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 direct quote: man kan godt legge fram tall som viser at det er over 60 prosent. I hvert fall godt over halvparten 
av hele EØS-avtalen er på mattrygghetsspørsmålet.  
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Norway, and Scandinavian countries in general, is regarded for having established high 
standard regulatory systems for food policy, with consequent good animal health levels 
(Veggeland 2011: 16). What Elvbakken and Rykkja (2008: 78-81) furthermore observe is the 
presence of diverging interests in food policy making and management, with agricultural 
authorities emphasizing the quality aspects of food control and health authorities emphasizing 
the integrity and pure health aspects.  
That being said, Norwegian decision makers, as a whole, appear to have common interests 
with the EU on Food policy. As noted by an informant, ‘no severe general controversies exist 
between the EU and Norway on this area
52
 for the time being' (Interview Mission of Norway 
to the EU 2012a). The informant in question portrays the EU’s food policy as being ‘without 
doubt an advantage for Norway, in that it, to a considerable extent, contributes to the 
improvement of Norwegian food safety by a knowledge based and more sophisticated and 
targeted legislation' (Interview Mission of Norway to the EU 2012a). The active participation 
and contribution to the further development of EU Food policies is indeed being highlighted 
as a central priority in the Norwegian Government’s policy toward Europe (Norwegian 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2012a: 67). On the basis of these observations, it could be argued 
that the Norwegian approach to food policy making in Brussels, is somewhat more offensive. 
However, diverging opinions on the implementation of EU policy into Norwegian food 
legislation are observed as well. These are to be elaborated on in the forthcoming chapter. 
Although the EEA-agreement does not confine the freedom of Norway to decide on its 
organization of food policy management, one nevertheless observes some extent of 
adjustment to the emerging institutions at EU level (Lie and Veggeland 2010: 118, 125). With 
regard to policy content, Norway implemented the EU’s General Food Law in 2003, thereby 
adopting the integrated approach toward the whole food chain – ‘from farm to fork’ (Lie and 
Veggeland 2010: 109). A stronger emphasis on consumer considerations – also present in EU 
Food Policy – was introduced in 1999, with the Ministry of Agriculture’s (1999: 73) report to 
the Storting (Parliament) stating that ‘the consumer is the employer of agriculture, industry 
and trade’. What furthermore happened in 1999, was the incorporation of EU veterinary 
legislation into the EEA-agreement, thereby abolishing the veterinarian border control toward 
EU member states (Veggeland 2011: 17). In 2004, major food reform was introduced, a 
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consequence being the strict separation, both functionally and institutionally, of risk 
management and risk assessment. Thus, the former is now managed by the Norwegian Food 
Safety Authority, under the co-administration of the Ministries of Food and Agriculture
53
, 
Health and Care Services as well as Fisheries and Coastal Affairs (Lie and Veggeland 2010: 
111). The conduct of risk assessment, on the other hand, is handled by the Norwegian 
Scientific Committee for Food Safety, an agency that is independent of the Norwegian Food 
Safety Authority (Lie and Veggeland 2010: 114). 
Contact between the EU/EEA and Norwegian institutions on food policy making and 
management is considerable (Lie and Veggeland 2010). ESA inspectors pay visits to the 
Norwegian Food Safety Authority, and sometimes participate in the latter’s inspections, in 
order to control Norwegian food policy management’s  consistency with the EEA-agreement 
(Lie and Veggeland 2010: 86). The Norwegian Food Safety Authority for its part constitutes 
Norway’s formal point of contact with the EU Food policy regime. In 2011, the Food Safety 
Authority participated in 223 meetings at EU level (Norwegian Food Safety Authority 2011: 
7). Representatives of the Authority participate in numerous of the DG SANCO’s committees 
and working groups, including the Standing Committee on the Food Chain and Animal Health 
(SCFCAH) (Lie and Veggeland 2010: 120). Extensive routines have been established in order 
to coordinate the positions of the Norwegian government prior to meetings in the DG SANCO 
committees. The three ministries responsible for the Food Safety Authority, meet with the 
Authority every Friday. The two food safety counsellors at the Mission are also participating 
in the deliberations by phone. During the meeting, proposals for positions on upcoming issues 
are discussed. The positions are decided at the meeting or later that same day. Prior to the 
session in the Commission, preparatory meetings are furthermore held between emissions 
from the Food Safety Authority and officials at the Mission of Norway to the EU (Interview 
Mission of Norway to the EU 2012a, Norwegian Food Safety Authority 2011: 7). 
The Norwegian Food Safety Authority’s participation in DG SANCO committees constitutes 
Norwegian public authorities’ most important channel to the EU Food policy regime, both 
with regard to information seeking and exertion of influence (Veggeland 2011: 32, Interview 
DG SANCO 2012). As briefly mentioned in the presentation of the EU Food policy regime, 
Norway do not possess any formal voting rights when EU decisions are made. Hence, the 
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Veggeland 2011: 111).  
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importance of Norwegian activism in the early stages of EU policy making processes (Lie and 
Veggeland 2010: 120).  
In that respect what is realized is the concern advanced by the Norwegian Farmers’ Union and 
the Federation of Norwegian Food, Agriculture and Forestry Enterprises, implying that 
opportunities for submitting input to the Food Safety Authority, and its responsible ministries, 
are too variable. Both interest groups argue that consultation procedures, and initiatives to 
which, are too dependent on the individual case officer. According to the two, the potential 
for exerting influence on EU food policy processes would have been strengthened if interest 
groups and state authorities coordinated their positions at the earliest possible stage (Interview 
Norwegian Farmers' Union 2012, Norwegian Farmers’ Union 2012a, Interview by phone 
Federation of Norwegian Food, Agriculture and Forestry Enterprises 2013, Federation of 
Norwegian Food, Agriculture and Forestry Enterprises 2012). One informant, while admitting 
his/her limited insight in state-society coordination at domestic level, still believe there is a 
potential not fully utilized in that regard (Interview Mission of Norway to the EU 2012a).  
3.2.3 The political system of agriculture and food in Germany  
When clarifying the agriculture- and food policy systems of Germany what first should be 
emphasised is the federal system, on which governance of the Federal Republic of Germany 
(BRD) is based (Berntzen 2008: 225). The German decision-making system now is composed 
of 16 federal states (Länder), the federal states constituting one level of governance, and the 
federal level in Berlin – the federal states’ legislative, the Bundesrat, the federal legislative, 
the Bundestag, and the federal government – constituting the other (Berntzen 2008: 228). A 
functional division of powers – with legislation primarily managed at federal level and 
implementation, on the other hand, at federal state level – has been, and still is, maintained in 
the German federal system
54
 (Jeffery 2005: 78, 85). As is to be touched upon later on, the 
decentralised organization of state has created challenges with regard to the effective and 
coordinated governance of policy, food policies in particular.  
Traditional agricultural policy 
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between legislative responsibilities of the federal government and federal states was introduced (Berntzen 2008: 
237).   
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The German agricultural policy sector has typically been characterized by the application of 
economic support mechanisms by federal governments, in order to ‘protect farmers from a 
sharp fall in prices’, ‘close co-operation between the ministerial administration and the 
[agrarian] lobby’ with regard to policy-making and implementation as well as a strong 
emphasis on self-sufficiency in food (Hendriks 1991: 30, 40). When taking into consideration 
the volatile history of the German nation state, featuring two world wars and approximately 
40 years of separation (1949-1990), the agricultural policy sector stands out as an area 
distinguished by continuity (Hendriks 1991: 82). Whereas the end of the Second World War 
led to significant change of the German society and agricultural structure – the latter change, 
due to the massive loss of land in the east – traditional agricultural policies re-emerged in the 
Federal Republic, founded on the British, American and French occupational zones in 1949 
(Hendriks 1991: 34, 41).  
An important element in that respect was the agreement upon the Agricultural Act 
(“Landwirtschaftsgesetz”) in 1955, then characterized by a farm interest group leader as ‘the 
Magna Charta of German agricultural policy’ (Rieger 2007: 299). The Act constituted a 
‘parity law’, according to which the federal government was to present an annual ‘Green 
report’ on the situation in German agriculture. Although not being obliged to guarantee 
clearly defined income targets, the government nevertheless was to represent a ‘Green plan’ – 
on the basis of the ‘Green report’ – encompassing primarily economic support measures for 
the German agricultural sector (Hendriks 1991: 37-38).  
Central to the introduction of the Agricultural Act was the argumentation put forward by the 
German Farmers’ Union (DBV - Deutscher Bauernverband) implying that ‘agricultural 
wages substantially lagged behind those in the industrial sector’ (Hendriks 1991: 37). The 
DBV had been established in 1948. Due to the loss of the eastern parts of the German Reich, 
the agricultural sector of the Federal Republic emerged as a sector more coherent and 
homogenous than had earlier been the case (Rieger 2007: 298). Thus, on the basis of a 
prevailing farmer majority composed of Christian conservative family farmers, the DBV was 
able to establish itself as ‘the voice of all agricultural activities in Germany’ (Rieger 2007: 
297, Interview by phone DBV 2012). It came to be the umbrella organization, representing 
the interests of the farmers’ associations at federal state level and county level55 – and, later 
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 According to the DBV (2012), 'more than 90 percent of the about 380 000 German farmers are voluntary 
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on, the European level too (Deutscher Bauernverband 2012). The farmers themselves are 
volunteer members of the Association at county level (Interview by phone DBV 2012).  
Polity and politics of German agriculture 
The political system that evolved from the 1950s and onwards share some apparent 
commonalities with the ‘segmented'’ system in Norway. Agricultural policy issues have 
arguably been handled within a structural triangle, consisting of the agricultural ministry, the 
agricultural committee in the Bundestag and the farm lobby, with processes allegedly being 
kept at an arm’s distance from the outsider electorate and diverging interests (Rieger 2007: 
309). 
Key feature of this structure has been the close relationship between the farm lobby – first and 
foremost the DBV, which up until the early 1970s had a monopoly in terms of representing 
German farmers – and the Federal institution responsible for agricultural policy, the then 
Ministry of Food, Agriculture and Forestry (BMELF
56
) (Hendriks 1991: 38). A complex set 
of personal contacts between the DBV and the Ministry manifested itself through e.g. 
monthly meetings between the DBV President and the Minister of Agriculture and the 
continuous access to the Ministry’s management committees. By means of these 
arrangements the Farmers’ Union has been able to present its opinions to officials, as well as 
consult the Ministry on important issues prior to the decision-making (Hendriks 1991: 146). 
According to one informant, when speaking about the contact between state and interest 
groups in the present, pressure groups have ‘formal right [...] to speak or to say what [their] 
problems are with legislation’ (Interview by phone DBV 2012). Hence, pressure groups are 
consulted by the federal government on upcoming issues, before they are being given to the 
parliament. Then, the parliament ‘asks us [as pressure group] whether we are in favor or 
against, or what suggestions we have’ (Interview by phone DBV 2012). These arrangements 
for consultation appear to come close to the concept corporatism.  
What furthermore has been special with this policy sector, is the apparent absence of 
associations and political parties promoting agri-oppositional interests. Thus, the Ministry of 
Agriculture came to be a representative of agricultural interests, whereas the interests of the 
consumer and tax payer were promoted by the Ministries of Economics and Finance (Rieger 
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2007: 298). However, as illustrated by informants, consultation procedures in the present are 
by no means reserved only for the DBV (Interview BDSI 2012, Interview FEI/GFP 2012). As 
is to be emphasized later on, the agricultural and food policy sectors in Germany have become 
increasingly pluralized.  
Close contacts have moreover been present between the farm lobby and the agricultural 
committee in the Bundestag. According to Rieger (2007: 308) the committee constituted an 
important basis for the “inner” farm lobby.  
In addition to the close relations between farm interests and public institutions, the farm lobby 
has been assigned with implementation responsibilities
57
 (Rieger 2007: 313). These are 
accomplished in cooperation with the Agricultural Chambers (“Landwirtschaftskammer”) at 
federal state level. The Chambers function as linkages between the Farm Unions (at federal 
state level) and policy, while simultaneously being de facto public institutions (Rieger 2007: 
299). A number of consultancy services towards the farming society are being provided by 
the Chambers. Furthermore, the Chambers have been assigned with the responsibility for 
educational systems
58
 (Rudzio 2006: 62). Central coordination of the Agricultural Chambers 
is secured through the Association of Agricultural Chambers (VLK
59
). The VLK is member 
of the Central Committee of German Agriculture (“Zentralausschuss der Deutschen 
Landwirtschaft”), at which the positions of the Association of Agricultural Co-operatives 
(“DRV”60), the German Agricultural Society (“DLG”61) and the VLK are coordinated with 
the ones of the Farmers’ Union (DBV) (Rieger 2007: 297).   
The arrangements clarified above are elements of the domestic institutional governance 
structure, into which the DBV and the farm lobby have been incorporated. As noted by Rieger 
(2007: 313) participation in the structure has supplied the DBV with considerable influence 
on agricultural policy outcomes. However, what is furthermore argued is the reliance of the 
DBV on the sustainment of this structure, if its potential to influence processes is to remain 
(Rieger 2007: 313).  
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what could be argued is that this arrangement shares some affinities with implementation corporatism, as 
defined by Nordby (1994: 9).  
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 A complete illustration of the responsibilities of the Agricultural Chambers, is to be found at the internet portal 
of the Institut für Kammerrecht e.V. (Institut für Kammerrecht e.V. 2013) 
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 Deutscher Raiffeisenverband e.V.  
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The EU’s presence in German Agriculture and Food policy 
The Federal Republic of Germany (BRD) has been member of the European Community 
since its creation in 1951, with the establishment of the European Coal and Steel Community 
(ECSC). In the following decades the BRD was to become a protagonist for further policy 
integration within the framework of the European Communities (EC) (Paterson 2005). 
Hendriks (1991: 15) notes that ‘the EC [...] provided the framework for [Germany’s] political 
rehabilitation on a worldwide scale'. The EC
62
, on the other hand, has developed into a level 
of governance, its legislation having precedence over national legislation. Thus, with regard 
to the agriculture and food policy sectors, Germany appears to be part of a governance 
system, in which the EU (the former EC) constitutes the superior legislator (Rudzio 2006: 
241).  
Similar to the agricultural policy objectives as defined at domestic level, Germany has 
traditionally defended the support mechanism system based on price support of the CAP 
(Hendriks 1991: 82). German decision makers initially showed reluctance towards the 
creation of a common agricultural policy, due to the perceived loss of national control over 
trade terms and the domestic price level (Hendriks 1991: 40). The agreement on the 
establishment of CAP in the Treaty of Rome, 1957, has been portrayed as ‘the earliest 
example of ‘package deals’, in which Germany sacrificed its control over agricultural policies 
in order for the Customs Union to be achieved (Hendriks 1991: 44). However, in line with the 
role European policy-making has come to occupy in Germany, negative attitudes toward the 
CAP framework gradually changed. Thus, in the 1970s, with monetary instability and 
recession generating uncertainties in the markets,  Germany seemingly came to see the CAP 
as a means to pursue its national agricultural policy objectives (Hendriks 1991: 57, 82). 
Hence, the German support of CAP arrangements, which in effect enabled the continuation of 
a favourable high price system on agricultural products (Hendriks 1991: 58-61, 82).  
With regard to the farm lobby, its influence on national decision-makers appeared to continue 
despite the transfer of policy-making authority to Brussels. Hendriks (1991: 147), in her 
contribution, points to the interdependent relation between the Ministry of Agriculture and the 
DBV. The Ministry when formulating proposals for European policies is in need of first hand 
information on the situation in German agriculture, information which the DBV has been able 
to deliver. For the DBV on the other hand, the preservation of close relations with the 
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Ministry and the executive arguably became increasingly important, in order to ensure the 
presentation of its opinions at Community level (Hendriks 1991: 147).  
According to an informant from the diplomatic circle in Brussels, an important underlying 
aspect influencing German positions on EU Agriculture and food policy is the ‘diverse 
situation in Germany, especially in the field of agriculture’ (Interview Brussels diplomat 
2012). The consequence of having farms ‘all over the scale’, implying that some are located at 
below sea level and others 1000-1500 meters above sea level, and some have 5 dairy cows 
and others 1000 dairy cows, is a variety of interests with regard to determining German 
positions toward the EU. With reference to this diversity, it is the informant in question’s  
‘feeling [...] that the Germans often try to really contribute to constructive solutions, not 
always saying this is the best solution for Germany, but often saying this is a good 
compromise for everybody’(Interview Brussels diplomat 2012) 
As compromise apparently is necessary at domestic level, one would hardly be surprised if 
Germany sought compromises at EU level too.  
Resilience toward reform 
Nonetheless, Commission proposals for reform of the CAP system have habitually been 
watered-down by member states, including Germany, within the intergovernmental decision-
making arenas of the EU (Hendriks 1991: 228, Nugent 2010: 365). In the 1970s, Germany 
defended the continued existence of the Monetary Compensatory Amount (MCA)
63
 against 
French demands for abolishment (Hendriks 1991: 66). German resistance was also present in 
the late 1980s and 1990s, when fundamental change to the CAP support mechanism regime 
was discussed. At the Berlin summit of the European Council in 1999, Germany arguably 
played a decisive role in the moderation of Agenda 2000 proposals prescribing a 
strengthening of the ecologic and social profile of  the CAP (Rieger 2007: 305).  
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The German Farmers’ Union (DBV) has made use of its gradually strengthened position 
within the European Farm Community (COPA)
64
, which with regard to reform rounds from 
the late 1980s and onwards has taken a critical stance toward Commission proposals (Rieger 
2007: 306, Daugbjerg 2009: 401, Grant and Stocker 2009: 236-38). Hendriks (1991: 160) 
meanwhile argues that if activities at European have proven not sufficient in order for 
demands to be met, the DBV has tended to pursue strategies directed toward the German 
government. As a matter of fact, there are some instances to show that such strategies indeed 
have been successful, with German governments having introduced national subsidies in 
order to ‘counteract’ CAP reform in e.g. 1965 and 1988 (Hendriks 1991: 54-55, 73-74, 152-
53).  
The Agrarian turning point ("Agrarwende") 
In the winter of 2000, Germany was hit by an outbreak of the BSE-disease (Dressel et al 
2006:  287). The reactions which were to follow – together with existing food- and agriculture 
regulatory structures’ apparent loss of legitimacy – arguably contributed to fundamental 
changes of the domestic structure, on which farm lobby influence had profited (Rieger 2007: 
308).  
Fundamental reform of the political system of German food (and agriculture) 
Prior to the BSE-crisis in Germany, food policy management, including risk assessment and 
risk management of food safety, had been conducted by the Federal Agency for Consumer 
Health Protection and Veterinary Medicine (BgVV
65
), with implementation responsibilities 
remaining under the authority of the federal states (Dressel et al 2006: 287, 289). Food policy 
decision-making furthermore was mainly placed under the authority of the Federal Ministry 
for Health (Dressel et al 2006: 289). What occurred in the aftermath of the German BSE-crisis  
in terms of reform seems to have established a more comprehensive approach toward food 
policy and agricultural policy in Germany. 
As a consequence of the emerging crisis, both the Minister of Agriculture and the Minister of 
Health of the Federal Government in January 2001 chose to resign. In response to a perceived 
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need to make the agricultural- and food policy sector more consumer-orientated – and to 
retain popular confidence in decision-making structures – one decided to create a new 
ministry, the Federal Ministry of Food, Agriculture and Consumer Protection (BMELV
66
) 
(Dressel et al 2006: 289, Rieger 2007: 312). The new ministry has been set in charge of the 
German agriculture- and food policy sector. Later on, that same year, German decision 
makers acted on the recommendations put forward by the von Wedel commission, and 
dissolved the food safety agency, the BgVV. Two new units were to replace it, these were the 
Federal Institute for Risk Assessment (BfR
67
) and the Federal Agency for Consumer 
Protection and Food Safety (BVL
68
). By reorganizing its food policy institutions, Germany 
assured her conformity with the EU’s General Food Law (Dressel et al 2006: 290-91). Hence, 
the functional and institutional separation of risk management and risk assessment 
responsibilities – with the former now being undertaken by the BVL, and the latter by the BfR 
– in an independent manner, apart from the Ministry (Dressel et al 2006: 287, 292-93, 295-
96).  
With regard to the federal structure of Germany – implementation responsibilities still lie with 
the federal states – the BfR and BVL furthermore function as ‘interface managers’ between 
levels of governance, i.e. a means of contact between regulators at European and federal state 
level. Reorganization thus appears to have been directed toward the improvement of 
coordination and effectiveness of the regime (Dressel et al 2006: 306). With regard to the 
coordination of German positions on EU affairs, it is important to notice that official positions 
need to be accepted by all Federal Ministries before being valid. Thus, although the majority 
of preparatory work on food- and agricultural policy is done by the BMELV, acceptance by 
the other ministries still is needed before a position can be presented at EU level (Interview 
Brussels diplomat 2012). Once again, the need to find compromises becomes evident. 
The changes observed in the German agriculture- and food policy sector after the ‘agricultural 
turning point’ is by Rieger (2007: 309) denoted ‘the pluralisation of an arena of power’. The 
dominant position of the farm lobby, first and foremost the DBV, in both administration and 
parliament has come under increasing pressure. As noted by the informant from the DBV 
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(interview by phone 2012) when commenting on the scope of accessible influence channels 
toward national authorities,  
‘[...] it becomes more  difficult because [...] on the authority side, on the political side, 
there are not much farmers anymore, and they are speaking more and more from the 
consumer side. [...] so, on this side, it became harder to understand what farmers want’.  
The agricultural committee in the Bundestag has been renamed the Committee on Food, 
Agriculture and Consumer Protection, so as to reflect its corresponding ministry. According 
to Rieger (2007: 308) the fraction of committee member being affiliated with the DBV has 
decreased. The committee is now chaired by a veterinarian who represents the liberal party, 
FDP
69
 (Deutscher Bundestag 2013). Similarly, first-hand access to decision-makers within the 
Federal Ministry appears not to be a matter of course for representatives of the DBV anymore. 
Consumer reorientation and extension of responsibilities have eased the accessibility of 
electoral interests to the agricultural ministry, thereby accelerating the struggle for access 
between interest groups (Rieger 2007: 312). One indicator being the participation of not only 
agricultural interests, but consumer-, food retail-, food industry-, environmental-, animal 
welfare interests etc. too, in the formulation of the BMELV’s (2012: 3) Charta für 
Landwirtschaft und Verbraucher, which lays down the challenges for food and agriculture in 
Germany.  
2013 reform of the CAP 
This year, 2013, the member states of the EU are about to find an agreement on reform of the 
CAP. The forthcoming round is the first attempt of major CAP reform since the accession of 
the 12 Central East European Countries (CEECs) in the 2000s (kilde). It furthermore 
constitutes the first round of CAP reform since the entering into force of the Lisbon Treaty, 
after which co-decision rights on agricultural policy were given to the European Parliament 
(Folgart 2012: 13).  The emergence of an additional actor with decision making authority is 
likely to influence the dynamism of the negotiations. In which way, however, remains to be 
seen.  
According to the Commission’s DG Agriculture and Rural Development 
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proposals for a reform of the CAP after 2013 aim to strengthen the competitiveness and the 
sustainability of agriculture and maintain its presence in all regions, in order to guarantee 
European citizens healthy and quality food production, to preserve the environment and to 
help develop rural areas (European Commission 2012).  
The German federal government supports an extension of CAP policies, by which the 
farmers’ orientation to the market is further strengthened and bureaucratic arrangements 
simplified and reduced (BMELV 2011: 3-4). Moreover, Germany is ‘interested in making, or 
keeping the CAP green, and as environmental friendly as it can be’ (Interview Brussels 
diplomat 2012).  
The reform package on which negotiations are to be held is undoubtedly of interest to interest 
groups too, not only the agricultural ones, but to food manufacturers, veterinarians, food 
retailers, environmentalists and so on etcetera. Interest group priorities do not necessarily 
coincide with the ones of the federal authorities all the time (Interview Brussels diplomat 
2012). How interests groups act in order to exert influence on EU policy-making processes is 
to be focused on in the next chapter.  
3.3 Summary 
Both agriculture and food policy have been subject to considerable change the recent 20 
years. At EU level, the common agricultural policy has been subject to three major rounds of 
reform, all of which inspired by a perceived, and demanded, need to limit EU spending on 
agriculture, and strengthen the orientation of farmers to the markets.  Simultaneously, food 
policy competences, especially on food safety, at EU level have been extensively enhanced. 
Thus, whereas agricultural policy primarily was motivated by economic considerations and 
the security of supply from the outset, health and consumer concerns have come to occupy a 
primary role in EU agriculture and food policy.  
With regard to the two countries under scrutiny, Germany as EU-member is wholly integrated 
in the EU’s agriculture and food policy, and consequently is affected to a considerable extent 
by policy making in Brussels. Significant competences have been delegated from national 
authorities to the EU institutions. This in fact has been the case since the late 50s/early 60s, as 
the Federal Republic has been part of the CAP since its establishment. Food policies however, 
remained mainly under national jurisdiction until the mid/late 1990s. Norway, for its part, is 
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not member of the EU, but nonetheless is affected by decision-making in Brussels through the 
EEA-agreement. Agricultural policy however has been kept out of the EEA-framework. Thus 
making the continuation of an offensive agricultural policy possible. On the other hand, 
Norway appears to be more or less wholly integrated in EU food policy making, due to the 
EEA-agreement. A seemingly contradictory situation has developed, in which concerned 
actors are both within and outside of the EU framework.  
In both countries private agricultural interests have traditionally held dense relations with 
national authorities. Notwithstanding, societal developments have strengthened the presence 
of pluralism in the agricultural and food sector, meaning that an increasing number of 
interests have come to occupy an interest in the formulation of policies. In the next chapter, 
what is to be emphasized is the strategies of Norwegian and German interest groups. How are 














4 Interest group strategies toward 
policy-making systems in change 
The interest groups chosen for study constitute the units of this analysis. All of which are 
domestic based interest groups, which in turn makes it possible to categorize them into what I 
refer to as ‘the German system of interest groups’ and ‘the Norwegian system of interest 
groups’. The two domestic systems of interest groups constitute the two cases subjected for 





 – the two first segments of the food chain – or veterinarians72. 
Consequently, both producer and health scientific interests are present, both of which are to a 
varying extent affected by agricultural and/or food policy decision-making. 
Two aspects are of special interest with regard to the analysis. First, how the interest groups in 
Germany and Norway are distributed on this thesis’ dependent variable, namely ‘the selection 
of influence channel(s)’. Consequentially, what is to appear in the analysis is how, or more 
precisely, through which channels the interest groups operate in order to influence agricultural 
and/or food policy-making. In that regard, three alternatives appear to be most plausible, the 
domestic channel, toward national authorities, and the two European channels, toward either 
European associations of interest groups, or directly toward EU institutions. Second, in order 
to assess why interest groups operate as they do, a number of theoretical assumptions from 
Moravcsik’s (1993) Liberal intergovernmentalism (LI) and Pierson’s (2000, 2004) Historical 
institutionalism (HI) approaches have been derived. The analysis and discussion around these 
is to structure the analysis.  
What first is to be elaborated is the extent to which theoretical assumptions derived from LI 
can explain interest group behaviour. Then, interest group behaviour is to be examined 
against HI theoretical assumptions. In the third section, the extent to which interest groups' 
channelization of influence has come to resemble the characteristics of multi-level governance 
is to be evaluated. With regard to the analysis, what needs to be accentuated, is that 
confirmation of one or the other theoretical approaches’ applicability is not the objective. 
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Rather, emphasis is put on providing a careful analysis of how these interest groups operate in 
order to exert influence on policy making processes, and whether, and if so, how theoretical 
assumptions offer explanations of their behaviour.  
The forthcoming sections are structured in accordance with the theoretical assumptions, and, 
moreover, observations of the farm unions, food industry and veterinarians' behaviour.  
4.1 Liberal intergovernmentalism 
At the core of Moravcsik's (1993: 480) theoretical approach is the suggestion that 'the EC 
[EU] is best seen as an international regime for policy co-ordination'. By means of a two 
level process, national preferences are first identified through state-society interactions at 
domestic level, and then brought forward to interstate negotiations by national governments 
(Moravcsik 1993: 480-81). Accordingly, interest groups are expected to channelize their 
activities toward state authorities, which effectively hold a gate-keeper role toward 
international regimes, such as the EU.  
The LI theoretical expectations on which the forthcoming analysis is structured, apparently 
offer explanatory power in two ways. First, LI's liberal element – i.e. its emphasis on issue 
salience and cost/benefit perceptions – is perceived to constitute an account on what, or, put 
differently, which aspects of EU agricultural- and food policy that make interest groups 
mobilize politically. Second, LI's intergovernmental element – i.e. channelization of activity 
toward national authorities – offers insight on the character of the EU agricultural- and policy 
making system itself. If identified one might regard the policy-making system as being 
equivalent to an intergovernmental regime where national authorities control processes. 
4.1.1 Issue salience 
Determinant of interest groups' cost/benefit assumptions 
The competitiveness of actors at domestic and international markets is assumed to influence 
producer interests' weighing of costs and/or benefits of policies aimed at commercial 
liberalization. As both EU agricultural- and food policy include some degree of commercial 
liberalization, one is lead to assume domestic producers' extent of competitiveness as being 




Figures concerning the import and export of food products might yield some insight with 
regard to the competitiveness of Norwegian and German agriculture and food industry. The 
Norwegian food industry – the fishery sector excluded – exported for about 629 million 
Euro
73
 in 2011, whereas the corresponding import figure amounted to about 3,3 billion Euro. 
Of all food production in Norway in 2011, 81,8 percent was produced for the domestic 
market, and 4,0 percent for markets abroad (Hval and Rålm 2012: 92). Favourable conditions, 
in terms of protection from foreign business, are furthermore secured through import 
restrictions on agricultural products from abroad (Interview Mission of Norway to the EU 
2012b). Needless to say, the competitive strength of Norwegian farmers and food producers is 
identified to be on the domestic market. In accordance with the LI perspective, producer 
interests, given these framework conditions, are expected to perceive commercial 
liberalization policies
74
 as less profitable for business. The primary reason being the 
expectancy of increased competition on domestic markets from abroad (Moravcsik 1993: 
489).  
This might be one of the reasons why farmers, represented by the Norwegian Farmers' Union 
appears to be reluctant toward the liberalization of agricultural markets. In 2011 it reacted 
negatively when the Norwegian government, under a WTO ministerial meeting, signed a 
declaration against protectionism (Norwegian Farmers' Union 2012b: 34). Furthermore, the 
fall in prices in EU member states provoked by CAP developments
75
, is not perceived to be 
good for Norwegian farmers. The reason why is the enhanced competitiveness of EU 
producers toward the Norwegian market (Interview Norwegian Farmers' Union 2012). In that 
regard, one ought to keep in mind that Norway, relative to EU member states, has 
considerable higher price levels for milk, cheese and eggs (Veggeland 2011: 45). The 
commerce of these products constitutes an important source of income for farmers. In other 
words, Norwegian farmers would probably not profit from a strengthened competition with 
cheaper products from abroad.  
                                                 
73
 the calculation  is based on the average Euro currency in 2011, when compared to NOK: 7,7926 (Norges Bank 
2013). 
74
one consequence being the increased transborder flow of goods. 
75
 e.g. reforms aimed at further liberalization of the common agricultural market.  
77 
 
The Norwegian government's decision in the autumn of 2012 to amend the principle for duties 
on selected agricultural products
76
, uncovered contradictions in a Norwegian food industry 
segment whose interests in most instances coincide (Interview Mission of Norway to the EU 
2012b). The Federation of Norwegian Food, Agriculture and Forestry Enterprises has 
members from both the agricultural co-operative segment and the private segment. Key 
objective for the federation is to secure the sufficient volume of supply to member firms' 
production, and to secure competitiveness (Interview Federation of Norwegian Food, 
Agriculture and Forestry Enterprises 2012). The same objectives can be attributed to the 
Federation of Norwegian Food and Drink Industries (Interview 2012). Still, the former 
federation supported the Government's amendment, whereas the latter opposed it (Interview 
Mission of Norway to the EU 2012b, Federation of Norwegian Food and Drink Industry 
2012a). The Federation of Norwegian Food and Drink Industries represents the interests of 
primarily private firms, some of which are exposed to greater competition from abroad as 
their products fall under the scope of Article 19 and protocol 3 of the EEA-agreement. On the 
other hand, the Federation of Norwegian Food, Agriculture and Forestry Enterprises' 
(Interview 2012) traditional group of members has primarily been composed of manufacturers 
of meat products. These are products which to a greater extent fall under the scope of border 
protection arrangements.  
Thus, one plausible reason for the differing view on the government's amendment of duty 
principle, is, as indicated by Veggeland (2011: 40), that manufacturers of processed 
agricultural products – some of which are members of the Federation of Norwegian Food and 
Drink Industries – are better suited to handle increased competition from abroad. 
Manufacturers of meat, milk, eggs etc. – a tangible share of the  members of the Federation of 
Norwegian Food, Agriculture and Forestry Enterprises – on the other hand, appear to be more 
vulnerable. Here too, the LI perspective appears to offer some extent of explanatory power of 
interest group approximations. Whereas the Federation of Norwegian Food and Drink 
Industries cannot be said to wish for enhanced competition from abroad, its member 
companies nevertheless have been forced to accommodate their production to international 
competition. One apparent implication is member companies' greater extent of robustness, 
relative to the other federation's members, in terms of versatility towards enhanced levels of 
import from abroad. Thus, although not necessarily assessing the further liberalization of 
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markets as profitable for business, members of the Federation of Norwegian Food and Drink 
Industries could be viewed as being more versatile to international competition than members 
of the Federation of Norwegian Food, Agriculture and Forestry Enterprises. This might 
explain why the two federations appear to mobilize on somewhat different political grounds.   
Germany 
Germany, with regard to the competitiveness of its farmers and food producers, ought to be 'in 
another division'  if compared to corresponding actors in Norway. Germany has the largest 
turnover in terms of food industry, when compared to the other EU member states, the figure 
amounting to 151,8 billion Euro in 2010 (Hval and Rålm 2012: 46). The export of German 
agriculture and food industry goods amounted to 51,8 billion Euro in 2010, the export to the 
EU zone amounting to 40 billion Euro (BMELV 2011: 44). In 2011 the export of agriculture, 
hunting, and food products amounted to 51,8 billion Euro, whereas the import figure was 
about 65,4 billion Euro (Statistisches Bundesamt 2013a).  
Extensive export figures, and exposure to foreign competition notwithstanding, German 
farmers are not necessarily enthusiastic supporters of measures aimed at the further 
liberalization of agricultural markets (Interview Brussels diplomat 2012). Bearing in mind the 
structural change in progress, the DBV (2011: 50) in its 2010/2011 annual report states that 
the number of farms has continued to fall, whereas the remaining farms are becoming larger. 
Thus, in terms of competitiveness, it might be argued that ongoing processes of change, 
increase the standing of German agriculture in that it is becoming more effective. However, at 
the expense of the continuous drop in the number of active farmers. The DBV (2010: 3), in its 
position paper on the forthcoming CAP reform, 2013, states that a strong EU agricultural 
policy, with the continuous support of farmers through direct payments, needs to be 
maintained. Financial subsidization by governing authorities is needed in order to compensate 
the contribution of agriculture to society, and the higher standards in the EU when compared 
to the world market (DBV 2010: 3).  
Thus, although appearing to be competitive domestically and abroad, German farmers still 
seem to be very much in favour of market interventionist measures. An LI approach to the 
condition, might be that German farmers still constitute import-competing producers and 
consequently is expected to oppose free trade (Moravcsik 1993: 489). According to an 
informant (Interview Brussels diplomat 2012), German farmers' self understanding is based 
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on the perception that they are producing high value food, to feed, not the world, but to feed 
Germany. In that regard, the further liberalization of markets, with concomitant rising import 
figures and falling prices, could be viewed as a threat to farmers' business. Faced by a 
potential fall in profit from production, one consequently could foresee the high issue salience 
attached by farmers to policies aimed at commercial liberalization. In other words, what is 
identified is a plausible reason for farms to mobilize politically.  
According to the BVE
77
, the political top-level association of the German food and drink 
industry, Germany, with its six percent share of the world market for foodstuff (2010), 
constitutes the third largest food stuff exporting nation in the world (BVE 2012: 17). 
Furthermore, as the import figures from the Statistisches Bundesamt (2013a)  indicate, 
Germany is a leading importer of food and agricultural products too. Thus, besides being a 
competitive force worldwide, the food industry appears to be exposed to considerable 
international competition at domestic level. With regard to the industry's political objectives, 
it is stated by the BVE that disintegration of barriers to trade and the opening of markets 
through international trade agreements, such as the WTO, are of central concern (BVE 2012: 
17). Similar attitudes can be observed in the BDSI's
78
 position on the CAP reform in 2013. 
BDSI, also a member of the BVE, welcomes the proposal brought forward by the EU 
Commission which stipulates the continuation of a path toward a CAP more strongly 
orientated to the market (BDSI 2011). One important issue for the federation
79
, is the 
abolishment of quotas that put limits on the channelization of European sugar into food 
production, and, moreover, on the import of sugar from outside of the EU.  This again appear 
to be subject for opposition from sugar producing farmers in Europe (Interview BDSI 2012, 
e-mail correspondence BDSI 2013, COPA-COGECA 2004).  
Bearing in mind the observations above, the objectives framed by the BVE and the BDSI 
seem to come close to Moravcsik's (1993: 489) expectation, in that 'exporters [...] tend to 
support freer trade'. EU policy suggestions that stipulate enhanced levels of commercial 
liberalization are seemingly supported both by the BVE and the BDSI. Hence, the perception 
that a considerable share of German food industry is likely to consider such policy 
amendments as profitable for business. Here too, one identifies an incentive for interest 
groups to mobilize politically. 
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Interest specificity and ambiguity toward EU policy  
Norway 
The extent to which Norwegian interest groups under scrutiny mobilize politically on issues 
related to the EU, appear to coincide with the scope of the EEA-agreement. As noted by the 
informant from the Federation of Norwegian Food and Drink Industry (Interview 2012) '[...] 
Norway through the EEA-agreement is not integrated with the EU's agricultural policy, thus, 
positions on the CAP as such is not natural for us'
80
. Agricultural policy-making is a national 
competence. Still, as noted by another informant, it is obvious that both the Norwegian 
government and food industry have an interest in monitoring the developments of agricultural 
policy-making in Europe (Interview Federation of Norwegian Food, Agriculture and Forestry 
Enterprises 2012). One reason being the indirect influence of EU developments on import, 
competitiveness and, furthermore, the potential usage of the EU as 'role model ' in discussions 
over policy and framework condition amendments (e-mail correspondence Federation of 
Norwegian Food, Agriculture and Forestry Enterprises 2013b). With reference to the previous 
section, the EU's agricultural policy is clearly identified as a potential threat in that EU 
farmers and food industry are being regarded as more competitive by Norwegian producers. 
The level of mobilization on CAP issues however is moderate, arguably because of the 
absence of significant and certain costs and/or benefits. Hence, the perception of CAP policies 
by actors as being less significant for business. 
The Norwegian Farmers' Union does not appear to employ an active strategy toward the CAP, 
in terms of efforts aimed at influencing policy-making processes, either. On food, veterinary 
and trade issues however, the situation appears to be somehow different.  Decision-making on 
food and veterinary policy is being highlighted as the areas on which the EU influences the 
Norwegian farmers' every day the most (Interview Norwegian Farmers' Union 2012). Animal 
welfare and animal health, the importance of making use of the scope of action vis-à-vis the 
EU, in order to sustain Norway's traditional higher levels on these issue areas, is identified as 
important. Thus, whereas mobilization on issues related to the CAP appears to be rather 
limited, activity levels on issues pertaining to food policy are evident. One reason seems to be 
the perceived salience of animal health and animal welfare legislation for Norwegian farmers' 
activity. Apparently, the Farmers' Union observes a certain and significant effect imposed on 
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its members' business. The Veterinary agreement in 1998, which abolished the veterinarian 
control of animals from the EU, is for instance being pointed to as having enhanced the risk 
for getting contagious diseases into the country (Interview Norwegian Farmers' Union 2013, 
Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2012b: 649). An apparent consequence of revelations 
such as this one, is a political mobilization on EU food policy by the Farmers' Union.  
Article 19 and protocol three of the EEA-agreement, which confer guiding rules on the trade 
of certain agricultural products, are perceived to influence farmers too. Under the assumption 
that increasing import
81
 of agricultural products from the EU, does harm to the Norwegian 
agricultural production, the Norwegian Farmers' Union, in order to minimize levels of import 
from the EU, mobilize when these issues are subject for negotiation (Interview Norwegian 
Farmers' Union 2012). Yet again, the observation of political mobilization in response to 
policies which costs are perceived of as certain, significant and risky for farmers. Also present 
when negotiations on Article 19 and protocol three are held, is the Norwegian food industry. 
For members of the two food industry federations under scrutiny, the outcome of these 
negotiations do necessarily have consequences for their competitive strength, and for some, 
the supply of goods. Hence, the mobilization under negotiation processes in order to sustain a 
competitive framework for business. 
What furthermore is observed in that regard, is the Federation of Norwegian Food and Drink 
Industries (2012b: 1, 2013: 4) different approximation of the Art. 19 and protocol three 
negotiations, when compared to the Federation of Norwegian Food, Agriculture and Forestry 
Enterprises. This might be seen in light of the already emphasised difference in 
approximations of costs and/or benefits from commercial liberalization policies. As already 
pointed to, members of the former federation who deal with processed agricultural products, 
are exposed to international competition through protocol three. Decision-making that reverse 
processes of liberalization on trade of processed agricultural products, would ultimately bring 
unforeseen changes to the framework conditions of these member companies. Hence, the 
federation's apparent estimation of consequences generated by Art. 19 and protocol three 
decisions as significant and risky.  
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Decision-making on Art. 19 and protocol three are undoubtedly of significant importance to 
members of the Federation of Norwegian Food, Agriculture and Forestry Enterprises too. The 
federation in 2000 came to view negotiations on additional mutual tariff reductions through 
protocol three as unacceptable. The primary reason being that eventual reductions would not 
contribute to a balanced outcome – especially when seen in light of the adverse development 
in raw material prices – with EU and Norwegian producers as equal beneficiaries (Federation 
of Norwegian Food, Agriculture and Forestry Enterprises 2000). As members of the 
federation to a greater extent are protected from international markets by tariff barriers, one 
might argue that the eventual expansion of Art. 19 and protocol three agreements constitutes 
the greater threat to business. To summarize, both federations seem to consider outcomes of 
protocol three and Art. 19 negotiations as significant, certain and risky for their members. 
Consequently, both federations appear to mobilize politically when these negotiations are in 
progress. However, as their weighing of cost/benefits in terms of commercial liberalization 
appear to deviate somewhat, they also seem to mobilize on apparently different political 
grounds.  
The Federation of Norwegian Food and Drink Industries' viewpoint toward Art. 19 and 
protocol three negotiations is assumed to be related to its approach to EU food policy, on 
which it maintains that it does not want legislation in the EU and Norway to be different. The 
reason why is that differences affect business interests' incentives to invest in Norway 
(Interview Federation of Norwegian Food and Drink Industry 2012). In other words, EU food 
policy making is perceived of as generating significant benefits to the Norwegian food 
industry. As stated by an informant, the introduction of EU food policies, food safety 
standards in particular, is 'an unconditional advantage, which has contributed to the furthered 
professionalization and modernization of food policy in Norway'
82
 (Interview Federation of 
Norwegian Food and Drink Industry 2012).  
The Federation of Norwegian Food, Agricultural and Forestry Enterprises' approach to food 
policy appears to be focused on other aspects. Although recognizing that much of the EU's 
regulations are satisfactory, what in addition is being emphasised is the incompatibility 
sometimes arising between Norwegian regulations and EU legislations on food production, 
animal health and animal welfare (Interview by phone Federation of Norwegian Food, 
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Agriculture and Forestry Enterprises 2013, e-mail correspondence [same org.] 2013c). The 
risk of incompatibility is pointed to by the Norwegian Farmers' Union too, however primarily 
on animal health and welfare legislation (Interview Norwegian Farmers' Union 2013). At the 
same time, the Norwegian tendency to implement the strictest solutions, e.g. on transport of 
animals to slaughter houses, is being identified as a potential challenge (Interview by phone 
Federation of Norwegian Food, Agricultural and Forestry Enterprises 2013). The Federation 
of Norwegian Food, Agricultural and Forestry Enterprises' approach to food policy 
consequently emphasises both the benefits and costs for business. Moreover, as the effect of 
decision making clearly is perceived of as certain, significant and risky, the Federation do 
mobilize politically on issues relating to food policy.  
The Norwegian Veterinary Association differs from the other interest groups dealt with 
above, in that it represents the interests of health personnel, and not producers. Consequently, 
when speaking of costs or benefits imposed on veterinarians' business, one cannot refer to 
framework conditions for production. The Norwegian Veterinary Association is a union, 
whose major objective is the promotion of the science based veterinary field (Interview 
Norwegian Veterinary Association 2012). Of major concern to the association is the 
safeguarding of animal welfare, animal health and public health, all of which closely 
associated with the management and assessment of food safety. Decision making on these 
policy areas is of certain significance to veterinarians' conditions of work. This incidence 
comes from the fact that the veterinarian is an integral part of the food safety control regime. 
Hence, the salient effect and incentive for veterinarians to mobilize politically whenever 
amendments of the system are being made. Yet another aspect which affects the Norwegian 
veterinarian, is the EU's arrangement for accreditation of education against European 
standards. This indeed is being pointed to as 'a European affair'
83
 by the association 
(Interview Norwegian Veterinary Association 2012). Here too, the Veterinary Association 
apparently mobilizes in response to polices with certain and significant effects on business.  
Germany 
With regard to German interest groups' cost or benefit calculations, it is worthwhile to keep in 
mind that full EU membership necessarily implies that consequences of decisions taken at EU 
level, to some extent are imposed on German actors. Furthermore, as noted by one informant, 
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because of the diverse composition of German agriculture, 'at the end, everything which is 
touched by the CAP, is an issue for us' (Interview Brussels diplomat 2012). 
German agriculture received about 5,4 billion Euro through direct payments from the CAP's 
first pillar in 2010. Subsidization from the EU's CAP budget thus amounted to about 50 
percent of German agriculture's income in 2009/10 (DBV 2011: 44). Needless to say, the 
CAP is of substantial importance to German farmers. Here too, one observes interest group 
mobilization on policy issues which impose certain and significant costs and/or benefits on 
members. In relation with the forthcoming reform of the EU's agricultural policy, the DBV 
has actively pursued a strategy aimed at maintaining a strong EU agricultural budget 
(Interview by phone DBV 2012). Also of importance to the DBV is the simplification of the 
bureaucracy associated with the EU's cross compliance arrangement, which appears to impose 
an administrative burden on farmers (DBV 2011: 43, Interview Brussels diplomat 2012). 
Food policy, including issues such as animal health and animal welfare, is equally very much 
being dealt with. One illustration being the DBV's engagement in relation with DG SANCO's 
proposed amendment of the regulation on protection of animals during transport
84
 in 2009 
(DBV 2011: 70). What these observations clearly show is that the DBV sees the EU's 
agriculture and food policy as imposing significant and certain effects on its members, i.e. 
farmers. On these grounds it do endeavour to influence policy outcomes.  
The EU's agricultural policy is of considerable importance to the German food industry too. 
As already touched upon, for the Association of the German Confectionery Industry (BDSI) 
the EU's sugar quota constitutes a big issue. It is pointed out that 'the main problem of the 
sugar quota is that not all the sugar produced in the EU can be used for food, even though 
there would be enough' (e-mail correspondence BDSI 2013). Whereas stating that the 
European sugar beet is preferred by the industry, the BDSI points to the negative impact on 
the industry caused by the quota restriction. As pointed out by an informant 'they [the firms] 
have a lot of losses, and there are even some enterprises who have to stop their work' 
(Interview BDSI 2012). In other words, potentially severe costs are imposed on the 
confectionery industry due to the EU quota regulations. Implicit lies an incentive to mobilize 
politically in order to advocate amendment of the quota system. The implications of the CAP 
on the industry driven research and innovation interest groups GFP and FEI are perhaps 
slightly less dramatic. Nevertheless, for German plant breeders organized in the GFP, 
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research and innovation always becomes more important, due to the competition from new 
plants, and, possibly, diseases from abroad (Interview GFP/FEI 2012). Hence, the interest in 
research funding programs at both national and European level. In that regard, the 
Commission's pronouncement of additional investment in research and innovation in the 
future CAP, is believed to attract more interest, especially from plant breeders (Interview 
GFP/FEI 2012, European Commission 2012). In other words, increased funding opportunities 
seem to have made the EU more salient for the two research oriented interest groups. It thus 
might be argued that enhanced salience has contributed to the strengthening of activities 
related to EU policy issues.  
EU food policy has provided the German food industry with numerous incentives to mobilize 
politically. One of the BDSI's primary concerns has been on issues related to food information 
regulation and labelling. The association was very much involved in the resistance toward the 
introduction of so called traffic lights – red, yellow, green labels – on food products 
(Interview BDSI 2012). The introduction of such labelling, could have imposed significant 
costs on BDSI members' business. The FEI and GFP, due to their primary focus on research 
and innovation appear not to be involved in food policy decisions. The main organization of 
the GFP however, Bundesverband Deutscher Pflanzenzüchter (BDP), is occupied with EU 
food policy issues, such as seed legislation and plant health. Both of which affect the German 
plant breeder to some extent (BDP 2010: 20-21). Also the BVE, to which the FEI is loosely 
associated, is active on health-related consumer protection issues (Interview GFP/FEI 2012). 
What is being highlighted is the decreasing freedom of manoeuvre imposed on the industry in 
relation with the broadening scope of food legislation. This necessarily imposes confinements 
on the industry's methods for production, or, put differently, significant and risky costs. Some 
of which, according to the BVE, has not necessarily been justifiable on consumer protection 
terms, rather a fundamental scepticism toward the industrial manufacturing of food products 
(BVE 2013a).  
The Bundestieräztekammer (BTK) represents the interests of German veterinarians, '[...] the 
ones who know the scientific base [for food control].' (Interview by phone BTK 2013). Of 
major concern to the BTK is the perceived dysfunction of the food chain. According to the 
BTK, the 'EFSA, or the European Union [in terms of food hygiene] seems to solely focus [...] 
on zoonosis risk assessment, and nothing on [the] quality [aspect]' (Interview by phone BTK 
2013). The perceived shortcomings in food safety risk assessment naturally is of concern to 
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the association, whose members are part of the risk management and assessment regime. On 
these grounds, it seems plausible to assume that costs or benefits of EU food policy are 
certain, significant and risky for German veterinarians too. In order to counteract identified 
deficiencies, the BTK is in favour of the employment of more veterinarians into the 
controlling bodies. This would be perceived of as a benefit to both veterinarians and 
consumers, who would be supplied with safe food products of high quality. What furthermore 
seems to be an important aspect for the BTK, is the maintenance of veterinarians' reputation. 
The notion is affirmed in the EU debate on medical prescription. The BTK argues in favour of 
veterinarians by reasoning that he or she, in terms of the use of animal medicine, constitutes 
the better advisor due to the loss of reputation if he or she does not do well (Interview by 
phone BTK 2013). Needless to say, a loss in reputation would constitute a significant cost to 
veterinarians. However, as is to be pointed to in a subsequent section, the perception of a 
given EU food policy as significant in terms of costs or benefits, does not necessarily lead to 
political mobilization by the BTK. The reason why seems to be the reactive method of 
operation held by the interest group. In other words, the expectation derived from LI, in that 
issue salience influence the extent to which actors mobilize, cannot be said to apply to the 
Bundestierärztekammer. However, with regard to the other German observations its 
application appears to be just. 
Mobilization  
Liberal intergovernmentalism holds that the extent of mobilized interests is greater on issues 
related to food policy, than on agricultural policy. The primary reason being that food policy 
impose certain, significant and risky costs and/or benefits on multiple societal groups, 
whereas effects from agricultural decision-making are believed to be imposed primarily on 
producers. 
Norway 
What generally is being pointed to with regard to the Norwegian society is the prevalence of 
harmony and consequent absence of extensive conflict (Interview Mission of Norway to the 
EU 2012b). So it appears that domestic debates on food and agricultural policy is rather 
peaceful. One does not see the burning of tires or other aggressive manifestations very often.  
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However, as suggested by an informant, in contamination, the spread of diseases, instances 
related to animal welfare or systemic failure lie a potential for conflict (Interview Mission of 
Norway to the EU 2012a). A very recent incidence is the so called horsemeat scandal, where 
one discovered the presence of non-clarified horsemeat in food products at various locations 
in Europe (CNN 2013). Food is something to which everyone can relate, it is something that 
everyone has one or the other opinion about (Interview Federation of Norwegian Food, 
Agriculture and Forestry Enterprises 2012). When moreover taking into consideration the fact 
that EU food policy applies to a broad range of actors within the food chain, one comes to 
realize that the scope of affected segments in society is rather extensive. In addition to 
producer and retail interests along the food chain, one observes the presence of consumer 
interests, animal welfare organizations, environmentalists and so on. The observation seems 
to correspond with Moravcsik's (1993: 493) expectation, in that socio-economic goods 
provision policies constitute two-dimensional issues.  
As noted in the last chapter, agricultural policy making in Norway has been portrayed as 
taking place within an 'iron triangle' of sector specific interests and actors (Hernes 1983, 
referred to in Rasch and Rommetvedt 1999). According to one informant, the food industry in 
present time is less involved in agricultural policy making, than what is the case on food 
policy. One reason being its respect of the matter of fact that not all areas of agricultural 
policy-making should be of its concern
85
 (Interview Federation of Norwegian Food and Drink 
Industries 2012). What moreover is being pointed to, is the institutionalized system 
surrounding agricultural policy-making, which contributes to the greater influence of the 
agricultural sector (Interview Federation of Norwegian Food and Drink Industries 2012, 
Interview Norwegian Veterinary Association 2012). These observations do seem to support 
the LI expectation, in that the range of mobilized interests related to commercial policy is 
confined to producers (Moravcsik 1993: 488). Moreover, on agricultural policy, merely farm 
interests appear to be active.  
However, what temporary debates on issues such as government amendments of guiding 
principles for duties – most recently, on specific products from abroad, e.g. types of cheese – 
illustrate, is agricultural policy's extensive contact surface. The debate that arose in the 
autumn of 2012, mobilized not merely actors from within the agricultural food chain, but the 
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fisheries sector, consumers and chefs too (Interview Federation of Norwegian Food and Drink 
Industries 2012, Interview Norwegian Farmers' Union 2012). Also underpinning discussions 
on agricultural policy, are the contrasting views of political right and centre-left on the 
baseline of agricultural policy in Norway. Hence, whereas the former is in favour of the 
deregulation and liberalization of agricultural markets, the latter tend to defend existing 
arrangements (Interview Mission of Norway to the EU 2012b). In other words, policy making 
on agricultural policy cannot be said to attract the interest of merely producer interests. One 
consequently observes an apparent contradiction to "the commercial policy expectation" 
derived from LI.  
Germany 
The level of debate on agriculture and food policy making in Germany seems to bear 
resemblance to the characteristics described in the case of Norway. According to an 
informant, 'there are [of course] conflicts, but [...] in comparison to other political fields, 
these conflicts are small' (Interview Brussels diplomat 2012). That being said, agricultural 
and food policy still are being identified as spheres in focus of the society. And 'because food 
is an everyday thing, [probably] more of the food side, than the agricultural side'  (Interview 
by phone DBV 2012). Germany, at least relative to Norway, is distinguished by strong 
consumer protectionist, environmental and, in particular, animal welfare groups.  One 
indicator is the number of members in the biggest animal welfare group, Deutscher 
Tierschutzbund, which amounts to 800 000. In comparison, the number of farmers in 
Germany amount to about 300-350 000 (Deutscher Tierschutzbund 2013, BMELV 2011: 36). 
Animal welfare arguably does not constitute a "green topic" in Germany, it is a topic with 
traditional strong salience in society (Interview Brussels diplomat 2012). What these 
observations indicate is the presence of a wide range of societal interests when food policy is 
up for discussion in Germany. In other words, the range of mobilization on food policy issues 
is in accordance with the expectation derived from LI, in that socio-economic public goods 
provision attracts the interest of multiple societal groups.  
In Germany too, one observes considerable debate on agricultural policy, especially in terms 
of the future farming structure and the industrialization of farming. At the annual Grüne 
Woche in Berlin, January 2013, about 25 000 people demonstrated against what they perceive 
to be 'animal factories' (Nationen 2013, Wir haben es satt 2013). A comprehensive alliance of 
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animal welfare groups, environmentalists, small- to medium scale farmers and opponents of 
globalization are behind the initiative, which goes under the name 'Wir haben es satt!' (2013). 
One hereby observes the presence of both producer and non-producer interests in the 
agricultural sphere, which apparently contradicts the LI expectation of commercial policy. 
One possible explanation is the apparent fluidity with regard to the boundaries between food 
and agricultural policy making. Hence, what first and foremost might appear to be an 
agricultural issue, could equally contain elements of animal welfare and human health 
concerns (Interview by phone BTK 2013). In other words, the distinction between agricultural 
policy and food policy appears to be more complex and less clear cut than LI theory predicts.  
Information obtained from interviews further strengthens this assumption. According to one 
informant, 'with the upcoming of renewables in agriculture, 10 years, 15-20 years ago, [...] 
other stakeholders, [such as car producers and fuel producers] came in [too]'  (Interview by 
phone DBV 2012). Yet another informant points to the effect of increasing ambitions in terms 
of export of agricultural products. According to the informant 'Germany never used to be an 
export nation for animal products' (Interview by phone BTK 2013). Figures indicating that 
German food industry altogether exported for about 16 billion Euro in 1990, whereas in 2011, 
for about 60 billion Euro, seem to confirm this statement (Statistisches Bundesamt 2013b). 
This too, arguably fuels the agricultural debate in Germany (Interview by phone BTK 2013). 
Thus, in apparent contradiction to the theoretical assumption, there seems to be a reiterated 
number of stakeholders on agricultural policy too. 
4.1.2 Channelization of influence  
Norway 
In terms of agricultural policy, the Norwegian interest groups all seem to view the national 
authorities as the most important target for influence, against which strategic activity is 
channelized. The Norwegian Farmers' Union is of course one of the participants in the annual 
negotiations on the General Agreement, which outcome is of considerable significance to 
farmers. Both the Federation of Norwegian Food, Agriculture and Forestry Enterprises and 
the Federation of Norwegian Food and Drink Industries emphasize the importance of 
maintaining close, and regular contact with responsible ministries and agencies. However, 
where the former seems to prefer a more frequent contact, the latter federation prefers the 
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concentration of contact in two or three meetings a year (Interview by phone Federation of 
Norwegian Food, Agriculture and Forestry Enterprises 2013, Interview Federation of 
Norwegian Food and Drink Industries 2012).  
The same pattern appears to prevail on EEA-related issues, such as negotiations on Article 19 
and protocol three. As pointed out by an informant, 'we do not sit and discuss with the EU 
Commission on circumstances related to Norwegian agricultural policy, [...], that is not right' 
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(Interview Federation of Norwegian Food and Drink Industries 2012). Thus, on agricultural 
policy, the pattern of Norwegian interest group behaviour seems to be in line with the LI 
expectancy. Strategic activity is primarily channelized toward national authorities. However, 
one needs to keep in mind that the majority of agricultural policy-making is made in Norway. 
Hence, the natural orientation toward responsible authorities, whose agricultural policy 
decisions are most salient for the members of the interest groups in question.  
On food policy issues, Norwegian interest group priorities appear to deviate somewhat. While 
emphasizing that first one needs to influence Norwegian authorities in order for authorities to 
promote farmers' interests toward the EU, the Norwegian Farmers' Union does not rule out the 
parallel employment of other channels of influence (Interview Norwegian Farmers' Union 
2012). Thus, the Farmers' Union has endeavoured on building alliances with fellow Farm 
Unions in Scandinavia, especially the Swedish and Finnish ones. All of which are 
participating in COPA-COGECA, the European Farmers' Association. On animal health 
issues in particular, Nordic Farm Unions have tended to pursue a coordination of viewpoints 
prior to meetings in COPA-COGECA (Interview Norwegian Farmers' Union 2012, 2013). 
These observations indicate that the Norwegian Farmers' Union channelize some activity 
toward the EU too. As LI theory considers the national authority to be the decisive actor at 
both domestic and European level, one would not expect domestic interest groups to engage 
in processes of preference formulation with actors and institutions abroad. This behaviour is 
difficult to explain by use of LI theory. 
The Federation of Norwegian Food, Agriculture and Forestry Enterprises similarly as the 
Farmers' Union perceives the Norwegian authorities to be its primary target for influence on 
food policy. The federation is being characterized as too little an actor for efforts, in terms of 
channelizing influence towards the EU. Hence, its emphasis on coordinated efforts by private 
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actors and national authorities (Interview by phone Federation of Norwegian Food, 
Agriculture and Forestry Enterprises 2013). As touched upon in the previous chapter, the 
federation has called for the establishment of a consultative arrangement, in which affected 
interests are given the opportunity to supply government with their opinions on upcoming EU 
issues (Federation of Norwegian Food, Agriculture and Forestry Enterprises 2012). 
In terms of influence, the Federation of Norwegian Food and Industry shares the approach 
expressed by the other two organizations, in that Norwegian authorities constitute the most 
important target. Its approach consequently seems to fall in line with the expectation derived 
from LI. However, what stands out with regard to the latter federation is its routine work 
toward FoodDrinkEurope, the European Association for Food and Drink Industries. The 
Federation in that regard emphasizes the importance of participating in an active cooperation 
with European colleagues. The emphasis is put on influence through close cooperation at EU 
level, not necessarily the direct pursuit of influence on positions towards EU institutions. On 
research and innovation policies however, the Federation has laid down a more active 
approach in terms of influence. (Interview Federation of Norwegian Food and Drink 
Industries 2012). By means of its participation in the European Technology Platform (EPT) 
'Food for life'
87
, it can contribute to the preparation of research strategy agendas, which 
ultimately are being brought forward to the EU Commission (Food for life NO 2013). 
Similarly as identified in the Norwegian Farmers' Union's method of operation, the Federation 
of Norwegian Food and Industry makes use of multiple channels of influence. LI's 
anticipation of an almost exclusive channelization toward national authorities seems to be at 
odds with reality.  
The Norwegian Veterinary Association as noted by an informant, 'continuously attempts to be 
in dialogue with national authorities. [And] maybe be a corrective to some of the authorities' 
decision-making'
88
 (Interview Norwegian Veterinary Association 2012). Simultaneously,  the 
Veterinary Association holds a full membership in the Federation of Veterinarians of Europe 
(FVE). As stated by an informant, 'often, it can be equally as fruitful to work via the FVE, the 
Commission, and back to Norway, as to attempt to go direct to the Ministry of Agriculture in 
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 (Interview Norwegian Veterinary Association 2012). What is being pointed to in 
that regard is the perceived scepticism with witch the Veterinary Association is being met in 
the Ministry. Arguably because it is being conceived of by the Ministry as a labour union
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(Interview Norwegian Veterinary Association 2012). Similarly as the Farmers' Union, the 
Veterinary Association seek close contact with their Nordic colleagues. Meetings between 
Norwegian, Finnish, Danish and Icelandic veterinary associations always take place prior to 
European meetings (Interview Norwegian Veterinary Association 2012). 
A brief summary now seems appropriate. With regard to the Norwegian interest groups 
channelization of strategic efforts on issues related to food policy, two patterns stand out. 
First, the Federation of Norwegian Food, Agriculture and Forestry Enterprises and the 
Norwegian Farmers' Union both seem to emphasise first and foremost the importance of 
keeping in contact with national authorities. The Farmers' Union do participate in a European 
association, COPA-COGECA, and do seek transnational cooperation if possible, but its main 
emphasis still seems to be the channelization of activity toward national authorities. In other 
words, the behaviour of these interest groups seem to come closest to the expectation derived 
from LI, in that strategic activity is mainly channelized toward national authorities. The 
second pattern emerges in the behaviour of the Federation of Norwegian Food and Drink 
Industries and the Norwegian Veterinary Association. What these interest groups seem to 
have in common, is the channelization of strategic efforts toward both national authorities and 
the European associations in which they participate. This observation, including the 
Norwegian Farmers' Union's activity abroad, cannot be explained by LI expectations. There 
consequently seems to be some evidence to suggest that the EU's food policy regime is not 
equivalent to an intergovernmental regime. Apparently, EU decision-making processes are 
not exclusively for national authorities to decide.  
Germany 
What stands out with regard to the German interest groups under scrutiny is the apparent 
prevalence of strategies in which multiple channels of influence are being used. Thus, not 
only national authorities, also European Associations and EU institutions are being identified 
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as targets for influence. In other words, the observation of German interest group behaviour 
seems to run counter to the expectation of exclusive channelization of activity toward national 
authorities, as emphasised in LI.  
The German Farmers' Union (DBV), while stressing that there is close contact on a day to day 
basis with federal ministries
91
, is involved in the working of COPA-COGECA too. In 
addition, the DBV has its own office in Brussels, from which direct contact with German 
officials in the Commission, members of the EP and other German associations are being kept 
(Interview by phone DBV 2012). Whether strategic activities are being channelized toward 
the national level, or the European level, arguably depends on the issue. On market issues, i.e. 
'the budget, and the farm subsidies, [the DBV has] to speak in Brussels, and [...] influence 
[its] national government'. On tax issues however, '[the DBV does not] speak with Brussels, 
because there is no power, or they have no power in dealing with taxes'  (Interview by phone 
DBV 2012). One is left with the impression that channelization to some extent depends on the 
location of policy-making competences. In other words, where policy-making competences 
are to be found, interest group activity is equally present.  
This impression is further sustained when looking at the strategic activities of the German 
food industry. The German Confectionery Association, BDSI, has an office of its own in 
Brussels, as do the research and innovation oriented GFP/FEI. According to the informant 
from the BDSI, the EU constitutes the most important target for influence (Interview BDSI 
2012). Whether activities are channelized toward national authorities, and, furthermore, 
European arenas or institutions, appears to be issue dependent. Thus, on the sugar quota issue, 
contacts between the BDSI and the federal ministry
92
 is momentary quite frequent. 
Furthermore, 'the issues where the EU can't say anything, it's of course still a national thing 
and it stays in Germany' (Interview BDSI 2012). However, as pointed out, issues that are 
dealt with at national level, are very often dealt with at European level too (Interview BDSI 
2012). In other words, the prevalence of domestic and European aspects in policy issues, 
makes the channelization of strategic activity toward both national and European level 
necessary. At EU level, the BDSI admittedly looks for alliances in e.g. its European 
associations
93
. However, in instances where common positions are not possible to find, it is 
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also lobbying alone (Interview BDSI 2012). What consequently is observed is a rather 
flexible approach, in terms of the BDSI's selection of channel(s) of influence. 
The main focus of the GFP and the FEI is the national level, an apparent logical priority when 
taking into consideration that about 85 percent of the total Germany research budget is 
coming from national authorities, whereas European funding amount to 15 percent (Interview 
GFP/FEI 2012). Nevertheless, the two interest groups are active at both national and 
European level. Here too, the channelization of strategic activity is perceived to be issue 
dependent (Interview GFP/FEI 2012). What is being emphasised is that national and 
European strategies are getting increasingly difficult to divide, due to the presence of multiple 
decision making levels on more and more issues. In other words, the EU policy-making 
system does not seem to fit the characteristics of an intergovernmental regime, which LI 
theory anticipates. Decision-making competence does not seem to be an exclusive property 
for national authorities, it rather is shared by actors across multiple levels of governance. On 
Horizon 2020
94
, to take one example, contact with national authorities, which are involved in 
the development of the new EU framework, is close (Interview GFP/FEI 2012). At European 
level, regular participation in the European Associations constitutes the baseline approach of 
both interest groups. The FEI is proxy member
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 of FoodDrinkEurope, which means that it 
participates on topics related to research and innovation. The GFP for its part, is member of 
the European Seed Association (ESA). Moreover, both the FEI and GFP is attached to 
European Technology Platforms (EPTs), in which research strategy agendas are being worked 
out (Interview GFP/FEI 2012).  
Of German interest groups included in this analysis, the Bundestierärztekammer (BTK) is the 
only one who does not have an office of its own in Brussels. The observation corresponds 
with what is being pointed to, in that the '[the BTK's] main aim is not the European, it's the 
national' (Interview by phone BTK 2013). The BTK's points of view are nevertheless being 
promoted at EU level by the FVE, in which the German veterinary association participates 
routinely. In fact, it holds one of the FVE vice president positions. In other words, the 
European activity of the BTK is mainly being channelized through the FVE. A more direct, 
autonomous European presence, would allegedly mean to take away the FVE's competencies. 
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As pointed out by an informant 'it would be stepping on their toes, which we don't want' 
(Interview by phone BTK 2012). The majority of the BTK's activities thus find place at 
national level, toward national authorities such as the BMELV, BfR and the BVL. Contact 
with the authorities is perceived to be very good, one reason being its scientific basis. In that 
regard, it is worth noticing that the BTK does not pursue a proactive strategy, rather a reactive 
one (Interview by phone BTK 2013). Apparently, the BTK in most instances does not contact 
national authorities on issues, '[it] 'react[s] to issues that are [...] presented to it by federal 
ministry' (Interview by phone BTK 2012).  
What has been identified in this section is the employment of multiple channels of influence 
by German interest groups. This furthermore is perceived of as an expression of the character 
of the EU's agricultural- and food policy regime, which apparently does not correspond with 
the attributes of an intergovernmental regime as anticipated by LI.   
4.2 Historical institutionalism 
Bearing in mind the presentation thus far, one might argue that Moravcsik's (1993) liberalism 
notions on individual producers' competitive position in domestic and international markets,  
do offer explanatory power of interest group positioning toward EU policy-making, in 
particular the ones through which liberalization of markets is foreseen. Interest groups' 
approach to EU policy moreover correspond with their perception issue salience. In other 
words, political mobilization is possible to explain by emphasising interest groups' calculation 
of cost and/or benefits from EU policy-making. Thus, in terms of identifying reasons why 
interest groups decide to act – regardless of how the behaviour might appear – liberal 
intergovernmentalism seems to be helpful.  
What however is being identified in interviews with informants, and, moreover, written 
primary sources is interest groups' tendency to employ multiple channels of influence. 
Moreover, what is realized is the varying extent of individual interest groups' employment of 
these channels, in particular the European channels. The German interest groups, with the 
exception of the Bundestierärztekammer, have established EU units within their 
organizations, which continuously operate in Brussels. One plausible explanation of course is 
the matter of fact that Germany is an EU member state, and indeed one of the more influential 
ones. The presence of Norwegian interest groups in Brussels on the other hand appears to 
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vary, in particular on the extent to which participation in the European Associations is being 
extensively made use of.  
According to an informants' impression, 'Norwegian food industry is almost absent [in 
Brussels]'
96
 (Interview Mission of Norway to the EU 2012a). Norway is not member of the 
EU, which again could be an explanation of the perceived absence. Nevertheless, as pointed 
out in the previous chapter, Norway through the EEA-agreement is very much committed to 
the EU, especially its food policies. Thus, the motivation for active participation at European 
level do exist for Norwegian interest groups as well. There in fact seems to be a good base for 
greater influence on EU food policy for Norwegian actors, both private and governmental 
ones (Interview Mission of Norway to the EU 2012a).  
The historical institutionalism approach does anticipate neither the preference of European 
channels, nor domestic ones. Rather the emphasis is put on historical processes, put 
differently 'the unfolding of processes over time' (Pierson 2000: 264). Two aspects stand out 
in that regard. First, critical juncture emphasises 'specific patterns of timing and sequencing', 
i.e. the occurrence of '"small" or contingent events, [ from which] particular courses of 
action' might be generated (Pierson 2000: 251). The occurrence or absence of a critical 
juncture is assumed to explain substantial change, or the absence of which, in interest groups' 
methods of operations, i.e. channelization of efforts aimed at influencing policy-making 
processes. Second, processes of increasing returns are assumed to explain the eventual 
presence of path dependence. Where path dependency is present, 'particular courses of 
action, once introduced, [are] virtually impossible to reverse' (Pierson 2000: 251). Thus, 
interest group behaviour which pattern seems to be rigid and stable, might be explained by the 
'lock in' effects caused by increasing returns.  
4.2.1 Critical juncture 
Norway 
Both informants from the Norwegian Farmers' Union (Interview 2012, 2013) emphasize that 
Norwegian authorities constitute the primary focus of the union's activities. One of them 
'think[s] [...] that one attaches greater value to the results at national level'
97
 (Interview 
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Norwegian Farmers' Union 2012).Whereas the other points out that '[one] probably 
underestimate[s] the framework laid down by the EU, and, that [one] is not good enough on 
that work, neither from the government's side, nor from our side'
98
 (Interview Norwegian 
Farmers' Union 2013). What is suggested is that the delegation of decision-making 
competence from national to European level, has not constituted a critical juncture for the 
Norwegian Farmers' Union, in terms of strengthened presence at EU level. This might explain 
the Farmers' Union's continuing tendency for channelizing activity toward national 
governments. On agricultural policy, considerable resources have traditionally been 
channelized into the negotiations on the General Agreement (Seip 2002, Norwegian Farmers' 
Union 2012b). In accordance with Pierson's (2004: 71) assumption in that 'groups able to 
consolidate early advantages may achieve enduring superiority', it is tempting to suggest that 
establishment of the annual negotiations on a General Agreement, 1950, constituted an event, 
by which advantages for farm interests were consolidated. This suggestion however, cannot 
be supported by empirical data, and thus needs to be regarded as mere speculation.  
The EU-issue has been central to the Farmers' Union for at least 20 years. A continuous 
engagement and economic support of the grass root movement "No to the EC/EU" is 
observed from at least 1992, up to present day (Norwegian Farmers' Union 1992: 44, 2003: 
52, 2011: 34). The majority of this activity, which is focused on preventing Norway from 
becoming EU member, is channelized toward the public opinion at domestic level. In 1993 
however, the Farmers' Union in cooperation with the Federation of Norwegian Agricultural 
Co-operatives, established an office in Brussels. As pointed out in the annual report,  
'[the establishment] was necessary in a situation where the Norwegian negotiators [– 
on EU accession –] did not contribute to an open and objective presentation of the progress 
of negotiations' (Norwegian Farmers' Union 1994: 38).  
In the aftermath of the Norwegian rejection of EU membership, 1994, the office allegedly was 
left unstaffed until about 2000, and then used again up to late 2009, at which point it was 
closed because of economic re-ordered priorities (Interview Norwegian Farmers' Union 
2012). With reference to an eventual path dependent European activity, this cannot be said to 
be a supporting observation. One would have expected the high costs related to a cease of 
direct presence in Brussels, to make up a preventive effect. On the other hand, the Farmers' 
Union has been participating in a European Association at least since prior to 1990. Prior to 
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2004, European activity was channelized toward the Confederation of European Agriculture 
(CEA), arguably an organization which was more used for discussion and network-building, 
than direct influencing (Interview Norwegian Farmers' Union 2012, Norwegian Farmers' 
Union 2004: 55). Due to the accession of the Central- and East-European countries (CEECs) 
into the EU, and the consequent inclusion of its farm unions in COPA in 2004, one decided to 
subject the CEA to the COPA-COGECA umbrella too (Norwegian Farmers' Union 2004: 55). 
Since then, activities toward Europe have mainly been channelized toward that association. 
The Norwegian Farmers' Union participates in COPA-COGECA working party meetings two 
to three times a year. However, while acknowledging the importance of the EU, the 
magnitude of missions related to national affairs sometimes necessitates the lesser priority 
given to EU affairs (Interview Norwegian Farmers' Union 2013).  
On these grounds, one might argue that the Norwegian Farmers' Union is 'locked-in' on a 
national path, where the strengthened participation in COPA-COGECA is prevented by the 
amount of work on national level. What furthermore is identified, is an apparent absence of a 
critical juncture in that its employment of channels of influence does not seem to have 
changed substantially.  
Whether 'locked-in' on a national path or not, the Federation of Norwegian Food, Agriculture 
and Forestry Enterprises nevertheless appears to have a tradition for channelizing the greater 
majority of its activity toward national authorities. Emphasis on maintaining close contact 
with the authorities was communicated by the then KIFF
99
 in relation with negotiations on the 
EEA-agreement, the extension of the EEA-agreement through Article 19, protocol three, 
legislation on animal welfare, so on so forth (Federation of Norwegian Food, Agriculture and 
Forestry Enterprises 1993: 9, 1997: 12, 2002: 5, 2010: 16). References to activities at 
European level are confined to study tours now and then, and observation of EU processes. 
One incidence however needs to be highlighted. In 2003, the Federation worked toward both 
the European Parliament and national authorities, in an attempt to convince the EU to approve 
the usage of carbon monoxide in meat packaging processes (Federation of Norwegian Food, 
Agriculture and Forestry Enterprises 2004: 6). In the end, the attempt fell through as the EP 
voted against it by a small margin. The Federation conceded in the aftermath,  
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'Communication with Norwegian authorities, companies and professional 
organizations indicated that there is no/very insufficient Norwegian competence and 
experience with practical lobbying activity toward the EU Parliament. The work furthermore 
indicated the significance of support from Norwegian political authorities. Such support was 
to a lesser extent possible to obtain' (Federation of Norwegian Food, Agriculture and 
Forestry Enterprises 2004: 7).  
Three years later, in 2006, the Federation, according to its annual report, finally succeeded in 
getting recognition for its view, in that routines for cooperation between the industry and 
national authorities on EEA-issues needed to be improved. A workshop, "Team EEA", with 
participants from the authorities and the industry was initiated in early 2007 (Federation of 
Norwegian Food, Agriculture and Forestry Enterprises 2007: 17, 2008: 16). Whereas events 
such as the carbon monoxide packaging issue do not seem to have contributed to substantial 
change, in terms of the adding of a European channel of influence by the Federation, one 
might argue that they have contributed to its intensified employment of the preferred channel 
of influence, i.e. the domestic one. The critical juncture apparently has not occurred in the 
historical unfolding of processes. Hence, the likely persistence of existing methods of 
operation.  
The picture is different when looking at the Federation of Norwegian Food and Drink 
Industries. As already touched upon, the Federation lays down a serious effort at European 
level, in FoodDrinkEurope, and toward authorities in Norway. The Federation was established 
in 1990, under the name NIL
100
, the main reason being the establishment of the Confederation 
of Norwegian Enterprise (NHO) one year earlier (Federation of Norwegian Food and Drink 
Industries 1991: 5). The newly established interest group went on to establish contacts with 
Swedish and Finnish sister organizations. One of the motives was to send a joint application 
to CIAA, the European Association for food (Federation of Norwegian Food and Drink 
Industries 1991: 19). Thus, what is observed from the outset is clear objectives in terms of 
'establishing a good international network', and, simultaneously, 'influencing national 
authorities in central industry political issues' (Federation of Norwegian Food and Drink 
Industries 1992: 4, 6).  
According to one informant, the coming into being of the EEA-agreement has been an 
important motivation behind the Federation's priorities. In that regard, one ought to keep in 
mind that the interest group was founded just prior to the negotiations on Norway's accession 
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into the EU, and, moreover the EEA-agreement. Thus, in order to meet strategic objectives, as 
e.g. the monitoring of EU legislative developments and the expansion of networks, the 
Federation realized that a structure of its own was needed (Interview Federation of Norwegian 
Food and Drink Industries 2012). With reference to HI theory, what is identified is the 
temporal intersection of two apparent distinct processes, namely the founding of the interest 
group and the initiation of EU/EEA negotiations. This might have constituted a critical 
juncture, due to the Federation of Norwegian Food and Drink Industries' adding of a 
European aspect to its behaviour.  
One central expression of this European aspect has been the Federation's relation with the 
CIAA. In 1997, informal contact with the European association had been established. As 
noted in its annual report, this contact 'has given [...] the Federation access to information on 
legislative processes at an early stage' (Federation of Norwegian Food and Drink Industries 
1998: 13). Whereas, 'when the issues come via Norwegian authorities, it is often too late to 
influence' (Federation of Norwegian Food and Drink Industries 1998: 12). The Federation 
became associated member of the CIAA in 2002, after having emphasised its preference for 
coming into a better position for the exertion of influence at EU-level. The immediate 
background seemingly being the revolution in EU food policies. Here too, one observes the 
apparent contribution by changes at EU level on the strategic priorities of the interest group. 
However, it coincidentally stressed an emphasis on working first and foremost with 
Norwegian authorities. This was expressed by the establishment of a contact forum on food 
policy legislation, in which participants from national ministries and actors from the industry 
were to participate (Federation of Norwegian Food and Drink Industries 2002: 6, 2003: 7).  
What is perceived with regard to the Federation of Norwegian Food and Drink Industries is an 
apparent continuity in its objectives and channelization of activity. Thus, leading to the 
assumption that the path, or trajectory, which seems to have a distinct multi-level governance 
character, has been present from the beginning. What, on the other hand, cannot be ruled out, 
is the potential consequences generated by negotiations on EU membership, and the EEA-
agreement. Regardless of whether these process constituted critical junctures, in that interest 
group behaviour was substantially altered, they do seem to have vindicated the enhanced 
emphasis on European developments. This was indeed briefly touched upon by the informant.  
The Norwegian Veterinary Association's (DNV) strategic activities toward decision makers is 
mainly dealt with by its secretariat, which, while keeping in minds its gradual 
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professionalization, amount to ten employees (Interview Norwegian Veterinary Association 
2012). Consequently, due to limited capacities, the association regards the prioritization of 
relations as necessary. As identified earlier, what stands out in that regard is the DNV's work 
toward national ministries, in particular the Ministry of Food and Agriculture, the Food Safety 
Authority and the Federation of Veterinarians of Europe (Norwegian Veterinary Association 
2011: 288). According to one informant, the DNV has been member of the FVE for about 15-
20 years
101
. As the FVE does not constitute an EU agency, rather an organization of 
veterinary organizations in Europe, the DNV holds a full membership with all organizational 
privileges at hand (Interview Norwegian Veterinary Association 2012). Active participation 
in the FVE is observed from at least 1998. In its evaluation of activities that same year, the 
association states 
'As most of the framework conditions for our activity gradually are being laid down in 
Brussels, do the network which is created here and the information obtained through this 
work, become increasingly important. It also has to be accentuated that Norway, together 
with the other Nordic countries and the Baltic countries, has a real opportunity to influence 
decisions made in our European organization' (Norwegian Veterinary Association 1999: 18) 
The traditional working method of the association, with regard to FVE, seems to be the 
participation in the two to three member sessions every year. In 2003, the association's FVE 
delegation counted four members, in 2008, six members and in 2012, seven members  
(Norwegian Veterinary Association 1999: 18, 2004: 336, 2009: 440, Interview 2012). 
Participation undoubtedly seems to have been given priority over the years. In 2009, the 
Association records  
'This [FVE] gives us an unique opportunity to monitor our sector in Europe, [...] we 
have good opportunities to influence decision-making processes, which we otherwise barely 
would have known about' (Norwegian Veterinary Association 2009: 440).  
Similarly as perceived in the analysis of the Federation of Norwegian Food and Drink 
Industries, the Norwegian Veterinary Association appears to have a continuous tradition for 
channelizing efforts towards both national and European levels. Since information on the 
point of time, at which the DNV joined the FVE is not at hand, valid assumptions on the 
occurrence of a critical juncture are difficult to derive. Nevertheless, one can observe that the 
Association has emphasised the increasing importance of activities at European level. Which 
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again seem to indicate that changes in the EU policy making structure have given grounds for 
amendments in interest group priorities.    
Germany 
Annual reports, or other written primary sources on German interest group activity since 
1990, has been rather difficult to get hold of, the distance to their offices in Germany being an 
important reason. Thus, data material for assessing whether delegation of competence from 
national to European level, and reform of the CAP constitute critical junctures for German 
interest groups, is somewhat limited. Some points can still be made on the grounds of 
interview data.  
As pointed out in the previous chapter, the German Farmers' Union, DBV, has traditionally 
held very close relations with national German authorities, in particular the federal ministry of 
agriculture (Hendriks 1991: 38). This condition of state seems to be in place in the present 
too, with contact between authority and interest group being characterized as very close 
(Interview by phone DBV 2012). One perceives a possible parallel to the argument put 
forward by Pierson (2004: 71), in that 'groups able to consolidate early advantages may 
achieve enduring superiority [vis-à-vis others arriving later]'. The DBV of course played a 
prominent role in the introduction of the Agricultural Act in 1955, arguably the Magna Charta 
of German agricultural politics (Hendriks 1991: 37, Rieger 2007: 299). However, the so 
called agricultural turning point in 2001 – also touched upon in the previous chapter – 
whether constituting a critical juncture or not, seems to have made the channelization of 
efforts to the right person more challenging (Interview by phone DBV 2012). The apparent 
reason being the reorganization of German agriculture and food authorities since 2001, 
thereby giving the administration a more consumer friendly profile (Rieger 2007). In that 
regard, it is tempting to suggest that the agricultural turning point necessitated an amendment 
of behaviour by agricultural interest groups.  
In terms of European affairs, the DBV has been member of COPA-COGECA since the late 
1950s/early 1960s. It has held an office of its own in Brussels for 15-20 years (Interview by 
phone DBV 2012). Consequently, experience with operating in Brussels ought to be 
considerable. Work towards the EU has traditionally been channelized into COPA-COGECA, 
the EU Commission and toward the national government. However, and this indeed is an 
indication of amendment in behaviour generated by reform, efforts toward the European 
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Parliament have been enhanced 'a lot, a lot, a lot' because of the Lisbon treaty (Interview by 
phone DBV 2012). Arguably 'because they are speaking about agricultural policy. They 
decide, and that's why we speak with them' (Interview by phone DBV 2012). What is 
observed is a significant amendment by the DBV, in terms of its employment of channels of 
influence. However, as the DBV was strongly present at EU level prior to the Lisbon treaty 
too, it probably is misleading to denote the amendment a critical juncture.  
The Bundestieräztekammer has been present at European level for a while too, arguably since 
the FVE was founded – in 1975 (Interview by phone BTK 2013, FVE 2013). One the other 
hand, one needs to keep in mind that the core of BTK activities take place at national level. 
As it turns out 'for the FVE, we [the BTK] only supply information when they want to, or we 
might give them a hint' (Interview by phone BTK 2013). In other words, its tendency to work 
in accordance with a reactive strategy, rather than a proactive one, appears to apply to 
activities at both national and European level. One possible reason is that veterinarians used 
to work on call only (Interview by phone BTK 2013). The assumed implication being that 
traditional working methods have an effect on the BTK's strategic activities. If so, the 
existence of path dependent mechanisms might be argued in favour for. Thereby making 
probable the absence of a critical juncture, due to an apparently unchanged presence at EU 
level, as well.  
The research and innovation oriented interest groups FEI and GFP have operated an office in 
Brussels in cooperation since 2001. The primary reason has been to open the European 
funding market for their member enterprises (Interview GFP/FEI 2012). Whether or not this 
decision was motivated by political developments in the EU at the time
102
, is difficult to say. 
One can nevertheless observe that the strengthened EU presence of both organizations 
corresponds with the above mentioned developments. In other words, change in the EU 
policy-making system is perceived to have contributed to the increasing employment of 
European channels of influence by German interest groups. The matter of fact, that the GFP 
has been present at European level since 1996 corresponds with this observation too  
(Interview GFP/FEI 2012). With regard to the BDSI, they too appear to have been present in 
Brussels for a considerable time (Interview BDSI 2012).  
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4.2.2 Increasing returns 
Norway 
Characteristic of the Norwegian interest group's identification of positives acquired from 
European level activities is the emphasis on learning effects, in terms of a greater 
understanding of how the EU works. Thus, in accordance with the expectancy derived from 
HI, the increasing accumulation of knowledge and experience constitutes one explanatory 
factor of Norwegian interest groups' presence at EU level. As indicated by an informant in the 
Commission's DG SANCO, one needs to behave in accordance with established norms of 
procedure in Brussels. To give an illustration, representatives of the Finnish bureaucracy, 
after having become member of the EU, were sent on courses, allegedly in order to learn to 
behave internationally (Interview DG SANCO 2012). Another informant points out the 
significance of presenting proposals, that can be suitable to a widest extent of actors as 
possible (Interview Mission of Norway to the EU 2012a).  
The informant from the Federation of Norwegian Food and Drink Industries (Interview 2012) 
moreover emphasizes the 'better understanding of [...] how legislative processes in the EU 
take place, [...] to understand the EU system, how it functions technically and structurally' 
103
. 
Equally important seems to be the access to information on EU legislative processes at an 
earliest possible stage. As pointed out by the informant, 'it is important that one does not 
experience the tumbling arrival of a legislation by post, without having had the opportunity to 
follow its development'
104
 (Interview Federation of Norwegian Food and Drink Industries 
2012). In other words, the opportunity to accommodate one's activities in good time before a 
legislation comes into effect, is recognized as one prominent benefit of activities in Brussels. 
Which again might explain why some interest groups make use of a European channel of 
influence. The Norwegian Farmers' Union too often experience that its European Association, 
COPA-COGECA, is earlier involved in legislative processes, than Norwegian authorities are 
able to involve business interest in discussions on EU legislative processes (Interview 
Norwegian Farmers' Union 2013). Moreover, although, or perhaps because of its associated 
membership status, the Farmers' Union do not have direct access to COPA's data bases, in 
                                                 
103
 direct quote: du kan si at det har gitt oss en bedre forståelse av hele, hvordan regelverksprosesser i EU 
foregår. [...] Så i det hele tatt, det å skjønne EU systemet, hvordan det fungerer teknisk og strukturelt.  
104
 direct quote: det er viktig at man  ikke opplever at et regelverk kommer ramlende i posten, uten at man har 
fått fulgt med i utviklingen av det.  
105 
 
which information is stored (Interview Norwegian Farmers' Union 2013). In other words, the 
benefit from participating in European level agencies is clearly seen by the Farmers' Union. 
However, it seems to experience greater endeavours when it comes to the attainment of 
benefits. With reference to the challenge in terms of capacity identified by informants from 
the Farmers' Union, the above mentioned observation does not seem to be a positive benefit. 
It probably does not contribute to a greater use of European channels of influence by the 
interest group. 
Increasing returns are expected to emerge as so called coordination effects too (Pierson 2000: 
254). An apparent example in that regard is the Norwegian Farmers' Union's participation in 
the annual negotiations on the General Agreement. Although it cannot be characterized as a 
coordination of policies, the Farmers' Union nevertheless have a say in the process where 
negotiations with national authorities are held, in order to decide on future agricultural 
policies. In terms of activities toward EU level, what is observed is that demands for 
improved consultative arrangements with national authorities, to a greater extent are impelled 
by the interest groups with seemingly less intensive efforts towards Brussels (Federation of 
Norwegian Food, Agriculture and Forestry Enterprises 2012, Norwegian Farmers' Union 
2012a). This could be interpreted as one possible implication of the absent element of positive 
feed-back, in terms of access to information on EU legislative process at an earliest possible 
stage. Efforts in terms of coordination among interest groups themselves are observed too. 
The Norwegian Farmers' Union in collaboration with the Federation of Norwegian 
Agricultural Co-operatives (2013) and firms have established an advisory panel on food 
safety
105
. However, the panel appears not to have functioned perfectly the recent years 
(Interview Norwegian Farmers' Union 2013). In terms coordination effects, at least in this 
incident, strategic activity on issues related to food policy has generated merely modest 
benefits for the Norwegian Farmers' Union. 
With reference to the aspects highlighted above, neither the Norwegian Veterinary 
Association nor the Federation of Norwegian Food and Drink Industries seem to emphasize 
demands for improved consultative arrangements to the same extent (Interview Norwegian 
Veterinary Association 2012, Norwegian Veterinary Association 2011, Interview Federation 
of Norwegian Food and Drink Industries 2012, Federation of Norwegian Food and Drink 
Industries 2013, 2012b). In the processes of EU hygiene regulation translations in 2006, the 
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Federation of Food and Drink Industries
106
 expressed a general discontent with regard to the 
communication between authorities and the industry. Simultaneously, participation in the 
"Food and Consumer Policy Committee" of the CIAA, was being pointed out as 'very 
important in terms of monitoring development in the EU, and giving a basis for influencing 
legislative developments at domestic level'  (Federation of Norwegian Food and Drink 
Industries 2007: 9). On these grounds, what could be argued is that positive feed-back, in 
terms of e.g. information on legislative process, might still be generated through European 
level activities, if feed-back from the communication with national authorities does not meet 
interest groups' expectations.  
Germany 
Relative to the impression given by Norwegian interest groups under scrutiny, learning and 
gaining experience, according to an informant, do not seem to be the main issue for German 
interest groups in Brussels. Rather, 
'the main issue is that they try to make the business they are representing to be more 
profitable, or at least not less profitable. [...] that they try to prevent things being really a 
problem for their business' (Interview Brussels diplomat 2012). 
DBV activities in Brussels seem to generate positives very much in line with the argument 
above. As already touched upon, the German farmers' association has been involved in the 
fight for a strong EU agricultural budget in the period to come, i.e. 2014-2020 (Interview by 
phone DBV 2012). In his comment on the long term budgetary agreement, 8. February 2013, 
DBV President Joachim Rukwied, while conceding the reductions to the budget, emphasised 
that a reliable basis for EU policy making toward 2020 had been achieved (DBV 2013). The 
informant from the BDSI (Interview 2012) points out that the organization pursues tangible 
interests, 'in that '[the EU] has really economic consequences for us economically, 
concerning the employees [...], so it's really important for that, to be here'. The GFP/FEI 
informant, for its part, indicates that success at Brussels level, only can be measured on the 
extent to which more funding possibilities are opened (Interview GFP/FEI 2012). In other 
words, when thinking of benefits generated from European level activities, German interest 
groups tend first and foremost to highlight the economic aspects. This in turn is identified to 
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be a persuasive reason for German interest groups' employment of European channels of 
influence.  
What might seem to be an almost exclusive "realpolitik" approach by German interest groups, 
in terms of perceived returns from European activities, is however somewhat misleading. The 
informant from the DBV for instance, emphasises the need to act smarter at European level. 
'[Brussels is] more the town of compromises than Berlin is. [...] on Berlin level, we know that 
we can speak a little bit louder, a little bit harder, a little bit direct' (Interview by phone DBV 
2012). The need to adapt to the norms of procedure in Brussels seems to be evident. In that 
regard, the BDSI informant notes that one has to be proactive. Emphasis is put on the 
'challenge [...] to see things developing, the consequences, the advantages (Interview BDSI 
2012). Simultaneously, one observes what other actors are doing, in terms of arguments and 
specific activities (Interview BDSI 2012). Consequently, learning effects, in terms of learning 
from one another's behaviour, appear to be present. The perception of gradually more 
advanced methods of operation at European level, might be an expression of path 
dependency. The reason why is that interest groups, by developing their activities toward 
Brussels arguably become increasingly nested into day to day activities at European level. 
According to HI, this 'lock in' of influence channelization becomes increasingly difficult to 
reverse as time moves on.  
With regard to the German food industry, one apparently came to realize that some division of 
labour on EU activity between the three peak organizations was necessary. Hence, the 
arrangement where the BVE, the main organization, focuses on general framework 
conditions, the BLL on law issues, in particular towards the EFSA, and the FEI on research 
and innovation (Interview GFP/FEI 2012, BVE 2013b). Interest group activities toward the 
EU, especially in terms of food policy, thus give the impression of being to some extent 
coordinated. Hence, the observation of benefit from European activities in terms of 
coordination effects.  
Multiple equilibrium – inertia  
The general impression given by Norwegian and German informants, in terms of whether the 
extent of available influence channels has increased or decreased, is more or less concurrent. 
This explains why the presentation of findings is channelized into one section.  
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The general impression is namely that of a gradual increase in influence channels available to 
interest groups. In other words, the observed condition seems to come closest to a state of 
multiple equilibrium. This, in turn, would imply that a process of increasing returns is absent. 
One channel, which has become more important over the years, is the media. As pointed out 
by an informant, 'one might have become more and more conscious on influencing the public 
opinion'
107
 (Interview Norwegian Farmers' Union 2012). In that regard, influence via the 
media appears to become increasingly important. Communication in general, as e.g. in terms 
of communication through social media, is frequently being highlighted by interest groups in 
both Norway and Germany. In other words, informal channels seems to have been subject for 
an increase, whereas the formal ones to a greater extent remain unaltered in numbers 
(Interview Mission of Norway to the EU 2012b). This condition of state is suggested by 
representatives for German veterinarians and farmers too.  
Brussels is said to have been "a wasp's nest" for lobbying for some time (Interview Mission of 
Norway to the EU 2012b). And moreover, the extent of lobbying still seems to be increasing. 
One informant points to the presence of professional lobby bureaus, which take on missions 
toward decision making authorities on behalf of interests (Interview DG SANCO 2012). The 
apparent increase in channels of influence notwithstanding, it might be argued that the interest 
groups under scrutiny make use of a fixed selection of channels, in particular at EU level. 
Contrary to what was highlighted above, this would imply that interest group activity might 
be subject to process of increasing returns after all. Norwegian interest groups who are 
working towards Brussels, channelize their efforts toward their European associations 
(Interviews Norwegian Veterinary Association 2012, Federation of Norwegian Food and 
Drink Industries 2012, Norwegian Farmers' Union 2013). The possible exception being in 
instances where they in addition consult with national experts in the EU Commission 
(Interview Norwegian Farmers' Union 2012). German interest groups are to a greater extent 
working towards both European associations and EU institutions. A major share of these 
direct contacts are conducted with German citizens in the Commission and the European 
Parliament
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 (Interview by phone DBV 2012, Interview BDSI 2012). In other words, a 
greater flexibility in terms of using multiple channels of influence at European level seems to 
be evident in German interest groups' method of operation. One plausible reason is the 
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 whether contact is channelized toward a German citizen however comes with the issue, whether it concerns 
German affairs (phone conversation BDSI 2013).  
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longevity of German interest groups' presence in Brussels. In other words, they might have 
generated more experience in terms of how to employ European channels of influence, than 
what is the case for Norwegian interest groups.  
What furthermore should be noted is the perceived tendency of particular strong firms to 
influence institutions in very different ways. One example being the tobacco industry which 
sometimes appear as single enterprises, as association of farmers producing tobacco, 
enterprises producing packaging etc. (Interview Brussels diplomat 2012). Whereas a 
prominent firm like Orkla make use of its Nordic profile, which seemingly implies that it uses 
its Swedish or Danish profile when talking to the Commission, and its Norwegian profile 
when talking to Norwegian authorities (Interview Mission of Norway to the EU 2012b).  
Institutional density – costs of establishing a trajectory, costs of exit 
'If the FVE had not been invented, we would probably invent it quickly.' (Interview by phone 
BTK 2013). The statement belongs to an informant from the Bundestierärztekammer, and 
gives a good impression of interest groups' evaluation of their presence in Brussels. Neither of 
the informants gave the impression that a future end to European activities was plausible. One 
informant characterized it as a chaos scenario, with the loss of knowledge supply as one 
salient negative effect (interview Federation of Norwegian Food and Drink Industries 2012). 
Another one points to the negative effect on business in the long run (Interview Brussels 
diplomat 2012). Whereas a third informant anticipates a great significance from an eventual 
end of activities at EU level, in terms of the consequent loss of accessible knowledge for 
Norwegian actors (Interview Mission of Norway to the EU 2012a).  
In other words, the need to monitor and influence EU developments in order to promote 
sustainable framework conditions for business, seems to be a persuasive argument for 
continued activities toward Brussels. In fact, a sensible share of the interest group informants 
foresee a greater emphasis on EU level activities in the years to come. Here too, one observes 
a potential expression of increasing returns, in that EU level activity is expected to be 
deepened in the years to come. The Bundestierärztekammer, which is mainly operating at 
domestic level, is currently debating whether it needs to have somebody in their office to look 
more into the EU matters (Interview by phone BTK 2013). One of its motivations is the 
perceived need 'to support the FVE, because they are such a small organization, and [...] 
therefore they can only deal with very few issues' (Interview by phone BTK 2013). The 
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Federation of Norwegian Food, Agriculture and Forestry Enterprises too, which neither has 
exercised a very active approach towards Brussels, is currently considering its engagement 
towards the EU. One possible outcome is 'an enhanced emphasis on contacts with the EU and 
Brussels-system'
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(Interview Norwegian Federation of Food, Agriculture and Forestry 
Enterprises 2012).  
However, the costs related to establishing oneself with an office in Brussels is perceived to be 
considerable. This is perhaps one of the reasons why Norwegian interest groups under 
scrutiny do not have their own offices in Brussels
110
, and rather prefer to travel back and forth 
when there is a meeting. German groups who are present with an office in Brussels, on the 
other hand give the impression that their presence is expected to continue (Interview BDSI, 
GFP/FEI 2012, Interview by phone DBV 2012). If seen in light of Pierson's assumptions, the 
set-up costs related to the establishment of strategic activities in Brussels have been high. 
Hence, the likely continuation of the activity.  
4.3 Multi-level governance  
The Multi-level governance approach is included in the thesis in order to assess whether the 
findings of the analysis, in particular those generated from the HI expectations, correspond 
with an LI or MLG assumption of interest group channelization of strategic efforts. Findings 
in accordance with the MLG perspective would suggest that the policy-making system that 
underpins the EU's agricultural- and food policy is equivalent with a multi-level polity. If so, 
decision-making competence is regarded to be held by both national authorities and EU 
institutions. Consequently, decision-making on agriculture and food policy should occur at 
multiple levels of governance, i.e. the subnational, the national and the supranational level. 
In accordance with what has been highlighted up to now, neither German nor Norwegian 
interest groups seem to exclusively channelize their strategic activities toward national 
authorities. The possible exception being the Federation of Norwegian Food, Agriculture and 
Forestry Enterprises. Attached to the Federation however, are trade organizations representing 
slaughter and meat processing interests, two of which are members of European associations 
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 The Federation of Norwegian Enterprise (NHO) does have an office in Brussels. However, it is rarely being 
used by the Federation of Norwegian Food and Drink Industries (Interview 2012).  
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(Interview by phone Federation of Norwegian Food, Agriculture and Forestry Enterprises 
2013). In other words, although not being directly connected to European arenas itself, a de 
facto indirect presence might be indentified in the participation of its trade organizations. The 
Norwegian Farmers' Union's behaviour seems to come close to the expectation derived from 
LI too, in that they emphasise the need first to influence Norwegian authorities, who then can 
bring farmers' interests forward to the EU (Interview Norwegian Farmers' Union 2012). 
Simultaneously, however, the Farmers' Union participates in COPA-COGECA, the European 
association for farmers and agricultural co-operatives. 
Thus, while keeping in mind the differing scale, what nevertheless can be pointed out is the 
presence, whether to a moderate or great extent, of Norwegian and German interest groups at 
multiple levels of governance. In other words, the observations indentified in the analysis 
seem to come close to the main assumptions of the multi-level governance (MLG) approach. 
There thus seems to be some evidence to suggest that the EU agricultural and food policy-
making system constitutes a multi-level polity. In light of the observations in the HI section, 
what is identified is a persistent presence of German interest groups at European level. The 
German Farmers' Union, DBV, has been member of COPA-COGECA since the late 1950s, or 
early 1960s. The other German interest groups dealt with in the analysis have gradually 
established European channels too. What moreover is observed in the analysis of 
developments in the 1990s and 2000s, is the tendency of German interest groups to establish 
own offices in Brussels. Consequently, a continuous level of operation can be maintained. 
Norwegian interest groups, on the other hand, are not present in Brussels with units of their 
own. Nevertheless, a varying extent of presence at European level is identified. Two of the 
interest groups included in the analysis – the Federation of Norwegian Food and Drink 
Industries and the Norwegian Veterinary Association – seem to have strengthened their 
presence at European level over the recent 10-15 years. The strengthening is manifested in the 
greater emphasis ascribed to activities in their respective European associations. A 
strengthening of European activity equivalent to these two interest groups is not identified in 
the Norwegian Farmers' Union's method of operation.  
A considerable share of the informants have emphasized the increasing importance of the EU, 
in terms of policy-making competences. What furthermore is foreseen is the continuing 
accumulation of competences at EU level. As stated by one of the informants,  
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'I think we have to do more in Brussels, more in Europe, because more and more 
regulation, especially for farmers, is coming from that. And on national level, on regional 
level, [...] we deal with the consequences' (Interview by phone DBV 2012). 
Still, as identified earlier in this chapter, both Norwegian and German interest groups are 
channelizing severe efforts toward national authorities too. In that regard, one could argue that 
the interest groups, in particular the German ones, perceive both national and European 
authorities to be important targets for influence. Which again leads to the assumption that 
'decision-making competencies are shared by actors at different levels' (Hooghe and Marks 
2001: 3). One observes the contrast to a genuine intergovernmental regime, as emphasised by 
LI, in which national authorities control the outcome of policy-making processes. 
Yet another suggestion that framework conditions to some extent resemble the assumptions of 
multi-level governance, is the existence of transnational networks between interest groups 
from different countries. Both the Norwegian Veterinary Association (Interview 2012) and 
the Norwegian Farmers' Union (Interview 2013) have emphasised that coordinative meetings 
between Nordic associations often find place prior to meetings in their respective European 
associations. What these activities seem to indicate is that processes of preference formation 
do not exclusively occur within the national arenas. Thus, rather than being nested, as LI 
would presume, political arenas for preference formation seem to be interconnected (Hooghe 
and Marks 2001: 4). 
4.4 Summary 
The previous section identified the main findings of the analysis in terms of how the interest 
groups operate in order to influence agriculture and food policy-making.  
What furthermore has been subject for focus is the reason why interest groups mobilize on 
issues related to EU agriculture and food policy, and why they channelize strategic efforts as 
they do. With regard to the first aspect, it is argued that the liberal elements of LI constitute a 
sound basis for explaining interest group mobilization. Expectations grounded in the 
assumption that competitive position in domestic and international markets influence 
producer interests' perception of commercial liberalization policies, seem to be confirmed. 
Moreover, the perception of consequences from EU policies as significant or insignificant, put 
differently, certain or ambiguous, do seem to affect levels of mobilization.  
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Expectations derived from HI appear to be better suited to explain the second aspect, i.e. 
interest groups' prioritization of channels of influence. One assumption in this thesis is that 
delegation of policy-making competence from national to European level, and reforms of EU 
agricultural policy, constitute critical junctures in interest groups' method of operation. What 
the findings seem to suggest is that substantial change has not occurred, rather patterns of 
interest groups' channelization of influence seem to be stable. Nevertheless, the analysis of the 
previous two decades identifies a gradual increase in interest groups' presence at European 
level. Hence, the assumption that the suggested junctures have had some effect on interest 
group behaviour. Moreover, regardless of whether the majority of activity is located at 
national or European level, there is some evidence to suggest that increasing returns processes 
contribute to the entrenchment of existing methods of operation.  
If taking into consideration these observations, one might argue that the two theoretical 
approaches, LI and HI, to some extent complement each other. Apparently, the former offers 
explanatory power of interest group mobilization, and the latter, preference for patterns of 
influence channelization.  
Finally, one brief comment on the resource basis of interest groups. Both the analysis of 
German interest groups and Norwegian interest groups suggest that extensive amount of 
manpower is an advantage when operating at national and European level. For instance, 
multiple level presence is not recognized as a challenge by the informant from the DBV 
(interview by phone 2012). The DBV of course represents all German farmers. It is a major 
actor, with extensive manpower. However, observations of other German interest groups, 
such as the GFP and FEI, both of which represent small sectors, may suggest that extensive 
resources is not strictly required for continuous presence at two levels to be maintained 
(Interview GFP/FEI 2012). With regard to the Norwegian observations, the Norwegian 
Veterinary Association, despite of its rather modest manpower – its secretariat amount to ten 
people – still seems to be able to participate at both national and European level (Norwegian 
Veterinary Association 2011: 288). In other words, extensive manpower does not appear to be 




5 Concluding remarks 
This study has been carried out in order to answer the following research question:  
How do agricultural interest groups in Norway and Germany adapt their activities to 
changing institutional structures at national and EU level? How to explain eventual changes 
in interest groups' strategies toward decision making authorities?  
Before summarizing the main findings of the study, what needs to be emphasised is the 
rationale for selecting a Norwegian and a German case in the first place. An analysis of a 
German system of agricultural interest group is expected to generate insight on how EU 
member interest groups channelize their strategic efforts toward EU agriculture and food 
policy. The analysis of a Norwegian system of agricultural interest groups on the other hand, 
is expected to generate insight on how interest groups in EFTA member states, which is part 
of the EU's single market by means of the EEA-agreement, channelize strategic efforts on 
issues related to EU agriculture and food policy. One implication of Norway's formal 
attachment through the EEA-agreement, is that agricultural policy is held outside of the 
system of agreements, whereas food policy is included. Germany as EU member, is integrated 
on both agricultural and food policy.  In light of these observations, differences and 
similarities in agricultural interest group behaviour across the underlying variable, EFTA 
(EEA) - EU member state, ought to be identified. Eventual observations could possibly 
contribute to the debate on the extent to which domestic interest groups' potential for 
influencing EU policy-making processes is utilized. And moreover, whether changes at the 
EU level affect interest group mobilization at the national level. 
5.1 Policy-making systems in process of change 
In chapter three, emphasis was put on the considerable changes in policy-making systems 
since 1990. The presentation identified the implications of consecutive reform processes at 
EU level, in terms of its agriculture and food policies. With regard to the former, income 
support mechanisms have replaced previous price-level support mechanisms. Moreover, the 
introduction of de-coupling has made the payment of CAP subsidies contingent on farmers 
meeting additional standards, in terms of food safety etc. And last, but not least, the Lisbon 
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Treaty, 2009, introduced the co-decision procedure on CAP. Thus, the European Parliament is 
now to decide EU agricultural policy on equal terms as the Council.  
The changes in EU food policy since the mid-1990s have undeniably been considerable. From 
constituting primarily an ad hoc approach, food policy now amount to one of the most 
important policy areas in the EU. One implication of this enhancement in importance has 
been the transfer of policy making competence from national to EU level. A considerable 
share of food policy-making, including risk management, now occurs in the Commission's 
DG SANCO. Moreover, risk assessment is being carried out by the EFSA. Yet another 
innovation is the "from farm to fork" approach, which implies that EU food policy is to apply 
to all activities in the food production chain.  
Changes at the EU level seem to affect political developments at national level too. Norway, 
while not being an EU member state, still is committed to EU food policy arrangements 
through the EEA-agreement. Consequently, a contrasting picture emerges, in which Norway 
in terms of food policy, is almost completely integrated in the EU framework, whereas on 
agricultural policy she is not. Hence, the situation where agricultural actors, i.e. farmers and 
food producers, are protected from the EU's common agricultural market by high tariff 
barriers. Whereas on food policy, the Norwegian system appears to become increasingly 
similar to the system developed by the EU. One illustration being its accommodation to the 
EU's General Food Law. With regard to processes of agricultural policy making, one 
furthermore observes the persistence of the Norwegian General Agreement. By means of this 
arrangement, farm interest have the right to participate in annual negotiations with state 
authorities on future policy objectives. 
Germany of course is full member of the EU. Consequently, both the EU's agricultural policy 
and food policy apply to German actors. With reference to the traditional close bonds between 
Norwegian agricultural interests and Norwegian authorities, similar patterns are identified in 
Germany too. The German Farmers' Union, DBV, was for some time the single speaking tube 
for German farmers' toward federal authorities. Although more agricultural interest groups 
gradually have emerged, the DBV holds close contact with national authorities in the present 
as well. However, the agricultural turning point in 2001 has brought perceptible change to the 
German political system, both in terms of agricultural policy and food policy. A consequent 
strengthening of policies' consumer profile seems to have contributed to a situation, whereby 
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agricultural and food policy making attract greater interest from the society in general. In 
other words, the number of stakeholders has seemingly increased.  
5.2 Interest group behaviour in change too?  
Three theoretical approaches have been made use of in order to analyse the influence 
channelization by agricultural interest groups in Norway and Germany. First, liberal 
intergovernmentalism which emphasises interest groups' perception of costs and/or benefits, 
i.e. issue salience, when explaining why they mobilize politically. Moreover, as the EU is 
anticipated to be an intergovernmental regime, LI assumes interest group activity mainly to be 
channelized toward national authorities. Second, historical institutionalism emphasise the 
presence of critical junctures, and processes of increasing returns when explaining interest 
groups' employment of channels of influence. In other words, if substantial change
111
 is 
observed, this might be explained by the occurrence of a critical juncture. Moreover, if the 
employment of influence channels has remained unchanged, this might be explained by the 
occurrence of 'lock in' processes, i.e. increasing returns. Third, multi-level governance has 
been employed as an alternative approach to LI's anticipation of the EU political system. In 
other words, interest group activity at both domestic and European level is understood be an 
expression of the multi-level character of the EU polity. This furthermore would imply that 
decision making competence on agricultural and food policy is shared by multiple actors, 
including national authorities and the EU.    
With regard to the findings in the analysis, some aspects in particular stand out. First, in terms 
of how agricultural interest groups adapt their activities to changing institutional structures at 
national and EU level, multi-level governance seems to offer the greater explanatory power. 
What the findings in chapter four suggest is a prevailing presence of domestic interest groups 
at multiple levels of governance. Norwegian interest groups, on issues related to agricultural 
and food policy, channelize a considerable share of their strategic efforts toward national 
authorities. In terms of agricultural policy, this behaviour is of course a natural consequence 
of the matter of fact that the majority of policy making competence is located at national 
level. On food policy, where Norway is integrated in the EU's framework, interest group 
activity is channelized toward European associations of interest groups too. Of the four 
Norwegian groups chosen for study, channelization of activity toward European associations 
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seems to be pursued most actively by the Federation of Norwegian Food and Drink Industries 
and the Norwegian Veterinary Association. What furthermore is identified, is that Norwegian 
interest groups do not seem to use channels toward EU institutions very frequently.   
All German interest groups included in this study to some extent channelize activity toward 
multiple levels of governance. Furthermore, what stands out, if compared with the Norwegian 
observations, is German interest groups continuous presence in Brussels. From offices in 
Germany and Brussels, they are channelizing efforts toward both European associations and 
directly toward EU institutions. With regard to the latter, the greater presence of German 
officials in EU institutions is assumed to be helpful in establishing direct contact between 
institutions and interest groups. Nevertheless, one observes a European approach by German 
interest groups, which to a greater extent is flexible in terms of selecting channel of influence.  
These findings are assumed to be an expression of the multi-level character of the EU. It 
seems plausible to expect interest group activity to be present wherever decision-making 
competence is located. Hence, the presence of agricultural interest groups at both national and 
European level. 
Second, with reference to the last part of the research question – how to explain eventual 
changes in interest groups' strategies toward decision making authorities – both liberal 
intergovernmentalism and historical institutionalism offer some extent of explanatory power. 
The liberal component of LI – the emphasis on interest groups' cost/benefit perceptions from 
EU policy-making, i.e. issue salience – to some extent seem to explain why interest groups 
mobilize politically. As both EU agricultural policy and food policy contain elements of 
commercial liberalization, amendments in one or the other direction are expected to impose 
costs and/or benefits on individual producers. Furthermore, the competitive position in 
domestic and international markets is assumed to influence individual producers' perception 
of new policies as positive or negative for business. What the analysis moreover seems to 
suggest is that costs and/or benefits need to be perceived of as 'certain, significant and risky' 
in order for interest groups to mobilize politically. 
The third main observation in the analysis is the apparent continuity in interest groups' 
prioritization of channels of influence. With regard to HI's emphasis on critical juncture, two 
events were highlighted as plausible junctures in interest group patterns of behaviour; the 
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delegation of decision making competence from national to EU level and the completion of 
major EU CAP reform. What the findings seem to suggest is that neither of these have 
constituted critical junctures in Norwegian and German agricultural interest groups' behaviour 
since 1990. With regard to the Norwegian case, on which an analysis of post-1990 historical 
developments of interest groups have been undertaken, some extent of presence at European 
and national level is identified at least from the early 1990s. With reference to the critical 
juncture assumptions, no radical change in interest groups' selection of influence channel is 
identified.  However, what is identified is a gradual increase in Norwegian interest groups 
European presence, in particular by the ones who from the outset seemed to emphasise the 
importance of maintaining/establishing contact with European level actors.  
With regard to the German findings, one need to keep in mind the somewhat limited basis for 
analysis, as written material has been more difficult to get hold of. Nevertheless, the German 
interest groups who were subject for analysis, appear to have held some kind of presence at 
European level for considerable time. Here too, however, one identifies a strengthened 
presence in Brussels during the historical period subject for analysis. All interest groups, 
except for one, have established offices in Brussels. In other words, although the suggested 
critical junctures do not seem to have generated substantial change in German interest groups' 
channelization of strategic activities, one observes an expansion in terms of the employment 
of European channels. Moreover, the channelization of strategic efforts on issues related to 
EU agricultural policy seems to have changed in the aftermath of the Lisbon Treaty. One 
informant from the German Farmers' Union, DBV, notes that the European Parliament has 
become an ever more important target for strategic activities. Thus, although not having 
constituted critical junctures in interest group behaviour, one nevertheless observes some 
contribution by the suggested events to interest groups' enhanced presence at European level. 
In the analysis, Pierson's conception of increasing returns processes is identified as one 
plausible approach in terms of how to explain eventual continuity in the interest groups' 
employment of channels of influence. There indeed seems to be some evidence to suggest that 
participation in activities at European level generates positive feed-back for the actors whose 
interests are represented by these interest groups. In that regard, what is highlighted is 
German interest groups' tendency to, first and foremost, emphasise economic aspects, whereas 
Norwegian interest groups tend to emphasise the knowledge/learning aspects. This might 
suggest that EU agriculture and food policy-making has a greater direct effect on German 
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actors, in terms of economic costs/benefits. However, knowledge and learning aspects could 
be translated into economic benefits too, as business get to prepare for what is coming from 
Brussels. In fact, there seems to be a prevailing expectancy of EU agriculture and food policy-
making to become ever more important in the years to come.  
5.3 Suggestions for further research 
This study applies liberal intergovernmalism (LI) and historical instititutionalism (HI) theory 
in order to approach the research question. Moreover, multi-level governance (MLG) is 
included as a means to assess whether findings correspond to the framework condition 
characteristics as set out in LI or MLG. The theoretical approach appears to be useful for 
analyses of interest groups' strategic behaviour, in particular if the topic chosen for study 
touches upon EU policies. On the one hand, MLG and LI offer two seemingly distinct 
expectations of how interest groups operate, in terms of channelization of strategic efforts. On 
the other hand, LI and HI variables both seem to offer some explanatory power of why 
interest groups act as they do. That being said, one ought to keep in mind that interest group 
behaviour, in terms of interest channelization, might plausibly be explained by other 
theoretical approaches too. The continued accumulation of research on similar topics, 
however, by means of different theoretical approaches and methods, is undoubtedly believed 
to strengthen our basis for explanation.  
With regard to the research undertaken in this thesis, in particular one aspect is recognized as 
promising for further research, namely the inclusion of the retail segment in the analysis. In 
light of the ongoing discussion on the balance of power in the food chain, it is indeed 
regrettable that the third segment, retail, was left out of the analysis. By including this latter 
group, and the interest groups of which, one possibly would achieve greater insight on the 
Norwegian and German food production chain as a whole. With reference to the apparent 
shift in balance of power to the advantage of the retail segment (Norwegian Ministry of 
Agriculture and Food 2011b), one might observe greater and more diverse levels of retail 
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Appendix nr. 1: Interview guide for 
Norwegian interest group representatives 
Introduksjon: 
- Tema for avhandlingen  
- Informere informant om hans / hennes betydning for prosjektet 
- Forsikre informanten at informasjonen han eller hun gir, vil bli behandlet i tråd 
med forskningsetiske prinsipper, og at han eller hun vil forbli anonym. (spør også 
om han ønsker å forbli anonym, eller om det er greit at sitater benyttes i oppgaven) 
Bakgrunnsinformasjon: 
- Nøkkelinformasjon om interessegruppe – hvem den representerer, dets posisjon / 
funksjon på nasjonalt/overnasjonalt nivå.  
- Informantens posisjon, funksjon og oppgaver i interessegruppen 
- Hvor lenge?  
- Fulltid/deltid? 
- Tidligere relevante posisjoner 
Spørsmål basert på Liberal intergovernmentalisme 
- Hvilke problemstillinger/saker innenfor EUs CAP og matpolitikk er av størst 
interesse for din/deres organisasjon? Hva er din/deres posisjon på disse sakene? 
- Hvor ofte er du i kontakt med nasjonale statlige myndigheter på disse sakene? 
o Hvilke deler av det nasjonale byråkratiet? 
o På hvilke saker henvender dere dere til nasjonale myndigheter for å utøve 
innflytelse? (på det landbruks- og matpolitiske området) 
o På hvilke saker velger dere å kanalisere deres innsats, for å påvirke 
prosesser, gjennom EU-nivå?  
 I hvilken grad vil du si deg enig i påstanden om at "type kontakt 
(nasjonal / overnasjonal) avhenger av type saker? Hvis informant er 
enig; kan han/hun identifisere skillet? 
o Hvor godt posisjonert anser du din organisasjon å være, med tanke på å få 
tilgang til nasjonale myndigheter? Hvor nært er samspillet? 
 Formalisert kontakt (gjennom faste møtearenaer/komiteer) eller mer 
uformell kontakt?  
Engasjement i politiske beslutningsprosesser på inter-/overnasjonalt nivå 
- Hva er din erfaring/inntrykk med/av koordineringen av nasjonale preferanser på/-
tvers av forskjellige nivåer, i forkant av møter i EU? 
 mellom interessegrupper 
 mellom offentlige myndigheter (departementer, direktorater etc.) 
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 mellom stat og interessegruppe 
- Opplever du en koordinering av preferanser mellom stat og interessegrupper under 
politiske prosesser / forhandlinger på EU-nivå? 
Det politiske saksområdets i øyenfallenhet: 
- Er landbruks- og matpolitikk generelt ansett for å være konfliktutsatte saksområder 
i det norske/tyske samfunnet? 
- Hvilke saksområder innenfor den landbruks - og matpolitiske sektor anser du for å 
være spesielt konflikt genererende? (med mye interessemotsetninger) 
- Er det områder som ikke genererer konflikter og uenighet? 
- Har du et inntrykk av hvordan fordelingen av nasjonale interessegrupper som 
sikter mot innflytelse på nasjonale myndigheter i landbruks- og matpolitiske saker 
er? (utvalg av næringslivs- /ikke-økonomiske interesser som er involvert - antall 
grupper til stede) 
- Observerer du variasjon i interessegruppers / private aktørers tilstedeværelse/grad 
av mobilisering (omtrentlig antall aktører) ut fra hvilke saksområder som er oppe 
til diskusjon? (f.eks utelukkende landbruks-/mat politiske saker) 
- Hvilke interessegrupper ser du på som deres konkurrenter i "kampen for 
innflytelse"? 
- Sakskopling med andre interessegrupper som representerer ulike segmenter i 
samfunnet (alliansebygging), eller "lukket"/sektorisert interesseaggregering med 
aktører som representerer overlappende interesser? 
- CAP og EUs matpolitikk, fordel eller ulempe for deres medlemmer? 
Spørsmål basert på Multi-level governance 
- Hvilken autoritet oppfatter du som å være det viktigste målet for innflytelse? 
o EU (direkte kontakt og  / eller via euro-gruppe) 
o Nasjonale myndigheter (indirekte kobling til EU) 
- Er din organisasjon tilstedeværende på europeisk nivå? Siden når? 
- Hvis ja, kan du fortelle meg mer spesifikt hvordan? 
o I hvilken organisasjon(er)/arena(er) er dere tilstedeværende/ involvert? 
o Hvilken medlemskapsstatus har dere i organisasjonen(e)? Hva er 
implikasjonene av denne statusen? 
o Hvordan er beslutningsregelen i eurogruppen? Konsensus? Er det en 
effektiv arena for påvirking? 
o Er din organisasjon i direkte kontakt med EU organer/representanter? 
 Hvis ja, hvilke EU-institusjoner representerer de? 
- Hvor mye verdsetter din organisasjon resultatene fra aktiviteter på europeisk nivå, 
sammenlignet med resultatene fra deres aktiviteter på nasjonalt nivå? 
o Opptrer dere på forskjellig måte når det kommer til å påvirke politiske 




 Tatt i betraktning ulike rammebetingelser for påvirkningsarbeid 
(direkte/indirekte, oppstrøm/nedstrøm) 
o Kan du nevne et eksempel på en vellykket tilnærming fra deres side som er 
blitt oppnådd på EU-nivå? 
- Når du tar i betraktning den totale størrelsen på organisasjonen, i form av 
arbeidskraft, kompetanse, økonomi osv., hvor mye ressurser er viet til EU-relaterte 
aktiviteter? 
o Har din organisasjon enheter som utelukkende jobber med EU-relaterte 
saker? 
o Har dere en permanent representasjon til EU? 
- Er det utfordringer knyttet til å være tilstede både på nasjonalt og europeisk nivå 
som du vil peke på? Kan du nevne noen konkrete eksempler? 
Spørsmål basert på historisk institusjonalisme 
- Dersom en legger til grunn en forståelse av strategi som valg av innflytelses 
kanal(er), hva har vært denne organisasjonens tradisjonelle tilnærmingen? 
(Hvordan har dere gått frem?) 
- Har det vært noen vesentlige endringer i strategiske disposisjoner opp gjennom 
årene? 
- Eventuelt nye organisatoriske endringer for bedre å kunne forfølge strategiske 
mål?  
- Hvis ja, kan du peke på noen spesielle hendelser i tid, som har medvirket til 
endringer i organisasjons strategiske disposisjoner/apparat? (f.eks; styrket 
tilstedeværelse på EU / nasjonalt nivå, koordinering med andre aktører etc.) 
Multippelt ekvilibrium/inertia: 
- Med tanke på omfanget av tilgjengelige innflytelseskanaler overfor nasjonale 
myndigheter og EU, vil du si at dette har utvidet (større) eller innsnevret (mindre) 
seg siden den gang? (alternativt siden midten av 90-tallet) (NB; få informasjon om 
omfanget mot nasjonale myndigheter og EU, separat) 
Feed back: 
o Spesifiser kapasitet: enten i form av materielle evner (nye lokasjoner, 
enheter), økonomisk vinning, teknologisk utvikling, organisatoriske evner 
(rekruttering av nye medarbeidere og ny kompetanse), idémessig (læring, 
erfaring)  
- I hvilken grad har aktiviteter utledet fra deres strategier generert (tilført) nye 
kapasiteter i deres organisasjon?  
o Hva er ditt generelle inntrykk av tilførselen av nye kapasiteter gjennom de 
siste 10-15 årene? 
- Blir kostnader (i form av tapte inntekter etc.) også generert? Hvis ja, hvilke? Hvor 
følsomme er elementene i deres strategier for eventuelle kostnader? 
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Forventninger om tilpasning: 
- Ved utformingen av nye strategier, i hvilken grad blir de strategiske disposisjonene 
- hvis kjent – hos deres "konkurrenter" tatt i betraktning? (tilpasning til andres 
virkemåte) 
Institusjonell robusthet (målt ved de estimerte kostnadene ved exit): 
- Hvis dere hadde droppet deres tilstedeværelse/engasjement på nasjonalt eller 
overnasjonalt nivå, hva ville konsekvensene for organisasjonen og dens 
medlemmer blitt? 
- Anser du et slikt scenario som plausibelt? 
 Oppsummering: 
- Avklaringer 
- Oppmuntre informant til å tilføye informasjon han / hun anser for å være relevant, 





Appendix nr. 2: Interview guide for 
Norwegian diplomats 
Introduksjon: 
- Tema for avhandlingen  
- Informere informant om hans / hennes betydning for prosjektet 
- Forsikre informanten at informasjonen han eller hun gir, vil bli behandlet i tråd 
med forskningsetiske prinsipper, og at han eller hun vil forbli anonym. (spør også 
om han ønsker å forbli anonym, eller om det er greit at sitater benyttes i oppgaven) 
Bakgrunnsinformasjon: 
- Nøkkelinformasjon om delegasjonen – hvem den representerer, dets funksjon på 
nasjonalt/overnasjonalt nivå.  
- Informantens posisjon, funksjon og oppgaver på delegasjonen. 
- Hvor lenge?  
- Fulltid/deltid? 
- Tidligere relevante posisjoner 
Spesifiser; med interessegrupper menes her nasjonale interessegrupper med tilknytning til 
landbruks- og matsektoren. 
Spørsmål basert på Liberal intergovernmentalisme 
- Hvilke saker innenfor EUs CAP og matpolitikk er av størst interesse for Norge? 
Hva er Norges posisjon på disse sakene? 
- Hvor ofte blir delegasjonen kontaktet av nasjonale interessegrupper i forbindelse 
med CAP og matpolitikk? 
o Hvilke interessegrupper er det som henvender seg til dere? 
o Hvilke saker er norske interessegrupper opptatt av når de henvender seg til 
dere? 
o Hvilke ”tjenester” er det de er ute etter? (Informasjon, påvirkning – i form 
av at delegasjonen tar saken videre til EU, annet) 
- Hvor godt posisjonert anser du Norge å være, med tanke på å få tilgang til, og 
påvirke, EU i spørsmål som angår landbruks- og matpolitikk? (må nødvendigvis 
utformes annerledes for Tyskland) 
o Hvilke EU institusjoner er dere oftest i kontakt med på disse spørsmålene? 
/Er der institusjoner dere gjerne skulle hatt mer kontakt med? 
o Hvor mottakelige er de respektive institusjonene for norske synspunkter? 
o Eventuelt andre kanaler som anvendes/er tilgjengelige? 
Engasjement i politiske beslutningsprosesser på inter-/overnasjonalt nivå: 
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- Hva er din erfaring med koordineringen av nasjonale preferanser på/-tvers av 
forskjellige nivåer, i forkant av møter på EU-nivå? 
 mellom interessegrupper 
 mellom offentlige myndigheter (departementer, direktorater etc.) 
 mellom stat og interessegruppe 
- Opplever du en koordinering av preferanser mellom stat og interessegrupper under 
politiske prosesser / forhandlinger på EU-nivå? 
Det politiske saksområdets i øyenfallenhet: 
- Er landbruks- og matpolitikk generelt ansett for å være konfliktutsatte saksområder 
i Norge? 
- Hvilke saksområder innenfor den landbruks - og matpolitiske sektor anser du for å 
være spesielt konflikt genererende? (med mye interessemotsetninger) 
- Er det områder som ikke genererer konflikter og uenighet? 
- Har du et inntrykk av hvordan fordelingen av nasjonale interessegrupper som 
ønsker innflytelse på nasjonale myndigheter i landbruks- og matpolitiske saker er? 
(utvalg av økonomiske /ikke-økonomiske interesser som er involvert) 
- Hvilke motstridende interesser kommer til syne i ”konkurransen om innflytelse”. 
Hvilke interessegrupper står som regel ”mot hverandre”?  
- Observerer du variasjon i interessegruppers tilstedeværelse/grad av mobilisering ut 
fra hvilke saksområder som er oppe til diskusjon? (for eksempel utelukkende 
landbruks-/mat politiske saker) 
- CAP og EUs matpolitikk, fordel eller ulempe for Norge? 
Spørsmål basert på Multi-level governance 
- Hvilket inntrykk har du av norske interessegruppers tilstedeværelse på EU-nivå? 
o Hvilke sektorer/organisasjoner innenfor norsk landbruks- og matsektor 
fremstår som mest aktive på EU-nivå etter ditt syn?  
o Hvilke er i større grad fraværende? 
- Hva er inntrykket ditt av norske interessegruppers opptreden her i Brüssel? 
o Hvilke arenaer søker de seg mot? Spesifisering: Europeiske 
fellesorganisasjoner – direkte forbindelser med EU institusjoner. 
o Opplever du en forskjell mellom norske interessegruppers opptreden i 
Brüssel og i Norge? 
 Tatt i betraktning ulike rammebetingelser for påvirkningsarbeid 
(direkte/indirekte, oppstrøm/nedstrøm) 
- Kjenner du til eksempler på vellykkede tilnærminger på EU-nivå fra norske 
interessegrupper? 
- Er det utfordringer knyttet til å være tilstede både på nasjonalt og europeisk nivå 
som du vil peke på? Kan du nevne noen konkrete eksempler? 
Spørsmål basert på historisk institusjonalisme 
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- Dersom en legger til grunn en forståelse av strategi som valg av innflytelses 
kanal(er), hva har vært norske interessegruppers tradisjonelle tilnærming?  
- Har du observert noen vesentlige endringer i norske interessegruppers strategiske 
disposisjoner opp gjennom årene? 
- Hvor lenge har norske interessegrupper vært tilstede/aktive på EU-nivå?  
o Sett i et historisk perspektiv på 10-15 år, vil du si at deres tilstedeværelse 
har vært tiltakende eller forholdsvis stabil, evt. synkende?  
- Er det spesifikke hendelser i tid, som du tror kan ha medvirket til at norske 
interessegrupper har endret sine strategiske disposisjoner? (underforstått; styrket 
sin tilstedeværelse på EU, eventuelt andre elementer) 
Multippelt ekvilibrium/inertia: 
- Med tanke på omfanget av tilgjengelige innflytelseskanaler for nasjonale 
interessegrupper overfor 1) nasjonale myndigheter og 2) EU, vil du si at dette har 
blitt større eller mindre siden den gang / evt. siste 10-15 årene. (NB; få 
informasjon om omfanget mot nasjonale myndigheter og EU, separat) 
Feed back: 
o Spesifiser kapasitet: enten i form av materielle evner (nye lokasjoner, 
enheter), økonomisk vinning, teknologisk utvikling, organisatoriske evner 
(rekruttering av nye medarbeidere og ny kompetanse), idémessig (læring, 
erfaring)  
- Hvilket utbytte anslår du at norske interessegrupper har av å være tilstede på EU-
nivå? 
o Spesifiser: utbytte forstått som tilførsel av kapasiteter til organisasjonen.  
- Blir kostnader (i form av tapte inntekter etc.) også generert? Hvis ja, hvilke?  
Forventninger om tilpasning: 
- Observerer du stor grad av likhet i hvordan interessegrupper opptrer på EU-
/nasjonalt nivå? Eller er det store variasjoner? 
Institusjonell robusthet: 
- Dersom norske interessegrupper valgte å oppgi sin tilstedeværelse på EU-nivå, 
hvilke konsekvenser ville det hatt for organisasjonene og deres medlemmer? 
- Anser du et slikt scenario som plausibelt? 
 Oppsummering: 
- Avklaringer 
- Oppmuntre informant til å tilføye informasjon han / hun anser for å være relevant, 




Appendix nr. 3: Interview guide for 
German interest group representatives 
Introduction: 
- The topic of the thesis 
- Inform the informant about his/her importance for the project 
- Assure the informant that the information he or she provides will be treated in line 
with research ethical principles, and that he or she will remain anonymous.  
Background information: 
- Key information about interest group – who is it representing, its’ function at 
domestic/supranational level.  
- Informant’s position, functioning, tasks in the interest group 
- For how long?  
- Full time/part time?  
- Earlier positions of relevance 
Questions grounded on Liberal intergovernmentalism  
- What issues within the EU CAP and Food Policy are of most interest to your 
organization? What is your position on these issues? 
- How frequent are you in contact with national state authorities on these matters? 
o Which parts of the national bureaucracy? 
o On what issues do you interact with national authorities in order to exert 
influence? 
o On what issues do you choose to channelize your influence efforts at EU 
level?  
 To what extent do you agree with the assertion that “type of contact 
depends on type of issues? If informant agrees; can he/she identify 
the dividend?   
- How well positioned do you consider your organization to be, in terms of getting 
access to national authorities? How close is the interaction?  
Involvement in policy making processes at inter-/supranational level: 
- What is your experience/impression with the co-ordination of national preferences 
at various levels prior to meetings in the EU? 
 between interest groups 
 between public authorities (ministries, directorates etc.)  
 between state and interest group 
- Do you experience co-ordination of preferences/positions between state and 
interest groups in during policy making processes/negotiations at EU level?  
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Salience of policy issue: 
- Are agriculture- and food policies in general considered being conflict prone issue 
areas in the German society? 
- What issue areas within the agricultural and food policy sector do you consider to 
be particularly conflict/dispute generating?  
- Are there issue areas which do not generate conflict/controversy? 
- Do you have an impression of the distribution of domestic interest groups (range of 
business/non-business interests involved) seeking influence on national authorities 
on agricultural and food policy matters?  
- Do you observe any variation in interest group mobilization depending on what 
issue area is in the spotlight? (e.g. exclusively agricultural- / food policy issues) 
- Which interest groups do you look upon as being your competitors in the “struggle 
for influence”? 
- Issue linkage with multiple interest groups representing different segments in 
society, or “closed”/sectorized interest aggregation with actors representing 
overlapping interests?   
- CAP and the EU’s Food policy, advantage or disadvantage for your members?  
Questions grounded on Multi-level governance  
- Which authority do you perceive to be the most important target for influence?  
o The EU (direct interaction and/or via euro-group) 
o National authorities (the indirect linkage to EU)  
- Is your organization present at European level? Since when? 
- If yes, can you tell me more specifically how? 
o In which organization(s)/arenas are you present/involved? 
o What is your membership status in the organization(s)? 
 What are the implications of this status? 
o Is your organization in direct contact with EU representatives? 
 If yes, which EU institutions do they represent?  
- How much does your organization value the outcome from activities at European 
level, when compared to the outcomes from your activities at domestic level? 
o Is there a difference in your organization’s appearance/occurrence when 
seeking influence on policy processes at EU level (euro group included), 
and policy processes at national level? (different framework conditions..) 
- Could you mention an example of a successful approach accomplished by your 
organization at EU level? 
- When taking into consideration the overall size of your organization, in terms of 
manpower, expertise, financial strength etc., how many resources is devoted to EU 
related activities?  
o Does your organization have unit(s) specially assigned to EU related 
issues?  
o Do you have a permanent representation to the EU? 
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- Are there challenges related to being present at both national and European level 
which you would like to point to? Any concrete examples? 
Questions grounded on Historical institutionalism 
- When applying an understanding of strategy as the deliberate selection of influence 
channel(s), what has been your organization’s traditional approach? (How have 
you proceeded?) 
- Have there been any major shifts in strategic dispositions over the years?  
- Any new organizational amendments in order to better pursue strategic goals?  
- Are there specific events in time, which you would say have contributed to 
changes in the strategic dispositions of your organization? (example, strengthened 
presence at EU- level, domestic level, coordination with other actors etc.) 
Multiple equilibrium/inertia: 
- In terms of the scope of accessible influence channels toward 1) national 
authorities and 2) the EU, would you say that is has widened or narrowed since 
then / alt. the last 10-15 years? (NB; get info on scope toward national authorities 
and EU, separately) 
Feed back: 
Specify: whether in terms of material capabilities (new locations, units), economic 
income, technological advancement, organizational capabilities (recruitment of new 
staff and henceforth new expertise), ideational (learning, experience)  
- To what extent do activities derived from your strategies generate/supply your 
organization with capabilities? 
o What is your general impression of the supply of capabilities to your 
organization over the last 10-15 years?  
- Are costs (in terms of loss of revenue etc.) being generated as well? If yes, which? 
How sensitive are the elements of your strategy to these costs?  
Adaptive expectations: 
- When formulating new strategic packages, to what extent are the strategic choices 
– if known – of your ‘competitors’/other actors taken into account?  
Institutional stickiness (measured by the estimated costs of exit): 
- If you were to drop your presence at 1) domestic or 2) supranational level, what 
would the anticipated consequences for your organization and its members be like? 





- Encourage informant to add information he/she regards to be relevant, alternatively 
topics/questions that he/she feels I have paid little attention to.  
- Any literature/informants on the German agriculture and food policy sector which 
you would recommend me to contact? 
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Appendix nr. 4: Interview guide for 
Brussels diplomat 
Introduction: 
- The topic of the thesis 
- Inform the informant about his/her importance for the project 
- Assure the informant that the information he or she provides will be treated in line 
with research ethical principles, and that he or she will remain anonymous.  
Background information: 
- Key information about the agency to which the informant belongs – who is it 
representing, its function at domestic and supranational level.  
- Informant’s position, functioning, tasks in the agency 
- For how long?  
- Full time/part time?  
- Earlier positions of relevance 
Specification; When referring to German interest groups, I refer to the ones who are attached 
to the agriculture- and food sector.  
Questions grounded on Liberal intergovernmentalism  
- What issues within the EU CAP and Food Policy are of most interest to Germany? 
What is Germany’s position on these issues? 
- How often is the agency being contacted by national interest groups on issues 
related to the CAP and EU Food policy? 
o Which interest groups is it that contacts you? 
o What issues are German interest groups occupied with when they contact 
you? 
o What “services” do they request for? (information – influence in terms of 
making their voice heard in decision making arenas in the EU)  
- How well positioned do you consider Germany to be, in terms of influencing the 
EU on issues related to its Common agriculture and Food policy? 
o In which agriculture and food policy decision making arenas/bodies are 
German authorities present? Which parts of the German authority are 
present? 
o Are there agriculture and food policy arenas at EU level to which you 
experience a lesser degree of access? 
o How receptive are EU Agriculture- and Food policy institutions to German 
points of view? 
Involvement in policy making processes at inter-/supranational level: 
152 
 
- What is your experience with the co-ordination of national preferences at various 
levels prior to meetings in the EU? 
 between interest groups 
 between public authorities (ministries, directorates etc.)  
 between state and interest group 
- Do you experience co-ordination of preferences/positions between state and 
interest groups in during policy making processes/negotiations at EU level?  
Salience of policy issue:  
- Are agricultural and food policies in general considered being conflict prone issue 
areas in the German society? 
- What issue areas within the agricultural and food policy sector do you consider to 
be particularly conflict generating?  
- Are there issue areas which do not generate conflict/controversy? 
- Do you have an impression of the distribution of domestic interest groups (range of 
business/non-business interests involved) seeking influence on national authorities 
in agricultural and food policy matters?  
- Which contradictory interests do appear in the German “competition for 
influence”? Which interest groups appear to embody these contradictory interests?   
- Do you observe any variation in interest group mobilization depending on what 
issue area is in the spotlight? (e.g. exclusively agricultural- / food policy issues) 
- CAP and the EU’s Food policy, advantage or disadvantage for your members?  
Questions grounded on Multi-level governance  
- Which authority do you perceive to be most influential on German agriculture- and 
food policy? 
o The EU  
o The Federal authorities 
o The Federated states / Länder 
- What is your impression of German interest groups’ presence at EU-level? 
o Which sectors/organizations within the German agriculture- and food 
sector stand out as most active at EU-level in your opinion? 
o Which sectors/organizations stand out as less active? 
- What is your impression with German interest groups’ appearance here in 
Brussels? 
o Towards which arenas do they orientate? (Specification; eurogroups or 
direct relations with EU institutions) 
o Do you observe a difference in German interest groups’ appearance in 
Brussels and in Germany/Berlin? (different framework conditions..) 
- Do you know examples of successful approaches made by German interest groups 
at EU level? 
- Are there challenges associated with being present at both national and European 
level which you would like to point to? Any concrete examples? 
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Questions grounded on Historical institutionalism 
- When applying an understanding of strategy as the deliberate selection of influence 
channel(s), what has been German interest groups ‘traditional approach?  
- Have you observed any major shifts in German interest groups’ strategic 
dispositions over the years?  
- For how long have German interest groups been present at EU-level? 
o When seen in an historical perspective of 10-15 years, would you say that 
their presence has increased, decreased or stabilized? 
- Are there specific events in time, which you would say have contributed to 
changes in the strategic dispositions of German interest groups? (example, 
strengthened presence at EU- level, etc.)  
Multiple equilibrium/inertia: 
- In terms of the scope of influence channels, available to German interest groups, 
toward 1) national authorities and 2) the EU, would you say that is has widened or 
narrowed since then / alt. the last 10-15 years? (NB; get info on scope toward 
national authorities and EU, separately) 
Feed back: 
- What benefit/return do you reckon/consider German interest groups to have from 
being present at EU-level? 
o  Specify; benefit understood as the supply of capabilities to the 
organization; whether in terms of material capabilities (new locations, 
units), economic income, technological advancement, organizational 
capabilities (recruitment of new staff and henceforth new expertise), 
ideational (learning, experience)  
- Are costs (in terms of loss of revenue etc.) being generated as well? If yes, which? 
Adaptive expectations:  
- Do you observe a great extent of conformity in terms of how German interest 
groups appear at EU-/national level? Or is there considerable variance.  
Institutional stickiness (measured by the estimated costs of exit): 
- If German interest groups were to drop their presence at EU level, what would the 
anticipated consequences for the organizations and their members be like? 
- Do you render the above described scenario plausible?  
Sum up: 
- Clarifications 
- Encourage informant to add information he/she regards to be relevant, alternatively 
topics/questions that he/she feels I have paid little attention to.  
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- Any literature/informants on the German agriculture and food policy sector which 
you would recommend me to contact? 
 
 
